(a) This part contains the rules of practice of the Administrative Review Board when it is exercising its jurisdiction described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) The Board has jurisdiction to hear and decide in its discretion appeals concerning questions of law and fact from final decisions under parts 1, 3, and 5 of this subtitle including decisions as to the following: (1) Wage determinations issued under the Davis-Bacon Act and its related minimum wage statutes; (2) debarment cases arising under part 5 of this subtitle; (3) controversies concerning the payment of prevailing wage rates or proper classifications which involve significant sums of money, large groups of employees, or novel or unusual situations; and (4) recommendations of a Federal agency for appropriate adjustment of liquidated damages which are assessed under the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act.
(c) In exercising its discretion to hear and decide appeals, the Board shall consider, among other things, timeliness, the nature of the relief sought, matters of undue hardship or injustice, or the public interest.
(d) In considering the matters within the scope of its jurisdiction the Board shall act as the authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor. The Board shall act as fully and finally as might the Secretary of Labor concerning such matters, except as provided in Secretary's Order 01-2020 (or any successor to that order).
(e) The Board is an essentially appellate agency. It will not hear matters de novo except upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances. It may remand under appropriate instructions any case for the taking of additional evidence and the making of new or modified findings by reason of the additional evidence.
[36 FR 10863, June 4, 1971, as amended at 61 FR 19985, May 3, 1996; 85 FR 13031, Mar. 6, 2020; 85 FR 30616, May 20, 2020]
Notes of Decisions
Mistick PBT v. Chao, Elaine, 440 F.3d 503 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
“Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 (b), Mistick appealed to the Administrative Review Board (the “Board”).”
Mark Smith Constr. Co. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 540 (Ct. Cl. 1986).
“7 See 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 et seq. In the case at bar, we do not read the plaintiff’s grievance in Count IV to be with the Secretary of Labor, nor with any determination made by him.”
Framlau Corp. v. Dembling, 360 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
· cites it 2× “Essentially, plaintiff is alleging the constitutional infirmity of the procedure employed during a hearing before the Wage Appeals Board held pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 (e), and 40 U.S.C. § 276a et seq.”
Griffin v. Reich, 956 F. Supp. 98 (D.R.I. 1997).
· cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 (d) (1995). For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied, plaintiffs’ appeal is sustained, and the case is remanded to the Department of Labor for further consideration and fact finding.”
Kam Shing Chan v. City of New York, 803 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
“16 Only after a ruling on a wage dispute by the Administrator of the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division or an AU does an employee have an opportunity to initiate an action: he or she may appeal the ruling to the Wage Appeals Board, pursu *729 ant to 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 et…”
Summitt Investigative Serv., Inc. v. Herman, 34 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1998).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 (e). There appears to be no “extraordinary circumstance” that justifies Summitt’s attempt to present its arguments de novo to the ARB through a motion for reconsideration.”
Bldg. & Const. Trades Dept., Afl-cio v. Reich, 815 F. Supp. 484 (D.D.C. 1993).
“See 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 (d) (Wage Appeals Board acts as the “authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor” and acts with full and final authority in matters over which it has jurisdiction).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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