(a) The coverage of the Act's wage and hours provisions as described in sections 6 and 7 does not deal in a blanket way with industries as a whole. Thus, in section 6, it is provided that every employer shall pay the statutory minimum wage to “each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” It thus becomes primarily an individual matter as to the nature of the employment of the particular employee. Some employers in a given industry may have no employees covered by the Act; other employers in the industry may have some employees covered by the Act, and not others; still other employers in the industry may have all their employees within the Act's coverage. If, after considering all relevant factors, employees are found to be engaged in covered work, their employer cannot avoid his obligations to them under the Act on the ground that he is not “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” To the extent that his employees are so engaged, he is himself so engaged.
9
9Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517. See also Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564; McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491; Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178.
(b) In determining whether an individual employee is within the coverage of the wage and hours provisions, however, the relationship of an employer's business to commerce or to the production of goods for commerce may sometimes be an important indication of the character of the employee's work.
10 It is apparent, too, from the 1949 amendment to the definition of “produced” and its legislative history that an examination of the character of the employer's business will in some borderline situations be necessary in determining whether the employees' occupation bears the requisite close relationship to production for commerce.
11
10Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679; 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. Co. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126; Donovan v. Shell Oil Co., 168 F. 2d 229 (C.A. 4); Hertz Driveurself Stations v. United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (C.A. 8); Horton v. Wilson & Co., 223 N.C. 71, 25 S.E. 2d 437.
11 H. Mgrs. St., 1949, pp. 14, 15; Sen. St. 1949 Cong. Rec. 15372.
Notes of Decisions
Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
“Law at 10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 776.2 ).) Plaintiff responds that whether these potential plaintiffs fall within the FLSA definition of em *198 ployee goes to the ultimate issue of the case — whether the mechanics are employees or independent contractors — and therefore may not be…”
Jackson v. Airways Parking Co., 297 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
“However, the Act and the courts make no distinction as to the percentage, volume, or amount of activities of either the employee or employer which constitute engagement in commerce. Third, the “commerce” in which plaintiff contends he is engaged is defined in § 203(b) of the Act…”
Ruben H. Gilreath, Elmer E. Johnson, Rodney F. Daniels, Cecil Leroy Boyd & A. Gale Williams v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., Ruben H. Gilreath, Elmer E. Johnson, Rodney F. Daniels, Cecil Leroy Boyd & A. Gale Williams v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., 421 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970).
“' 29 C.F.R. 776.2(b)(footnote omitted). See Borden Co.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 776.2(b) — 1 case
Ruben H. Gilreath, Elmer E. Johnson, Rodney F. Daniels, Cecil Leroy Boyd & A. Gale Williams v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., Ruben H. Gilreath, Elmer E. Johnson, Rodney F. Daniels, Cecil Leroy Boyd & A. Gale Williams v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., 421 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970).
“' 29 C.F.R. 776.2(b)(footnote omitted). See Borden Co.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.