C.F.R. » Title 29 » CHAPTER XIV—EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION › PART 1601—PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS › Subpart B—Procedure for the Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices

29 C.F.R. § 1601.21

Reasonable cause determination: Procedure and authority

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(a) After completing its investigation, where the Commission has not settled or dismissed a charge or made a no cause finding as to every allegation addressed in the determination under § 1601.19, the Commission shall issue a determination that reasonable cause exists to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring under title VII, the ADA, GINA, or the PWFA. A determination finding reasonable cause is based on, and limited to, evidence obtained by the Commission and does not reflect any judgment on the merits of allegations not addressed in the determination.

(b) The Commission shall provide prompt notification of its determination under paragraph (a) of this section to the person claiming to be aggrieved, the person making the charge on behalf of such person, if any, and the respondent, or in the case of a Commissioner charge, the person named in the charge or identified by the Commission in the third party certificate, if any, and the respondent. The Commission may, however, on its own initiative reconsider its decision or the determination of any of its designated officers who have authority to issue Letters of Determination, except that the Commission will not reconsider determinations of reasonable cause previously issued against a government, governmental entity or political subdivision after a failure of conciliation as set forth in § 1601.25.

(1) In cases where the Commission decides to reconsider a dismissal or a determination finding reasonable cause to believe a charge is true, a notice of intent to reconsider will promptly issue. If such notice of intent to reconsider is issued within 90 days from receipt of a notice of right to sue and the charging party has not filed suit and did not receive a notice of right to sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent to reconsider will vacate the dismissal or letter of determination and revoke the notice of right to sue. If the 90- day period has expired, the charging party has filed suit, or the charging party has requested a notice of right to sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent to reconsider will vacate the dismissal or letter of determination, but will not revoke the notice of right to sue. After reconsideration the Commission will issue a determination anew. In those circumstances where the notice of right to sue has been revoked, the Commission will, in accordance with § 1601.28, issue a notice of right to sue anew which will provide the charging party with 90 days within which to bring suit.

(2) The Commission shall provide prompt notification of its intent to reconsider, which is effective upon issuance, and its final decision after reconsideration to the person claiming to be aggrieved, the person making the charge on behalf of such person, if any, and the respondent, or in the case of a Commissioner charge, the person named in the charge or identified by the Commissioner in the third-party certificate, if any, and the respondent.

(c) Where a member of the Commission has filed a Commissioner charge, he or she shall abstain from making a determination in that case.

(d) The Commission hereby delegates to District Directors, or upon delegation, Field Directors, Area Directors or Local Directors; and the Director of the Office of Field Programs, or upon delegation, the Director of Field Management Programs, the authority, except in those cases involving issues currently designated by the Commission for priority review, upon completion of an investigation, to make a determination finding reasonable cause, issue a cause letter of determination and serve the determination upon the parties. Each determination issued under this section is final when the letter of determination is issued. However, the Director of the Office of Field Programs, or upon delegation, the Director of Field Management Programs; each District Director; each Field Director; each Area Director and each Local Director, for the determinations issued by his or her office, may on his or her own initiative reconsider such determinations, except that such directors may not reconsider determinations of reasonable cause previously issued against a government, governmental agency or political subdivision after a failure of conciliation as set forth in § 1601.25.

(1) In cases where the issuing Director decides to reconsider a dismissal or a determination finding reasonable cause to believe a charge is true, a notice of intent to reconsider will promptly issue. If such notice of intent to reconsider is issued within 90 days from receipt of a notice of right to sue and the charging party has not filed suit and did not request a notice of right to sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent to reconsider will vacate the dismissal or letter of determination and revoke the notice of right to sue. If the 90-day period has expired, the charging party has filed suit, or the charging party has received a notice of right to sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent to reconsider will vacate the dismissal or letter of determination, but will not revoke the notice of right to sue. After reconsideration the issuing Director will issue a determination anew. In those circumstances where the notice of right to sue has been revoked, the issuing Director will, in accordance with § 1601.28, issue a notice of right to sue anew which will provide the charging party with 90 days within which to bring suit.

(2) When the issuing Director does reconsider, he or she shall provide prompt notification of his or her intent to reconsider, which is effective upon issuance, and final decision after reconsideration to the person claiming to be aggrieved, the person making the charge on behalf of such person, if any, and the respondent, or in the charge or identified by the Commissioner in the third party certificate, if any, and the respondent.

(e) In making a determination as to whether reasonable cause exists, substantial weight shall be accorded final findings and orders made by designated FEP agencies to which the Commission defers charges pursuant to § 1601.13. For the purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) “Final findings and orders” shall mean:

(i) The findings of fact and order incident thereto issued by a FEP agency on the merits of a charge; or

(ii) The consent order or consent decree entered into by the FEP agency on the merits of a charge.

Provided, however, That no findings and order of a FEP agency shall be considered final for purposes of this section unless the FEP agency shall have served a copy of such findings and order upon the Commission and upon the person claiming to be aggrieved and shall have informed such person of his or her rights of appeal or to request reconsideration, or rehearing or similar rights; and the time for such appeal, reconsideration, or rehearing request shall have expired or the issues of such appeal, reconsideration or rehearing shall have been determined.

(2) “Substantial weight” shall mean that such full and careful consideration shall be accorded to final findings and orders, as defined above, as is appropriate in light of the facts supporting them when they meet all of the prerequisites set forth below:

(i) The proceedings were fair and regular; and

(ii) The practices prohibited by the State or local law are comparable in scope to the practices prohibited by Federal law; and

(iii) The final findings and order serve the interest of the effective enforcement of title VII, the ADA, GINA, or the PWFA: Provided, That giving substantial weight to final findings and orders of a FEP agency does not include according weight, for purposes of applying Federal law, to such Agency's conclusions of law.

[42 FR 55388, Oct. 14, 1977, as amended at 45 FR 73036, Nov. 4, 1980; 48 FR 19165, Apr. 28, 1983; 49 FR 13024, Apr. 2, 1984; 51 FR 18778, May 22, 1986; 52 FR 26959, July 17, 1987; 53 FR 3370, Feb. 7, 1988; 54 FR 32061, Aug. 4, 1989; 56 FR 9624, 9625, Mar. 7, 1991; 71 FR 26828, May 9, 2006; 74 FR 63982, Dec. 7, 2009; 85 FR 65218, Oct. 15, 2020; 89 FR 11169, Feb. 14, 2024]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 51 cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1967–2026 · leading case: Susie J. Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1992).
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Susie J. Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1992). · cites it 7× “The regulation at issue, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1984), was promulgated pursuant to § 713(a).”
Lewis v. Norfolk S. Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Va. 2003). · cites it 3× “The EEOC Area Director who reopened the charge cited 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (d) as the authority for this action.”
McBride v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2002). “29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (b) (made applicable to dismissals for failure to cooperate by 29 C.”
Davis v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 251 F.3d 227 (1st Cir. 2001). “The EEOC affords the findings of the MCAD "substantial weight,” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (e), and the MCAD "may accord [EEOC] findings substantial weight,” 804 C.”
Odutola v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 321 F. Supp. 3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2018). · cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (b)(1). "If the EEOC issues a notice of its intent to reconsider within 90 days after a right to sue letter is issued, and 'the charging party has not filed suit .”
Martin v. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 19 F. Supp. 3d 291 (D.D.C. 2014). · cites it 2× “In his brief, Martin asserts that the EEOC’s actions in investigating his claim violated 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (e). (PL Opp. at 15-16, 22.”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Union Pac. R.R., 867 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2017). “§ 2000e-5(b), and the EEOC has not resolved or dismissed the charge, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.21 , 1601.19, the language of Title VII grants the EEOC control over its own investigation and enforcement efforts.”
Strong-Fischer v. Peters, 554 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2008). “Moreover, where an individual receives two letters on different dates regarding the same FAD, “a second right to sue letter tolls the limitations period only if floe EEOC issues [the letter] pursuant to a reconsideration on the merits under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (b).” Crane v.…”
Morón-Barradas v. Dep't of Educ., 488 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2007). “Because the DOE never responded to Moron’s charge, the EEOC issued a reasonable cause determination on August 7, 2001, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 , offering to initiate a conciliation process between the parties, see id.”
Roberta Santini, M.D. v. Cleveland Clinic Florida, 232 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2000). “2 A second Notice tolls the limitation period only if the EEOC issues such Notice pursuant to a reconsideration on the merits under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (b), (d). See, e.g., Gitlitz v.”
Santangelo v. New York Life Ins. Co., 785 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2015). “2001) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (e)). 3 . This claim is timely.”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2012). “See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (finding of cause); id.”
Show all 51 citing cases →
— 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b) — 4 cases
Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554 (11th Cir. 1997).
Robinson (N.D. Ala. 2026).
72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,106, 21 Emp. Benefits Cas. 2736, Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23939d, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 781 Edward Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, Joe F. Collins v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554 (11th Cir. 1997).
Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air (11th Cir. 1997).
— 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b)(1) — 1 case
Bain v. Wilcox & Jones, Inc., 976 P.2d 559 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
— 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b)(2) — 1 case
Robinson (N.D. Ala. 2026).
— 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(d) — 1 case
Cunningham v. Weinstein (E.D. Va. 2024).
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