29 C.F.R. § 790.6

Periods within the “workday” unaffected

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(a) Section 4 of the Portal Act does not affect the computation of hours worked within the “workday” proper, roughly described as the period “from whistle to whistle,” and its provisions have nothing to do with the compensability under the Fair Labor Standards Act of any activities engaged in by an employee during that period. 34 Under the provisions of section 4, one of the conditions that must be present before “preliminary” or “postliminary” activities are excluded from hours worked is that they ‘occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which the employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases’ the principal activity or activities which he is employed to perform. Accordingly, to the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after the employee commences to perform the first principal activity on a particular workday and before he ceases the performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of that section have no application. Periods of time between the commencement of the employee's first principal activity and the completion of his last principal activity on any workday must be included in the computation of hours worked to the same extent as would be required if the Portal Act had not been enacted. 35 The principles for determining hours worked within the “workday” proper will continue to be those established under the Fair Labor Standards Act without reference to the Portal Act, 36 which is concerned with this question only as it relates to time spent outside the “workday” in activities of the kind described in section 4. 37

34 The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee states (p. 47), “Activities of an employee which take place during the workday are * * * not affected by this section (section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, as finally enacted) and such activities will continue to be compensable or not without regard to the provisions of this section.”

35 See Senate Report, pp. 47, 48; Conference Report, p. 12; statement of Senator Wiley, explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4269 (also 2084, 2085); statement of Representative Gwynne, explaining the conference agreement to the House of Representatives, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388; statements of Senator Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 2293-2294, 2296-2300; statements of Senator Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 2181, 2182, 2362.

36 The determinations of hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended is discussed in part 785 of this chapter.

37 See statement of Senator Wiley explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 3269. See also the discussion in §§ 790.7 and 790.8.

(b) “Workday” as used in the Portal Act means, in general, the period between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee's principal activity or activities. It includes all time within that period whether or not the employee engages in work throughout all of that period. For example, a rest period or a lunch period is part of the “workday”, and section 4 of the Portal Act therefore plays no part in determining whether such a period, under the particular circumstances presented, is or is not compensable, or whether it should be included in the computation of hours worked. 38 If an employee is required to report at the actual place of performance of his principal activity at a certain specific time, his “workday” commences at the time he reports there for work in accordance with the employer's requirement, even though through a cause beyond the employee's control, he is not able to commence performance of his productive activities until a later time. In such a situation the time spent waiting for work would be part of the workday, 39 and section 4 of the Portal Act would not affect its inclusion in hours worked for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

38 Senate Report, pp. 47, 48. Cf. statement of Senator Wiley explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4269; statement of Senator Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 2362; statements of Senator Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 2297, 2298.

39 Colloquy between Senators Cooper and McGrath, 93 Cong. Rec. 2297, 2298.

[12 FR 7655, Nov. 18, 1947, as amended at 35 FR 7383, May 12, 1970]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 149 cases (66 in the last 5 years), 1986–2026 · leading case: Rochell Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014).
Rochell Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014). · cites it 10× “” 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (b). But the qualifying phrase “in general” (paraphrased as “generally” in IBP, Inc.”
Aaron Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball, 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019). · cites it 3× “” 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (b). The Supreme Court expanded upon this definition, interpreting “principal activity or activities” to also include “all activities which are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.”
Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2011). · cites it 3× “The rule “provides that ‘[p]eriods of time between the commencement of the employee’s first principal activity and the completion of his last principal activity on any workday must be included in the computation of hours worked to the same extent as would be required if the…”
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 2× “which such employee was employed to perform”); 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (b) (1999) (noting that the “workday” includes “all time within that period whether or not the employee engages in work throughout all of that period”); cf.”
United Transp. Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 1999). · cites it 5× “29 C.F.R. § 790.6 . We agree with the district court that we should not turn a single 24-hour period into essentially two 24-hour periods, simply because the drivers drive two shifts separated by a non-compensable off-duty period.”
Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011). · cites it 2× “514 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (b)). This Court has determined, however, that the continuous workday does not include time spent during a "bona fide meal period.”
Peg Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “” 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (b); Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29, 37 (describing and applying the continuous workday rule).”
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). “” 29 CFR § 790.6 (a) (2005). 3 Simi *29 larly, consistent with our prior decisions interpreting the FLSA, the Department of Labor has adopted the continuous workday rule, which means that the “workday” is generally defined as “the period between the commencement and completion…”
Rochell Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 753 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2014). · cites it 10× “Congress adopted section 203(o) with full knowledge of the then-existing Department of Labor definition of “workday” known as the “continuous workday” rule or doctrine—which states that the workday is, “in general, the period between the commencement and completion on the same…”
Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010). · cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (a). Dooley, 307 F.Supp.”
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010). · cites it 2× “2d 288 (2005) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (b)). In addition, "during a continuous workday, any walking time that occurs after the beginning of the employee's first principal activity and before the end of the employee's last principal activity is .”
Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (D.N.M. 2017). “Under Department of Labor regulations explaining the Portal-to-Portal Act, see 29 C.F.R. § 790.6 (1947), the workday begins with the “first principal activity” and ends with the last, see IBP, Inc.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b) — 3 cases
Butler v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 793 (D. Maryland 2014).
Wales v. Jack M. Berry, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
Marshall v. Amsted Rail Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Ill. 2011).
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