29 C.F.R. § 825.100

The Family and Medical Leave Act

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(a) The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, as amended, (FMLA or Act) allows eligible employees of a covered employer to take job-protected, unpaid leave, or to substitute appropriate paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it, for up to a total of 12 workweeks in any 12 months (see § 825.200(b)) because of the birth of a child and to care for the newborn child, because of the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care, because the employee is needed to care for a family member (child, spouse, or parent) with a serious health condition, because the employee's own serious health condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her job, or because of any qualifying exigency arising out of the fact that the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent is a military member on active duty or call to covered active duty status (or has been notified of an impending call or order to covered active duty). In addition, eligible employees of a covered employer may take job-protected, unpaid leave, or substitute appropriate paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it, for up to a total of 26 workweeks in a single 12-month period to care for a covered servicemember with a serious injury or illness. In certain cases, FMLA leave may be taken on an intermittent basis rather than all at once, or the employee may work a part-time schedule.

(b) An employee on FMLA leave is also entitled to have health benefits maintained while on leave as if the employee had continued to work instead of taking the leave. If an employee was paying all or part of the premium payments prior to leave, the employee would continue to pay his or her share during the leave period. The employer may recover its share only if the employee does not return to work for a reason other than the serious health condition of the employee or the employee's covered family member, the serious injury or illness of a covered servicemember, or another reason beyond the employee's control.

(c) An employee generally has a right to return to the same position or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, benefits, and working conditions at the conclusion of the leave. The taking of FMLA leave cannot result in the loss of any benefit that accrued prior to the start of the leave.

(d) The employer generally has a right to advance notice from the employee. In addition, the employer may require an employee to submit certification to substantiate that the leave is due to the serious health condition of the employee or the employee's covered family member, due to the serious injury or illness of a covered servicemember, or because of a qualifying exigency. Failure to comply with these requirements may result in a delay in the start of FMLA leave. Pursuant to a uniformly applied policy, the employer may also require that an employee present a certification of fitness to return to work when the absence was caused by the employee's serious health condition (see §§ 825.312 and 825.313). The employer may delay restoring the employee to employment without such certificate relating to the health condition which caused the employee's absence.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 72 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp.
Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp. (1998) ca1 · cites it 3× “§ 2611 (11); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100 (a), 825.114 (1997) (defining a “serious health condition”).”
Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc. (2014) ca7 “” 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 . If she did not, then C & M had no duty to grant her leave.”
Romans v. Michigan Department of Human Services (2012) ca6 “29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100 , 825.116. 2 Further: [t]he term also includes situations where the employee may be needed to fill in for others who are caring for the family member, or to make arrangements for changes in care, such as transfer to a nursing home.”
Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division (2005) ca1 “§ 2614 (a)(1); and 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (c)); see also Hillstrom v.”
Kathleen M. Victorelli v. Shadyside Hospital (1997) ca3 · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (a). More specifically, the FMLA applies when an employee’s own serious health condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her job.”
Carla Mutchler v. Dunlap Memorial Hospital Kathy Loede (2007) ca6 “6, 1995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 et seq.) (“[T]he minimum hours of service requirement is meant to be construed in a manner consistent with the legal principles established for determining hours of work for payment of overtime compensation under § 7 of the FLSA and…”
Peter v. Lincoln Technical Institute, Inc. (2002) paed “§ 2614 (a)(1) (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (c). When an employee seeks leave to care for a loved one or because they have a serious health condition that precludes them from working, her employer may require the employee to submit a certification completed by a health care…”
Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hospital (1999) ca1 “§ 2614 (a)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (c)). However, the regulations promulgated under the FMLA state that “[i]f the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition .”
Castro-Medina v. Procter & Gamble Commercial Co. (2008) prd “§ 2614 (a)(1); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100 (c) (1997)). “In addition to creating the above entitlements, the FMLA provides protection in the event an employee is discriminated against for exercising those rights.”
Joseph R. Scamihorn, Jr. v. General Truck Drivers, Office, Food and Warehouse Union, Local 952 Albertson's, Inc. (2002) ca9 “The regulations provide that "the employer may require an employee to submit certification from a health care provider to substantiate that the leave is due to the serious health condition of the employee or the employee's immediate family member.”
Barbara Taylor v. Progress Energy, Incorporated (2005) ca4 “See 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 et seq. We thus conclude for purposes of Chevron’s step one that Congress has not spoken directly on the issue of whether .”
Wheeler v. Jackson National Life Insurance (2016) tnmd “This was not a determination of Wheeler’s substantive FMLA "eligibility,” as asserted by Wheeler — that eligibility is determined by all the criteria set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 . . Wheeler "disputes [this fact] as characterized.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(c) — 1 case
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