29 C.F.R. § 1625.6

Bona fide occupational qualifications

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(a) Whether occupational qualifications will be deemed to be “bona fide” to a specific job and “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business,” will be determined on the basis of all the pertinent facts surrounding each particular situation. It is anticipated that this concept of a bona fide occupational qualification will have limited scope and application. Further, as this is an exception to the Act it must be narrowly construed.

(b) An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age. If the employer's objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact.

(c) Many State and local governments have enacted laws or administrative regulations which limit employment opportunities based on age. Unless these laws meet the standards for the establishment of a valid bona fide occupational qualification under section 4(f)(1) of the Act, they will be considered in conflict with and effectively superseded by the ADEA.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19 cases, 1983–2009 · leading case: Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). · cites it 2× “Further, as this is an exception to the Act it must be narrowly construed"). To succeed under the BFOQ defense, we held that an employer must demonstrate either "a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all employees above an age lack the qualifications required for…”
W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985). · cites it 2× “47727 (1981), 29 CFR § 1625.6 (1984). The restrictive language of the statute and the consistent interpretation of the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the statute convince us that, like its Title VII counterpart, the BFOQ exception “was in fact meant to be an…”
Stanley ORZEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF WAUWATOSA FIRE Dep't, Defendant-Appellant, 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983). · cites it 2× “47,727 (1981) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 ). 21 As noted earlier, such regulations are entitled to considerable weight.”
Sullivan v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 491 A.2d 1096 (Conn. 1985). · cites it 2× “See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (a). The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held, in an age discrimination case under the ADEA, that a BFOQ must reflect the requirements of the particular position which the claimant seeks to fill or to retain rather than those of…”
Coupé v. Fed. Express Corp., 121 F.3d 1022 (6th Cir. 1997). · cites it 5× “If the employer’s objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less…”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. The Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988). · cites it 2× “2d 1387, 1391 (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (b) (1987). The district court noted that FAA’s Age-60 Rule may be relevant evidence of a BFOQ for Boeing pilots if the regulation is based on the same considerations that would support determination of a BFOQ under ADEA.”
Melinda Erickson, United States of Am., Intervenor v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Ne. Illinois Univ., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000). “See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (a); see also Western Air Lines, 472 U.”
Richard T. Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, a Mun. Corp., & Bd. of Fire & Police Commissioners of the City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999). “Kopec is dubious that Elmhurst would be able to show that the under-35 rule for hiring is a BFOQ: the city’s police force includes many full-time officers who are over 35 and older; moreover, the city does not apply the rule to *902 part-time officers like Kopec, who perform…”
Carswell v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern., 540 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2008). “The EEOC has expounded upon the meaning of this so-called “BFOQ defense” as follows: An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all or substantially all…”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, Defendant-appellee, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989). “29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1988). . 472 U.S. 400 , 105 S.”
Amato v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 668 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y 1987). “§ 628 include 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (c), which states: Many State and local governments have enacted laws or administrative regulations which limit employment opportunities based on age.”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Pennsylvania, 565 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1983). · cites it 5× “29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 . Specifically, defendant’s argument, that age is a “reasonably” necessary criteria, focuses narrowly upon the statutory BFOQ provision, 29 U.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) — 3 cases
Francke v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
EEOC v. State of Miss., 654 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.