29 C.F.R. § 780.129

Required relationship of practices to farming operations

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To come within this secondary meaning, a practice must be performed either by a farmer or on a farm. It must also be performed either in connection with the farmer's own farming operations or in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm where the practice is performed. In addition, the practice must be performed “as an incident to or in conjunction with” the farming operations. No matter how closely related it may be to farming operations, a practice performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm is not within the scope of the “secondary” meaning of “agriculture.” Thus, employees employed by commission brokers in the typical activities conducted at their establishments, warehouse employees at the typical tobacco warehouses, shop employees of an employer engaged in the business of servicing machinery and equipment for farmers, plant employees of a company dealing in eggs or poultry produced by others, employees of an irrigation company engaged in the general distribution of water to farmers, and other employees similarly situated do not generally come within the secondary meaning of “agriculture.” The inclusion of industrial operations is not within the intent of the definition in section 3(f), nor are processes that are more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture (see Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1966–2021 · leading case: Rodriguez v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 360 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2004).
Rodriguez v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 360 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2004). · cites it 2× “” 29 C.F.R. § 780.129 ; Maneja, 349 U.S. at 265 , 75 S.”
Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 517 U.S. 392 (1996). · cites it 2× “Thus, 29 CFR § 780.129 (1995) reiterates that the work "must be performed `as an incident to or in conjunction with' the farming operations," and § 780.”
Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004). “565 (1956) (holding a process that results in changes to the natural state of the product is more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture); 29 C.F.R. § 780.129 (explaining manufacturing and industrial operations do not fall under the definition of secondary farming).”
Jose Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC, 997 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2021). · cites it 2× “” And the text of the secondary definition is clear: non-primary activities must be “performed by a farmer or on a farm” to be considered “agriculture.”
Jimenez v. Duran, 287 F. Supp. 2d 979 (N.D. Iowa 2003). “1396 ; 29 C.F.R. § 780.129 ; 29 C.F.R. § 780.141 .”
Eutolio A. Rodriguez v. Pure Beauty Farms, Inc., 503 F. App'x 772 (11th Cir. 2013). · cites it 3× “” 29 C.F.R. § 780.129 ; see also Sariol, 490 F.”
Tipton v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Tex. 1975). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. 780.129. . 29 C.F.R. 780.135. .”
Beck v. S. Rabbit Corp., 248 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1966). “” 29 C.F.R. § 780.129 (1965) It is thus obvious that the only type of animal intended in the agricultural exemption to this Act was a farm animal, and the use of the word “livestock” is consistent with this intent.”
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