(a) The workweek is to be taken as the standard in determining the applicability of the Act.
13 Thus, if in any workweek an employee is engaged in both covered and noncovered work he is entitled to both the wage and hours benefits of the Act for all the time worked in that week, unless exempted therefrom by some specific provision of the Act. The proportion of his time spent by the employee in each type of work is not material. If he spends any part of the workweek in covered work he will be considered on exactly the same basis as if he had engaged exclusively in such work for the entire period. Accordingly, the total number of hours which he works during the workweek at both types of work must be compensated for in accordance with the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Act.
13 See Gordon's Transports v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Walling v. Fox-Pelletier Detective Agency, 4 W.H. Cases 452 (W.D. Tenn.), 8 Labor Cases 62,219; Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 59 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Ky.); Fleming v. Knox, 42 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ga.); Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (C.A. 2). For a definition of the workweek, see § 778.2(c) of this chapter.
(b) It is thus recognized that an employee may be subject to the Act in one workweek and not in the next. It is likewise true that some employees of an employer may be subject to the Act and others not. But the burden of effecting segregation between covered and noncovered work as between particular workweeks for a given employee or as between different groups of employees is upon the employer. Where covered work is being regularly or recurrently performed by his employees, and the employer seeks to segregate such work and thereby relieve himself of his obligations under sections 6 and 7 with respect to particular employees in particular workweeks, he should be prepared to show, and to demonstrate from his records, that such employees in those workweeks did not engage in any activities in interstate or foreign commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce, which would necessarily include a showing that such employees did not handle or work on goods or materials shipped in commerce or used in production of goods for commerce, or engage in any other work closely related and directly essential to production of goods for commerce.
14 The Division's experience has indicated that much so-called “segregation” does not satisfy these tests and that many so-called “segregated” employees are in fact engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.
14 See Guess v. Montague, 140 F. 2d 500 (C.A. 4).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
23
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1966–2022 · leading case:
O'Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2003).
O'Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2003).
“29 C.F.R. §§ 776.4 (a) (“The workweek is to be taken as the standard in determining the applicability of the act.”
Martin v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 611 (Fed. Cl. 2014).
· cites it 2× “6 Counsel also have pointed to various DOL statements of general policy found in the federal register. E.g., Interpretative Bulletin on the General Coverage of the Wage and Hours Provisions of the *616 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 C.”
Giguere v. Port Resources Inc., 927 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2019).
“29 C.F.R. § 776.4 (a) ("The workweek is to be taken as the standard in determining the applicability of the Act.”
Garcia v. Frog Island Seafood, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D.N.C. 2009).
“Rather, compliance with the FLSA is measured by the workweek, see 29 C.F.R. § 776.4 ; thus, the issue is whether any deduction occurring during a particular workweek reduced a worker’s wages for that workweek below the minimum wage.”
Norceide v. Cambridge Health All., 814 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D. Mass. 2011).
“4 (a) (1984), the DOL explains that the "workweek is to be taken as the standard in determining the applicability of the Act,” meaning that "if in any workweek an employee is engaged in both covered and noncovered work he is entitled to both the wage and hours benefits of the…”
Upadhyay v. Sethi, 848 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
“Plaintiffs citation to 29 C.F.R. § 776.4 (a) is inapposite. The section describes only how to treat a situation where an employee performs both work that is covered by the FLSA and work that is not covered by the FLSA.”
O'BRIEN v. Town of Agawam, 440 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D. Mass. 2006).
“3d at 298 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 776.4 (a)). Since the only work weeks presently at issue are the weeks during which Plaintiffs were scheduled to work forty hours, Defendants contend that the regular rate in this case should be calculated by dividing Plaintiffs’ weekly pay by forty.”
Kirchgessner v. CHLN, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (D. Ariz. 2016).
“; see 29 C.F.R. § 776.4 (a) (“The workweek is to be taken as the standard in determining the applicability of the Act.”
Doe v. Butler Amusements, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 776.4 (a). The regulation continues: Thus, if in any workweek an employee is engaged in both covered and noncovered work he is entitled to both the wage and hours benefits of the Act for all the time worked in that week, unless exempted therefrom by-some specific…”
Wessling v. Carroll Gas Co., 266 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Iowa 1967).
“It cannot be said that such activity was isolated or sporadic. In regard to the damages which plaintiff has suffered, defendant has not succeeded in segregating plaintiff’s interstate activities from his intrastate duties.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 776.4(a) — 1 case
— 29 C.F.R. § 776.4(b) — 2 cases
Ruben H. Gilreath, Elmer E. Johnson, Rodney F. Daniels, Cecil Leroy Boyd & A. Gale Williams v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., Ruben H. Gilreath, Elmer E. Johnson, Rodney F. Daniels, Cecil Leroy Boyd & A. Gale Williams v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., 421 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970).
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