29 C.F.R. § 785.14
General
Whether waiting time is time worked under the Act depends upon particular circumstances. The determination involves “scrutiny and construction of the agreements between particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of the working agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of the service, and its relation to the waiting time, and all of the circumstances. Facts may show that the employee was engaged to wait or they may show that he waited to be engaged.” (Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)) Such questions “must be determined in accordance with common sense and the general concept of work or employment.” (Central Mo. Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 F. 2d 641 (C.A. 8, 1948))
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 37
cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1969–2025 · leading case: Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2011).
Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2011). “Although that regulation directly applies in the slightly different context of whether time spent waiting is compensable, see 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 , several courts have relied in cases like this one on its instruction that “[pjeriods during which an employee is completely relieved…”
Keun-Jae Moon v. Joon Gab Kwon, 248 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). “” 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 . The “[f]acts may show that the employee was engaged to wait,” making the time compensable, or that the employee instead “waited to be engaged,” rendering the time not compensable.”
Bernal v. Trueblue, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 736 (W.D. Mich. 2010). “” 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.14 -.16. In determining whether an employee is engaged to wait, or waiting to be engaged, the critical inquiry is whether the time spent waiting is primarily for the benefit of employer or the employee.”
Chelan Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Cnty. of Chelan, 745 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1987). “" An employee who is not required to remain on the employer's premises but is merely required to remain within contact by radio or telephone is not working while on-call.”
Little v. Technical Specialty Prods., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Tex. 2013). “(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 ). “An employee is engaged to wait, and thus must be compensated, when he is unable to use waiting time ‘effectively for his own purposes,’ and the time ‘belongs to and is controlled by the employer.”
Irma Ruth Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., Inc., D/B/A Pulse Ambulance Serv., 821 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1987). “See generally 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 to 785.17. The codification is apparently based on Armour and Skidmore; each section cites, among other decisions, either Skidmore or Armour.”
Elliott Gelber v. AKAL Sec., Inc., 14 F.4th 1279 (11th Cir. 2021). “’” 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.”
Roces v. Reno Hous. Auth., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (D. Nev. 2018). “Freedom to engage in personal activities "The regulations at 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.14 - 17, which clarify the 'waiting to be engaged' doctrine, clearly state that an employee is only compensable for idle time when 'the employee is unable to use the time effectively for his own…”
Thomas v. Cnty. of Fairfax, Va., 758 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Va. 1991). “See 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 (whether waiting time constitutes time worked under the Act to be determined by common sense in light of the particular circumstances).”
Marroquin v. Canales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 283 (D. Maryland 2007). “124 (1944); 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 . In making the distinction, courts examine several factors, including: the agreement of the parties, the nature of services provided, where the plaintiff is waiting, and, most importantly, whether the time spent waiting is primarily for the…”
Johnnie Mae Cole v. Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc., 824 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1987). “The provisions expressly declare that “[w]hether waiting time is time worked under the [FLSA] depends upon particular circumstances,” 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 , and the determinination involves a consideration of “all the circumstances,” id.”
Chao v. Akron Insulation & Supply, Inc., 184 F. App'x 508 (6th Cir. 2006). “Following the words of John Milton, “They also serve who only stand and wait,” 1 the Fair Labor Standards Act requires that employees must also be compensated for any “wait time” if it is for the employer’s benefit and at its behest.”
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