29 C.F.R. § 33.13
Intimidation and retaliation prohibited
No person may discharge, intimidate, retaliate, threaten, coerce or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has filed a complaint, furnished information, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, review, hearing or any other activity related to the administration of, or exercise of authority under, or privilege secured by section 504 and the regulations in this part.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2011–2025 · leading case: Cherryl Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Ed. Danville Indep., 974 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2020).
Cherryl Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Ed. Danville Indep., 974 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2020). “§ 794 (a), (d); 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 . In accordance with this provision, this Court and others have held that advocating for members of a protected class is a protected activity for purposes of retaliation claims.”
A.C. Ex Rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013). “§ 794 (a) and 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 (Section 504). The Acts have a similar scope and aim; for purposes of retaliation analysis, cases construing either Act are generally applicable to both.”
Hicks v. Benton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 222 F. Supp. 3d 613 (W.D. Tenn. 2016). “§ 794 (a); 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 ; A.C. ex rel. J.C., 711 F.”
A.C. Ex Rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 824 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Tenn. 2011). “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.”
Porter Smith v. MDOC (6th Cir. 2025). “at 696–97 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 ). But again, the Shelby County court had no reason to analyze the statutory basis for the retaliation claim and instead proceeded to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.”
Thomas v. Tennessee Dep't of Human Servs. (M.D. Tenn. 2022). “One of those regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 , is the one cited by the Sixth Circuit as the source (along with Section 504 itself) of the Rehabilitation Act’s anti-retaliation provision.”
Ambrose Wilbanks, Jr. v. Ypsilanti Cmty. Sch. (6th Cir. 2018). “§ 794 (a) and 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 (Section 504). The Acts have a similar scope and aim; for purposes of retaliation analysis, cases 3 No.”
L.G. v. Bd. of Educ. Of Fayette Cty. (6th Cir. 2019). “Thus, pursuant to the mandates of the IDEA, he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this claim to the district court.3 Retaliation Claim L.”
Kirilenko-Ison v. Danville Indep. Schs. (E.D. Ky. 2019). “§ 794 (a); 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 . The KCRA and the ADA are analogous and are interpreted consistently, so the plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and KRS §§ 344, et seq.”
Jones v. McDonough (M.D. Tenn. 2021). “§ 12203 ; see also 29 C.F.R. § 33.13 (“No person may discharge, intimidate, retaliate, threaten, coerce or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has filed a complaint, furnished information, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation,…”
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