29 C.F.R. § 801.2

Definitions

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For purposes of this part:

(a) Act or EPPA means the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646, 29 U.S.C. 2001-2009).

(b) (1) The term commerce has the meaning provided in section 3(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(b)). As so defined, commerce means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.

(2) The term State means any of the fifty States and the District of Columbia and any Territory or possession of the United States.

(c) The term employer means any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee. A polygraph examiner either employed for or whose services are retained for the sole purpose of administering polygraph tests ordinarily would not be deemed an employer with respect to the examinees.

(d) (1) The term lie detector means a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual. Voice stress analyzers, or psychological stress evaluators, include any systems that utilize voice stress analysis, whether or not an opinion on honesty or dishonesty is specifically rendered.

(2) The term lie detector does not include medical tests used to determine the presence or absence of controlled substances or alcohol in bodily fluids. Also not included in the definition of lie detector are written or oral tests commonly referred to as “honesty” or “paper and pencil” tests, machine-scored or otherwise; and graphology tests commonly referred to as handwriting tests.

(e) The term polygraph means an instrument that—

(1) Records continuously, visually, permanently, and simultaneously changes in cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation standards; and

(2) Is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.

(f) The terms manufacture, dispense, distribute, and deliver have the meanings set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 812.

(g) The term Secretary means the Secretary of Labor or authorized representative.

(h) Wage and Hour Division means the organizational unit of the Department of Labor to which is assigned primary responsibility for enforcement and administration of the Act.

(i) Administrator means the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, or authorized representative.

[56 FR 9064, Mar. 4, 1991, as amended at 82 FR 2230, Jan. 9, 2017]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 10 cases, 1992–2014 · leading case: Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2002).

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Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2002). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c) (2001). Although we have found no circuit court of appeals case law considering whether a polygraph examiner can qualify as an employer under the EPPA, the existing district court authority is consistent with the Western District of Texas’s approach in…”

Rubin v. Tourneau, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c) (emphasis in original).”

Accurso v. Infra-Red Servs., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 494 (E.D. Pa. 2014). “§ 2001; see also 29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c). Courts use the "economic reality” test to determine whether a party is an employer under the EPPA.”

Darryl N. Veazey v. Commc'ns & Cable of Chicago, Inc., D/B/A Tci Commc'ns, Inc., Chicago Cable Tv, Tci Chicago or Tci-Chicago Cable, 194 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 1999). “29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (d). . Generally, in voice stress analysis, a person is asked a series of questions by an examiner.”

Fallin v. Mindis Metals, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ga. 1994). · cites it 2× “Application of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c) *839 (1992); 56 Fed.”

James v. Professionals' Detective Agency, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ill. 1995). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c) (emphasis in original).”

Fernandez v. Mora-San Miguel Elec. Coop., Inc., 462 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2006). “” See 29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c) (“A polygraph examiner either employed for or whose services are retained for the sole purpose of administering polygraph tests ordinarily would not be deemed an employer with respect to the examinees.”

Pluskota v. Roadrunner Freight Sys., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 904 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). “The current revised statute is substantially similar to the Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 .”

Del Canto v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 865 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1994). “Richardson was a person “acting directly or indirectly in the interests of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee,” language that is found in both the statute and the regulations.”

M. G. v. Metro. Interpreters & Translators, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 1189 (S.D. Cal. 2014). · cites it 3× “29 C.F.R. § 801.2 (c) (2001); Calbillo v.”

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