29 C.F.R. § 785.6
Definition of “employ” and partial definition of “hours worked”
By statutory definition the term “employ” includes (section 3(g)) “to suffer or permit to work.” The act, however, contains no definition of “work”. Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act contains a partial definition of “hours worked” in the form of a limited exception for clothes-changing and wash-up time.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (D.N.M. 2017).
Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (D.N.M. 2017). “See 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (“By statutory definition the term ‘employ1 includes (section 3(g)) ‘to suffer or permit to work.”
Bustillos v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 310 F.R.D. 631 (D.N.M. 2016). “See 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (“By statutory definition the term ‘employ’ includes (section 3(g)) ‘to suffer or permit to work.”
Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139 (Cal. 2000). “( 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (1998); see also Bono, supra, 32 Cal.”
Elliott Gelber v. AKAL Sec., Inc., 14 F.4th 1279 (11th Cir. 2021). “§ 203(o); see 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 . 29 USCA11 Case: 18-14496 Date Filed: 09/30/2021 Page: 30 of 44 The Supreme Court originally defined “work” in the FLSA context to mean “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued…”
Brubach v. City of Albuquerque, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D.N.M. 2012). “§ 203 (g); accord 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 . In an action for unpaid overtime wages in violation of the FLSA, the burden of proof generally is upon the plaintiff-employee to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the number of hours of overtime worked each week and the amount of…”
Corman v. JWS of N.M., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (D.N.M. 2018). “See 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 ("By statutory definition the term 'employ' includes (section 3(g) ) 'to suffer or permit to work.”
Elaine L. Chao, Sec'y of Labor, United States Dep't of Labor v. Tradesmen Int'l, Inc., 310 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 2002). “§ 203(g); see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 . The Supreme Court has defined work to include any time “controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.”
Kari Sehie v. City of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2005). “§ 203 (g) (2005); see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (2005). However, the general rule is that an employee must be “paid for all time spent in ‘physical or mental exertion, whether burdensome or not, controlled and required by the employer, and pursued necessarily and primarily for the…”
Bono Enter., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). “) Instead, it recites “Principles for Determination,” including examples from cases which have construed the term: “The United States Supreme Court originally stated that employees subject to the act must be paid for all time spent in ‘physical or mental exertion (whether…”
Olivas v. C & S Oilfield Servs., LLC, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (D.N.M. 2018). “See 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 ("By statutory definition the term 'employ' includes (section 3(g) ) 'to suffer or permit to work.”
Frank Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). “See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.6 , -.7 (1974). Early Supreme Court cases interpreting FLSA developed the worktime standard.”
Dinkel v. Medstar Health Inc. (D.D.C. 2015). “’” 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203 (g)).”
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