29 C.F.R. § 1625.8

Bona fide seniority systems

Read at: eCFRecfr.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov CasesGoogle Scholar

Section 4(f)(2) of the Act provides that

* * * It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization * * * to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system * * * which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act except that no such seniority system * * * shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age of such individual. * * *

(a) Though a seniority system may be qualified by such factors as merit, capacity, or ability, any bona fide seniority system must be based on length of service as the primary criterion for the equitable allocation of available employment opportunities and prerogatives among younger and older workers.

(b) Adoption of a purported seniority system which gives those with longer service lesser rights, and results in discharge or less favored treatment to those within the protection of the Act, may, depending upon the circumstances, be a “subterfuge to evade the purposes” of the Act.

(c) Unless the essential terms and conditions of an alleged seniority system have been communicated to the affected employees and can be shown to be applied uniformly to all of those affected, regardless of age, it will not be considered a bona fide seniority system within the meaning of the Act.

(d) It should be noted that seniority systems which segregate, classify, or otherwise discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, are prohibited under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where that Act otherwise applies. The “bona fides” of such a system will be closely scrutinized to ensure that such a system is, in fact, bona fide under the ADEA.

[53 FR 15673, May 3, 1988]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1986–2024 · leading case: Cook v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Cook v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (a) (1986). The Second Circuit’s observation that this system “would appear to satisfy the test that length of service be the ‘primary criterion,’ ” Cook, 771 F.”

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Local Union Nos. 605 & 985, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 945 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Miss. 1996). · cites it 2× “” 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (a). (Emphasis added).”

Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995). “There is no real question but that this conclusion is correct. The seniority system at issue applies equally to all workers and uses length of service as the primary criterion by which work is allocated, see EEOC ADEA Interpretation, 29 C.”

Vrabec v. Geisinger Clinic (M.D. Penn. 2024). · cites it 2× “62 Nor has Geisinger pointed to any evidence that the seniority 59 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (a). 60 29 C.F.R. § 1625.”

Reihart v. JRK Enter., Inc. (M.D. Penn. 2022). “604 , 608–11 (1993); 29 CFR § 1625.8 . give rise to an inference of discrimination.”

— 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8(a) — 1 case

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Local Union Nos. 605 & 985, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 945 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Miss. 1996). “” 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (a). (Emphasis added).”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.