(a) In situations where the jurisdictional prerequisites of both the EPA and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 200e et seq., are satisfied, any violation of the Equal Pay Act is also a violation of title VII. However, title VII covers types of wage discrimination not actionable under the EPA. Therefore, an act or practice of an employer or labor organization that is not a violation of the EPA may nevertheless be a violation of title VII.
(b) Recovery for the same period of time may be had under both the EPA and title VII so long as the same individual does not receive duplicative relief for the same wrong. Relief is computed to give each individual the highest benefit which entitlement under either statute would provide. (e.g., liquidated damages may be available under the EPA but not under title VII.) Relief for the same individual may be computed under one statute for one or more periods of the violation and under the other statute for other periods of the violation.
(c) The right to equal pay under the Equal Pay Act has no relationship to whether the employee is in the lower paying job as a result of discrimination in violation of title VII. Under the EPA a prima facie violation is established upon a showing that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. Thus, the availability of a remedy under title VII which would entitle the lower paid employee to be hired into, or to transfer to, the higher paid job does not defeat the right of each person employed on the lower paid job to the same wages as are paid to a member of the opposite sex who receives higher pay for equal work.
Notes of Decisions
Lynda Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
· cites it 3× “29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 (1988). On the other side of the fence, some courts have not abandoned the distinctions between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, choosing instead to analyze each claim independently, even if brought together on the same underlying facts.”
Jessica Lind Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, a Foreign Corp., 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994).
“” (citation omitted)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 (a) (1993) (providing that when the jurisdictional requirements of both the EPA and Title VII are satisfied, “any violation of the Equal Pay Act is also a violation of Title VII”).”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. White & Son Enter., a Corp., 881 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1989).
“Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such…”
Butler v. New York Health & Racquet Club, 768 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
“See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 (a) (“In situations where the jurisdictional prerequisites of both the EPA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .”
Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 372 (D. Maryland 1994).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 . This statement does not adequately account for the confusing interplay between the burdens of proof under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine and the prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act.”
Churchill v. Int'l Bus. MacHines, Inc., Nat'l Serv. Div., 759 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1991).
“2d at 1277 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 ). The court refused to give deference to this regulation because it varied from the EEOC’s prior policy, as expressed in its 1981 regulations, and no new legislative history had been introduced to support the change.”
Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D. Va. 2003).
“See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 (b) ("Recovery for the same period of time may be had under both the EPA and Title VII so long as the same individual does not receive duplica-tive relief for the same wrong.”
Herndon v. Wm. A. Straub, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
“[3] The McKee holding, that proof of an EPA claim is dispositive of a plaintiff's sex-based Title VII claim founded on the same facts, is consistent with the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the EPA in 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27 (a), which states that where the jurisdictional…”
Bertotti v. Philbeck, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
“However, [T]itle VII covers types of wage discrimination not actionable under the EPA.”
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