29 C.F.R. § 785.23
Employees residing on employer's premises or working at home
An employee who resides on his employer's premises on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not considered as working all the time he is on the premises. Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private pursuits and thus have enough time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and other periods of complete freedom from all duties when he may leave the premises for purposes of his own. It is, of course, difficult to determine the exact hours worked under these circumstances and any reasonable agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all of the pertinent facts will be accepted. This rule would apply, for example, to the pumper of a stripper well who resides on the premises of his employer and also to a telephone operator who has the switchboard in her own home. (Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 183, 148 P. 2d 182 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1944; Thompson v. Loring Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. La. 1943).)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 75
cases (18 in the last 5 years), 1969–2025 · leading case: Maryam Balbed v. Eden Park Guest House, LLC, 881 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2018).
Maryam Balbed v. Eden Park Guest House, LLC, 881 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2018). “The district court agreed with Eden Park, concluding that 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 carved out an exception to the other FLSA regulatory requirements for recordkeeping and calculation of in-kind wages.”
Myers v. Baltimore Cnty. MD, 50 F. App'x 583 (4th Cir. 2002). “The district court, concluding that the parties had reached a "reasonable agreement" as provided under 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 (2001), entered an order granting summary judgment to Baltimore Parks.”
Charlene Brigham, as Pers. Rep. of the Est. of James Brigham Carl Hall Gary Millsap Donald E. Reed v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2004). “16 Most pertinent to the present case is 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 , which provides: An employee who resides on his employer’s premises on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not considered as working all the time he is on the premises.”
Irma Ruth Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., Inc., D/B/A Pulse Ambulance Serv., 821 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1987). “Pulse Drug also contends that the district court did not properly apply the exception to the FLSA’s minimum wage requirements for homeworkers, 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 , or the exception for time spent “waiting to be engaged.”
Schryvers v. Coulee Cmty. Hosp., 158 P.3d 113 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “29 C.F.R. § 785.23 ; 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(1).”
Lonnie Brock, Plaintiffs-Appellees/cross-Appellants v. City of Cincinnati John Shirey, City Manager, Defendants-Appellants/cross-Appellees, 236 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2001). “2 Cincinnati’s motion for summary judgment argued that the parties had reached a reasonable agreement as to work performed at home, which 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 recognizes as binding.”
Paula Leever v. Carson, City of Consol. Mun. of Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2004). “The City contends that it was exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 because it had a “reasonable agreement” to compensate Leever for her overtime work by way of a biweekly flat fee.”
Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881 (2019). “§ 207 (a). Therefore, this California law does not provide the rule of decision on the OCS, and to the extent Newton's OCS-based claims rely on that law, they necessarily fail.”
Sydney A. TerMorshuizen v. Spurwink Servs., Inc., 2019 ME 77 (Me. 2019). “2 [¶8] On March 23, 2018, Spurwink moved for summary judgment on the grounds that its sleep time compensation policy was in compliance with federal law, specifically 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 (2018), and was reasonable as a matter of law.”
Joseph H. Holzapfel, & Others Similarly Situated v. Town of Newburgh, Ny Charles M. Kehoe, Chief of Police, Town of Newburgh Police Dep't, 145 F.3d 516 (2d Cir. 1998). “While the Eighth Circuit in Rudolph applied 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 (1997), which provides that in light of the difficulty of calculating the precise number of hours an employee works at home, “any reasonable agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all of the…”
Irma Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., Inc. D/B/A Pulse Ambulance Serv., 864 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1989). “29 C.F.R. § 785.23 (1987). A Department of Labor regulation opinion has offered the following explanation of this regulation: Section 785.”
Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge, 433 P.3d 1173 (Alaska 2018). “He points to the relevant federal regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 , which recognizes that "[a]n employee who resides on his employer's premises on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not considered as working all the time he is on the premises," because…”
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