C.F.R. » Title 28 » CHAPTER I—DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE › PART 51—PROCEDURES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, AS AMENDED › Subpart A—General Provisions

28 C.F.R. § 51.18

Federal court-ordered changes

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(a) In general. Changes affecting voting for which approval by a Federal court is required, or that are ordered by a Federal court, are exempt from section 5 review only where the Federal court prepared the change and the change has not been subsequently adopted or modified by the relevant governmental body. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981). (See also § 51.22.)

(b) Subsequent changes. Where a Federal court-ordered change is not itself subject to the preclearance requirement, subsequent changes necessitated by the court order but decided upon by the jurisdiction remain subject to preclearance. For example, voting precinct and polling changes made necessary by a court-ordered redistricting plan are subject to section 5 review.

(c) Alteration in section 5 status. Where a Federal court-ordered change at its inception is not subject to review under section 5, a subsequent action by the submitting authority demonstrating that the change reflects its policy choices (e.g., adoption or ratification of the change, or implementation in a manner not explicitly authorized by the court) will render the change subject to review under section 5 with regard to any future implementation.

(d) In emergencies. A Federal court's authorization of the emergency interim use without preclearance of a voting change does not exempt from section 5 review any use of that practice not explicitly authorized by the court.

[Order No. 3262-2011, 76 FR 21244, Apr. 15, 2011]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19 cases, 1975–1999 · leading case: City of Rome v. United States
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City of Rome v. United States (1980) scotus · cites it 2× “In that case, the Court examined a regulation of the Attorney General, 28 CFR § 51.18 (a), that provided that § 5's mandatory 60-day period for consideration of original submissions is tolled whenever the Attorney General finds it necessary to request additional information from…”
Garcia v. Uvalde County (1978) txwd · cites it 6× “28 C.F.R. § 51.18 . There it is provided as follows: "If the submission does not satisfy the requirements of § 51.”
City of Rome, Ga. v. United States (1979) dcd · cites it 2× “[63] When additional information is supplied at the initiation of the submitting jurisdiction rather than the Government, there is even more reason to view the period as commencing anew from the time of receipt. [64] *235 We conclude, therefore, that the Attorney General has not…”
Johnson v. Mortham (1996) flnd · cites it 2× “28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (c) (1995). The Court will therefore review the Florida Legislature's plan, if any is forthcoming, to determine whether it is in compliance with federal law.”
John Roy Harper, II v. Edward H. Levi, Attorney General of the United States, (Two Cases) (1975) cadc · cites it 3× “10(a), the Attor *59 ney General shall request such further information as is necessary from the submitting authority and advise the submitting authority that the 60-day period will not commence until such information is received by the Department of Justice.”
Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Gantt (1992) nyed · cites it 2× “2d 268 (1971) (per curiam), as does the Department of Justice, see 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (a) (1991) (preclearance not required unless court-drawn plan “re-fleet[s] the policy choices of the submitting authority”), whose construction of the Voting Rights Act merits considerable…”
Blanding v. DuBose (1982) scotus · cites it 2× “On December 3, after having obtained necessary additional information, see 28 CFR § 51.18 (1980), the Attorney General made a timely objection to the at-large method of election of the Council.”
Wesch v. Hunt (1992) alsd · cites it 2× “See also 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1991) (stating that, in general, “changes affecting voting that are ordered by a federal court are subject to the pre-clearance requirements of section 5 to the extent that they reflect the policy choices of the submitting authority.”
Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington (1992) azd · cites it 2× “The interim use of the precinct boundaries as set forth in 28 C.F.R. section 51.18 is expressly conditioned upon each county filing an affidavit with this court certifying it submitted precinct boundary changes to the Department of Justice, pursuant to the relevant parts of 28 C.”
Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal. (1995) cand “Although a federal court’s authorization of the emergency, interim use of a court-created election plan does not normally require preclearance, see 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (e), such preclearance is required when the covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting its policy choices…”
Gonzalez v. Monterey County, Cal. (1992) cand · cites it 2× “28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1991). The Dunsford Intervenors argue that plaintiffs’ Section 5 claim is insubstantial because, unlike the legislative body in Sanchez , the Board of Supervisors did not prepare the H4 plan.”
Broussard v. Perez (1976) laed “28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (a). The Attorney General’s reply was mailed on December 2,1970, well within the sixty-day reply period.”
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