In accordance with the legislative history and authoritative decisions as discussed in §§ 783.28 and 783.29, an employee will ordinarily be regarded as “employed as a seaman” if he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master aboard a vessel, service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character. This is true with respect to vessels navigating inland waters as well as ocean-going and coastal vessels (Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Walling, 158 F. 2d 678; Walling v. Haden, 153 F. 2d 196, certiorari denied 328 U.S. 866; Walling v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 149 F. 2d 9, certiorari denied 327 U.S. 722; Douglas v. Dixie Sand and Gravel Co., (E.D. Tenn.) 9 WH Cases 285). The Act's provisions with respect to seamen apply to a seaman only when he is “employed as” such (Walling v. Haden, supra); it appears also from the language of section 6(b)(2) and 13(a)(14) that they are not intended to apply to any employee who is not employed on a vessel.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
33
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1983–2025 · leading case:
Adams v. All Coast, 15 F.4th 365 (5th Cir. 2021).
Adams v. All Coast, 15 F.4th 365 (5th Cir. 2021).
· cites it 13× “” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 . We disagree. Such a reading strays from the statutory and regulatory text and our jurisprudence.”
Kyle Halle v. Galliano Marine Serv., LLC, 855 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 5× “3d at 281 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 ). Per Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations, 3 “work other than seaman work becomes substantial if it occupies more than 20 percent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek.”
McLaughlin v. Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2005).
· cites it 6× “” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 . McLaughlin argues that because most of her work involved taking tickets, loading and unloading passengers, and cleaning the boat, she does not meet this test.”
Godard v. Alabama Pilot, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S.D. Ala. 2007).
· cites it 5× “” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 (emphasis added). The regulations further state that an employee’s eligibility for the seaman exemption “depends upon the character of the work he actually performs and not on what it is called or the place where it is performed.”
Mcmahan v. Adept Process Servs., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Va. 2011).
· cites it 2× “” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 . “This is true with respect to vessels navigating inland waters as well as ocean-going and coastal vessels.”
Keith Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., In, 771 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2014).
· cites it 2× “31 outlines these criteria as follows: [A]n employee -will ordinarily be regarded as employed as a seaman if he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master aboard a vessel, service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation…”
John H. Harkins v. Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2004).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 . But this just means that the employee must be a (more or less) full-time member of the marine crew, that is, the crew that is responsible for operating the ship.”
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