29 C.F.R. § 785.2
Decisions on interpretations; use of interpretations
The ultimate decisions on interpretations of the act are made by the courts. The Administrator must determine in the first instance the positions he will take in the enforcement of the Act. The regulations in this part seek to inform the public of such positions. It should thus provide a “practical guide for employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it.” (Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944).)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1971–2025 · leading case: Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2008).
Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2008). “Although courts are responsible for final decisions concerning interpretation of the Act, see 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.”
Sec'y United States Dep't of Labor v. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 873 F.3d 420 (3rd Cir. 2017). “2015) ("In evaluating the effect of these regulations, it is significant to keep in mind that the Supreme Court has commented that interpretive regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Labor under the FLSA do not have the force of law; the regulations ‘constitute…”
Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Kan. 2012). “The regulations in this part seek to inform the public of such positions.”
Riggs v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 664 (Ct. Cl. 1990). “” 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 . 18 It is readily observed from a reading of section 785.”
David Kavanagh v. Grand Union Co., Inc., 192 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1999). “124 (1944); 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (“The ultimate decisions on interpretations of the [Fair Labor Standards Act] are made by the courts.”
Kenneth J. Hill v. United States of Am., 751 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1985). “29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (1983). The district court recognized that these guidelines are not binding but may be considered by the courts.”
Akpeneye v. United States, 990 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “3d at 64–65; see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (“The ultimate decisions on interpretations of the [FLSA] are made by the courts.”
Fowler v. Incor, 279 F. App'x 590 (10th Cir. 2008). “” 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 . Nonetheless, because the agency “must determine in the first instance the positions [it] will take in the enforcement of [the FLSA],” the regulations “seek to inform the public of [the] positions” that it will take.”
Wahl v. City of Wichita, Kan., 725 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Kan. 1989). “The defendant argues that administrative regulations interpreting the FLSA are not binding on the courts, and essentially asks the court to discard the interpretation of worktime contained in 29 C.”
Michael J. Rudolph & James A. Lindquist, Appellants/cross-Appellees v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, Appellee/cross-Appellant, 103 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 1996). “10 , and that the courts are ultimately responsible for interpretations of the Act, 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 . The regulation’s caption, which we may properly use to construe it, expressly mentions not only work performed by employees who live on the employer’s premises, but also work…”
Koellhoffer v. Plotke-Giordani, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Colo. 2012). “Defendants argue that since the USDOL in 2002 investigated Defendants’ tip-pool policy and found Defendants’ policy to be in compliance with the FLSA, the Court should give deference to this finding and likewise conclude that Defendants’ tip-pool policy did not violate the FLSA.”
Haviland v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (S.D. Iowa 2010). “” 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.”
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