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C.F.R.Title 29Chapter XIV—Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionPart 1604—Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2026)

Sexual harassment

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1980–2026 746citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 746 opinions since 1980, 58 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (18 cases).

(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. 1 Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

1 The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin.

(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.

(c) [Reserved]

(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.

(e) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.

(f) Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.

(g) Other related practices: Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit.

Appendix A to § 1604.11—Background Information

The Commission has rescinded § 1604.11(c) of the Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, which set forth the standard of employer liability for harassment by supervisors. That section is no longer valid, in light of the Supreme Court decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The Commission has issued a policy document that examines the Faragher and Ellerth decisions and provides detailed guidance on the issue of vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (6/18/99), EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA), N:4075 [Binder 3]; also available through EEOC's web site, at www.eeoc.gov., or by calling the EEOC Publications Distribution Center, at 1-800-669-3362 (voice), 1-800-800-3302 (TTY).

(Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.)) [45 FR 74677, Nov. 10, 1980, as amended at 64 FR 58334, Oct. 29, 1999]
The 20 cases that cite 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMeritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
cites § 1604.11 14×cited by 5,189 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“The court drew additional support for this position from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11 (a) (1985), which set out these two types of sexual harassment claims.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff establishes a violation of Title VII by proving that sex discrimination created a hostile or abusive work environment through sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” · 616 citing courts
2
GREENBarbara J. HENSON v. CITY OF DUNDEE, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
cites § 1604.11 13×cited by 1,010 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1981). Of course, neither the courts nor the E.”
The case’s holding
An employer is strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment committed by a supervisor that results in tangible job detriment.
Later courts cite it for
“but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment.” · 26 citing courts
3
GREENAdler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1998).
cites § 1604.11 9×cited by 2,710 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“2d 49 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3) (1985)). To form the basis of a claim, the sexual harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”
The case’s holding
An employer is liable for sexual harassment only if the plaintiff establishes that the employer inadequately responded to incidents of harassment of which it knew or should have known.
Later courts cite it for
“to accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.” · 368 citing courts
4
GREENFaragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
cites § 1604.11 6×cited by 6,106 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“3d 429, 438 (CA1 1997) (applying "knew or should have known" standard to claims of environmental harassment by a supervisor); see also 29 CFR § 1604.11 (d) (1997) (employer is liable for coworker harassment if it "knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show…”
The case’s holding
Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents do not constitute actionable harassment under Title VII unless they are extremely serious.
Later courts cite it for
“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” · 664 citing courts
5
GREENBurlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
cites § 1604.11 6×cited by 4,717 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“See 29 CFR § 1604.11 (c) (1997) (vicarious liability for supervisor harassment turns on "the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual").”
The case’s holding
An employer is vicariously liable for a supervisor's creation of a hostile work environment but may assert an affirmative defense if no tangible employment action occurs.
Later courts cite it for
“a tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” · 687 citing courts
6
GREENVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
cites § 1604.11 4×cited by 916 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“See also 29 CFR §1604.11 (d) (2012); EEOC Guidance 405:7652.”
The case’s holding
An employee is a supervisor for purposes of Title VII vicarious liability only if they are empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.
Later courts cite it for
“an employee is a 'supervisor' for purposes of vicarious liability under title vii if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.” · 107 citing courts
7
GREENRadtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
cites § 1604.11 8×subsections: (a) 4× (a)(3) 2× (b) 2×cited by 346 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“[29 CFR 1604.11(a).] These guidelines, although not controlling, have been extensively consulted by federal courts.”
The case’s holding
The analysis for state hostile work environment and retaliation claims mirrors the federal standards established under Title VII.
Later courts cite it for
“must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party.” · 19 citing courts
8
YELLOWTom PIERCE v. COMMONWEALTH LIFE Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994).
cites § 1604.11 7×cited by 517 cases
Abrogated by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. on other grounds: 6 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 1604.11
“2d 701 (1992); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c) (“Applying general title VII principles, an employer .”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff establishing a prima facie case of reverse discrimination must show that the employer treated differently employees who are similarly situated in all relevant aspects of employment.
Later courts cite it for
“we have serious misgivings about the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their non-white or female counterparts.” · 10 citing courts
9
GREENNelson v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 38 P.3d 95 (Haw. 2001).
cites § 1604.11 10×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3) (2000). This court has held that a HESH claim exists when an employee can show: 1.”
The case’s holding
A hostile environment sexual harassment claim requires proof that conduct was severe or pervasive and had the purpose or effect of either interfering with work performance or creating a hostile environment.
Later courts cite it for
“motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENRabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
cites § 1604.11 16×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“The most important subsection in the guidelines is at 29 CFR § 1604.11 (a). This subsection provides as follows: “Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII.”
The case’s holding
Sexually vulgar language and displays constitute actionable harassment only if an average employee would find the overall work experience substantially and adversely affected rather than merely annoying.
Later courts cite it for
“to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of american workers.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENBarbara Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
cites § 1604.11 8×cited by 199 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“2d at 903 ; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985); (3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex, Henson, 682 F.”
The case’s holding
An employer is directly liable for Title VII violations committed by a supervisor who acts as an agent by exercising delegated authority over an employee's employment status.
Later courts cite it for
“with access to all the evidence, and with the common sense to make credibility determinations, a factfinder should not find it difficult to distinguish between harassing actions that constitute a violation of title vii and those 'ambiguous' actions which simply may not 'create an abusive working environment.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENTina Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 2017).
cites § 1604.11 4×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“, concurring) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c), (d) (1985)). Four years later, in Lynch v.”
The case’s holding
An employer is liable under a direct negligence theory for supervisor harassment if the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Later courts cite it for
“when a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.” · 5 citing courts
13
REDVivienne Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
cites § 1604.11 7×cited by 271 cases
Abrogated by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. on other grounds: 4 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says in part.
The case’s holding
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove the harassment unreasonably interfered with work performance and seriously affected their psychological well-being.
Later courts cite it for
“the charged sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiffs work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that affected seriously the psychological well-being of the plaintiff.” · 8 citing courts
14
cites § 1604.11 13×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“” The Notice of Decision quoted the EEOC Guideline definition of sexual harassment and stated that this regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 , “forms the basis for the various Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Department of Defense and Army prohibitions on sexual harassment.”
The case’s holding
A Title VII sexual harassment violation occurs when unwelcome, sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment, regardless of whether psychological injury occurs.
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of title vii is not to import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENOkoli v. City of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2011).
cites § 1604.11 4×cited by 323 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“The Court noted that the EEOC's Guidelines supported the conclusion that sexual misconduct violates Title VII "whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where `such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with…”
The case’s holding
A prima facie case of retaliation requires showing protected activity, an adverse action, and a causal connection between the two.
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff must show that (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, such as filing a complaint with the eeoc” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENKerry Ellison v. Nicholas F. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
cites § 1604.11 5×cited by 495 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3). We do not think that these standards are inconsistent.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment by alleging conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.
Later courts cite it for
“the required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” · 33 citing courts
17
GREENMarguerite Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
cites § 1604.11 5×cited by 480 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“”); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Final Guidelines on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1986) (“Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec.”
The case’s holding
Sexual harassment claims do not require predicate acts to be explicitly sexual in nature to establish a hostile work environment.
Later courts cite it for
“evidence of a general work atmosphere therefore-as well as evidence of specific hostility directed toward the plaintiff-is an important factor in evaluating the claim.” · 21 citing courts
18
GREENMechele Vinson v. Sidney L. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
cites § 1604.11 8×subsections: (a) (c)cited by 106 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“The differences are well summarized in EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines ].”
The case’s holding
An employee may have a Title VII claim if a supervisor creates a pervasive discriminatory work environment, even if the employee was not the direct object of harassment.
Later courts cite it for
“even a woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a title vii claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive.” · 13 citing courts
19
GREENR. A. v. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
cites § 1604.11 3×cited by 2,035 cases
Where it cites § 1604.11
“§ 2000e—2; 29 CFR § 1604.11 (1991). See also 18 *390 U.”
The case’s holding
Government restrictions on fighting words based on the ideas expressed are unconstitutional content-based regulations that are presumptively invalid under the First Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” · 64 citing courts
20
GREENHoward Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984).
cites § 1604.11 5×cited by 296 cases
The case’s holding
The creation of a hostile work environment through sexual or racial harassment may constitute a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Later courts cite it for
“actions which violate public policy may constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to state a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress.” · 9 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198020032026

One bar per year. Tallest: 45 cases in 1997. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
8th Cir.347th Cir.329th Cir.25S.D.N.Y.24N.D. Ill.232d Cir.2110th Cir.19D.P.R.18

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 158 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)18 cases
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).“[29 CFR 1604.11(a).] These guidelines, although not controlling, have been extensively consulted by federal courts.”
Joann S. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir. 1996).
Patsy Carolyn POE v. Donnie HAYDON, 853 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1988).
Koester v. City of Novi, 580 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. 1998).
Mechele Vinson v. Sidney L. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).“The differences are well summarized in EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines ].”
Showing the top 5 of 18. More in the list view →
(a)(1)1 case
Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
(a)(3)6 cases
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
Sheriff v. Midwest Health Partners, P.C., 619 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2010).
Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Utah 1986).
Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(b)2 cases
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
Conrad v. Ara Szabo, 480 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1996).
(c)5 cases
Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distrib. Grp., 11 S.W.3d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
Mechele Vinson v. Sidney L. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Henry v. Gehl Corp., 867 F. Supp. 960 (D. Kan. 1994).
Haught v. Louis Berkman, LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 543 (N.D. W. Va. 2005).
Ortiz González v. Burger King, 189 P.R. 1 (2013).
(d)6 cases
Maher v. All. Mortg. Banking Corp., 650 F. Supp. 2d 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 724 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(e)7 cases
Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 914 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2019).
Elise N. Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2001).
Sparks v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
Jarman v. City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
O'neill, No. 2:25-cv-01129 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2025).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(f)5 cases
Cutright v. Metro. Life Ins., 491 S.E.2d 308 (W. Va. 1997).
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
Clark v. UPS, No. 03-6393 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2005).
Acevedo-Torres v. Mun. of Arecibo, 941 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D.P.R. 2013).
(g)1 case

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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