A stenographer who reads a book while waiting for dictation, a messenger who works a crossword puzzle while awaiting assignments, fireman who plays checkers while waiting for alarms and a factory worker who talks to his fellow employees while waiting for machinery to be repaired are all working during their periods of inactivity. The rule also applies to employees who work away from the plant. For example, a repair man is working while he waits for his employer's customer to get the premises in readiness. The time is worktime even though the employee is allowed to leave the premises or the job site during such periods of inactivity. The periods during which these occur are unpredictable. They are usually of short duration. In either event the employee is unable to use the time effectively for his own purposes. It belongs to and is controlled by the employer. In all of these cases waiting is an integral part of the job. The employee is engaged to wait. (See: Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944); Wright v. Carrigg, 275 F. 2d 448, 14 W.H. Cases (C.A. 4, 1960); Mitchell v. Wigger, 39 Labor Cases, para. 66,278, 14 W.H. Cases 534 (D.N.M. 1960); Mitchell v. Nicholson, 179 F. Supp, 292,14 W.H. Cases 487 (W.D.N.C. 1959))
Notes of Decisions
Tina Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc., 852 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 2× “1 :065(3)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 . Thus, for example, “[bjecause doffing gear that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to employees’ work is a ‘principal activity’ under the statute, .”
United Transp. Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 1999).
· cites it 4× “” 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 . Examples include the following: “[a] stenographer who reads a book while waiting for dictation, a messenger who works a crossword puzzle while awaiting assignments, fireman who plays checkers while waiting for alarms and a factory worker who talks to his…”
Keun-Jae Moon v. Joon Gab Kwon, 248 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
“On the other hand, when an employee “is not required to remain on the employer’s premises but is merely required to leave word at his home or with company officials where he may be reached,” then the employee is “waiting to be engaged,” and therefore not “working]” under FLSA…”
Thomas v. Cnty. of Fairfax, Va., 758 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Va. 1991).
· cites it 2× “223 (as a general rule, the term “hours worked” includes “all time during which an employee is required to be on duty or to be on the employer’s premises”).”
Sec'y United States Dep't of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Mgmt. Inc., 128 F.4th 146 (3rd Cir. 2025).
· cites it 3× “Compensation is required both when the employee is on duty within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 and, when entering or exiting a period of off-duty rest, the travel is necessary and constitutes “part of” the employee’s “principal activity.”
White v. Army, 118 Wash. App. 272 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “The workers point to 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 to support their position that periods of inactivity do not qualify as acceptable rest periods.”
White v. Salvation Army, 75 P.3d 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “The workers point to 29 CFR § 785.15 to support their position that periods of inactivity do not qualify as acceptable rest periods.”
Richard Chambers v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 428 F. App'x 400 (5th Cir. 2011).
“Turning first to the activities that both Plaintiffs claim they performed off-the-clock, Plaintiffs fail to cite to any direct evidence that Sears had actual or constructive knowledge that they were performing these tasks outside of the working day.”
Little v. Technical Specialty Prods., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
“(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 ); Vega, 36 F.3d at 425 (“waiting time is compensable if the wait predominately benefits the employer”).”
Montoya v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 88 F.4th 309 (1st Cir. 2023).
· cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 (an employee is "engaged to wait" and thus "[o]n duty" when he is "unable to use [his] time effectively for his own purposes," because it "belongs to and is controlled by the employer").”
Julian v. Swift Transp. Co., 360 F. Supp. 3d 932 (D. Ariz. 2018).
“See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.15 , 785.16. In short, Plaintiffs were confined to the worksite (the truck), were not able to "use the time effectively for [their] own purposes" because they were not entitled to "leave the job" and were not provided a "definitely specified hour" when they…”
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