28 C.F.R. § 51.3

Delegation of authority

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The responsibility and authority for determinations under section 5 and section 3(c) have been delegated by the Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division. With the exception of objections and decisions following the reconsideration of objections, the Chief of the Voting Section is authorized to perform the functions of the Assistant Attorney General. With the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, the Chief of the Voting Section may designate supervisory attorneys in the Voting Section to perform the functions of the Chief.

[Order No. 3262-2011, 76 FR 21243, Apr. 15, 2011]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases, 1973–1998 · leading case: City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). · cites it 8× “28 CFR § 51.3 (d) (1979). [8] If in the present case the 60-day period for reconsideration is computed as running continuously from May 24, the date of the initial submission of the reconsideration motion, the period expired before the Attorney General made his August 12…”
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977). · cites it 2× “28 CFR § 51.3 (b)-(d) (1976). These regulations were reviewed and found valid by this Court in Georgia v.”
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998). “…for determinations under §5'has been delegated to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. 28 CFR §51.3 (1997).”
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). · cites it 2× “28 CFR § 51.3 (b)-(d). In the present case, the Attorney General found the initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the regulations.”
City of Rome, Ga. v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221 (D.D.C. 1979). · cites it 2× “On August 12, 1976, the Attorney General declined to withdraw his objection.”
Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982). “1982) (order granting declaratory judgment), the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, *521 acting for the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1981), interposed a section 5 objection to the proposed election schedule.”
Flateau v. Anderson, 537 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). “2d 472 (1973); 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (b)-(d). Thus a plan does not necessarily become law after the 60 days elapse.”
United States v. Bd. of Com'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 430 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ala. 1977). · cites it 2× “) Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff's *788 Rule 59 motion is due to be granted to the extent that July 6, 1976 was the next full business day for the Attorney General and his employees; therefore making the objection timely.”
Broussard v. Perez, 416 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. La. 1976). “28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (c). Defendants also contend that even if the Attorney General replied within sixty days, he failed to “object” to their changes in voting procedures.”
White v. Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 579 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ga. 1984). “A final focus guiding interpretation of the Act is its over-arching concern for preventing voting changes that may present a “potential for discrimination.”
Mcrae v. Bd. of Ed. of Henry Cty., 491 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1980). “In reference to the 60-day period, the Attorney General has promulgated a regulation which provides in part as follows: The 60-day period shall mean 60 calendar days, provided that if the final day of the period shall fall on a Saturday, Sunday, or national holiday the Attorney…”
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