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C.F.R.Title 29Chapter V—Wage and Hour Division, Department of LaborSubchapter C—Other LawsPart 825—The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993Subpart A—Coverage Under the Family and Medical Leave Act

29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (2026)

Eligible employee

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1995–2026 189citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 189 opinions since 1995, 31 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) An eligible employee is an employee of a covered employer who:

(1) Has been employed by the employer for at least 12 months, and

(2) Has been employed for at least 1,250 hours of service during the 12-month period immediately preceding the commencement of the leave (see § 825.801 for special hours of service requirements for airline flight crew employees), and

(3) Is employed at a worksite where 50 or more employees are employed by the employer within 75 miles of that worksite. See § 825.105(b) regarding employees who work outside the U.S.

(b) The 12 months an employee must have been employed by the employer need not be consecutive months, provided

(1) Subject to the exceptions provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, employment periods prior to a break in service of seven years or more need not be counted in determining whether the employee has been employed by the employer for at least 12 months.

(2) Employment periods preceding a break in service of more than seven years must be counted in determining whether the employee has been employed by the employer for at least 12 months where:

(i) The employee's break in service is occasioned by the fulfillment of his or her Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, et seq., covered service obligation. The period of absence from work due to or necessitated by USERRA-covered service must be also counted in determining whether the employee has been employed for at least 12 months by the employer. However, this section does not provide any greater entitlement to the employee than would be available under the USERRA; or

(ii) A written agreement, including a collective bargaining agreement, exists concerning the employer's intention to rehire the employee after the break in service (e.g., for purposes of the employee furthering his or her education or for childrearing purposes).

(3) If an employee is maintained on the payroll for any part of a week, including any periods of paid or unpaid leave (sick, vacation) during which other benefits or compensation are provided by the employer (e.g., workers' compensation, group health plan benefits, etc.), the week counts as a week of employment. For purposes of determining whether intermittent/occasional/casual employment qualifies as at least 12 months, 52 weeks is deemed to be equal to 12 months.

(4) Nothing in this section prevents employers from considering employment prior to a continuous break in service of more than seven years when determining whether an employee has met the 12-month employment requirement. However, if an employer chooses to recognize such prior employment, the employer must do so uniformly, with respect to all employees with similar breaks in service.

(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section and in § 825.801 containing the special hours of service requirement for airline flight crew employees, whether an employee has worked the minimum 1,250 hours of service is determined according to the principles established under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for determining compensable hours of work. See 29 CFR part 785. The determining factor is the number of hours an employee has worked for the employer within the meaning of the FLSA. The determination is not limited by methods of recordkeeping, or by compensation agreements that do not accurately reflect all of the hours an employee has worked for or been in service to the employer. Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked under FLSA's principles may be used.

(2) An employee returning from USERRA-covered service shall be credited with the hours of service that would have been performed but for the period of absence from work due to or necessitated by USERRA-covered service in determining the employee's eligibility for FMLA-qualifying leave. Accordingly, a person reemployed following USERRA-covered service has the hours that would have been worked for the employer added to any hours actually worked during the previous 12-month period to meet the hours of service requirement. In order to determine the hours that would have been worked during the period of absence from work due to or necessitated by USERRA-covered service, the employee's pre-service work schedule can generally be used for calculations. See § 825.801(c) for special rules applicable to airline flight crew employees.

(3) In the event an employer does not maintain an accurate record of hours worked by an employee, including for employees who are exempt from FLSA's requirement that a record be kept of their hours worked (e.g., bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees as defined in FLSA Regulations, 29 CFR part 541), the employer has the burden of showing that the employee has not worked the requisite hours. An employer must be able to clearly demonstrate, for example, that full-time teachers (see § 825.102 for definition) of an elementary or secondary school system, or institution of higher education, or other educational establishment or institution (who often work outside the classroom or at their homes) did not work 1,250 hours during the previous 12 months in order to claim that the teachers are not eligible for FMLA leave. See § 825.801(d) for special rules applicable to airline flight crew employees.

(d) The determination of whether an employee meets the hours of service requirement and has been employed by the employer for a total of at least 12 months must be made as of the date the FMLA leave is to start. An employee may be on non-FMLA leave at the time he or she meets the 12-month eligibility requirement, and in that event, any portion of the leave taken for an FMLA-qualifying reason after the employee meets the eligibility requirement would be FMLA leave. See § 825.300(b) for rules governing the content of the eligibility notice given to employees.

(e) Whether 50 employees are employed within 75 miles to ascertain an employee's eligibility for FMLA benefits is determined when the employee gives notice of the need for leave. Whether the leave is to be taken at one time or on an intermittent or reduced leave schedule basis, once an employee is determined eligible in response to that notice of the need for leave, the employee's eligibility is not affected by any subsequent change in the number of employees employed at or within 75 miles of the employee's worksite, for that specific notice of the need for leave. Similarly, an employer may not terminate employee leave that has already started if the employee count drops below 50. For example, if an employer employs 60 employees in August, but expects that the number of employees will drop to 40 in December, the employer must grant FMLA benefits to an otherwise eligible employee who gives notice of the need for leave in August for a period of leave to begin in December.

The 20 cases that cite 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDonnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2012).
cites § 825.110 6×cited by 143 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (c)(3). This provision, not cited by the District, plainly provides that the District must prove FMLA ineligibility.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation by showing a basis for a jury to conclude a causal connection exists between protected activity and adverse action.
Later courts cite it for
“when there is a basis for a jury to conclude that 'a causal connection exists between the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENCarla Mutchler v. Dunlap Mem'l Hosp. Kathy Loede, 485 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2007).
cites § 825.110 9×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“Additionally, the district court found that Plaintiff could not successfully invoke principles of equitable es-toppel, either as set forth in the common law or in the FMLA’s implementing regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d). Plaintiff timely appealed.”
The case’s holding
Compensated incentive hours not actually worked do not count toward the hours of service requirement for FMLA eligibility.
Later courts cite it for
“summary judgment is proper where 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” · 7 citing courts
3
cites § 825.110 4×cited by 295 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“” Moreover, New Rochelle argues she cannot be “deemed eligible” under 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d) due to New Rochelle’s failure to notify her of the FMLA requirements because such a determination would be in conflict with the clear statutory definition of an “eligible employee.”
The case’s holding
Equitable estoppel applies when an employer's failure to provide required notices causes an employee to detrimentally rely on the employer's silence or conduct, resulting in injustice.
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of equitable estoppel is properly invoked where the enforcement of the rights of one party would work an injustice upon the other party due to the latter's justifiable reliance upon the former's words or conduct.” · 28 citing courts
4
GREENWoodford v. Cmty. Action of Greene Cnty., Inc., 268 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2001).
cites § 825.110 11×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“We hold that the regulation upon which Woodford relies to establish her status as an eligible employee under the FMLA, 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d), contravenes the clear intent of the statute it is meant to implement.”
cites § 825.110 4×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d). 4 Here, it is undisputed that Pereda, at the time she requested leave, was not eligible for FMLA protection because she had not worked the requisite hours and had not yet experienced a triggering event, the birth of her child.”
The case’s holding
The FMLA protects an employee's request for foreseeable leave even before the employee becomes eligible for or entitled to that leave.
Later courts cite it for
“because the fmla requires notice in advance of future leave, employees are protected from interference prior to the occurrence of a triggering event, such as the birth of a child.” · 7 citing courts
6
GREENWolke v. Dreadnought Marine, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997).
cites § 825.110 11×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“Despite Plaintiff’s obvious ineligibility under the statute, Plaintiff argues that he should be deemed an eligible employee under the FMLA by operation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d) (1996). When the FMLA was enacted, the Secretary of Labor was authorized to promulgate regulations…”
Later courts cite it for
“29 c.f.r. 825.110, is invalid, because it impermissibly contradicts the clear intent of congress to restrict the class of employees eligible for the fmla.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENEngelhardt v. S.P. Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
cites § 825.110 4×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“Thus, Engelhardt was not an eligible employee under 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a)(3). I. SPR, a wholly-owned subsidiary of GPC, is an office supplies wholesaler headquartered in Smyrna, Georgia.”
The case’s holding
Separate entities are not integrated employers under the FMLA unless they demonstrate common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership.
Later courts cite it for
“may apply in cases where 'liability is sought to be imposed on the legal employer by arguing that another entity is sufficiently related such that its actions . . . can be attributable to the legal employer.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENDavis v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 543 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2008).
cites § 825.110 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“§ 2611 (2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a)(2). Davis failed to qualify for FMLA eligibility prior to September of 2004 because she did not meet the 1,250-hour requirement.”
Later courts cite it for
“to the extent she is claiming that she was terminated because of her attempt to obtain fmla leave . . . her claim must fail as a matter of law because she was not eligible for fmla benefits . . . .” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENBarron v. Runyon, 11 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Va. 1998).
cites § 825.110 9×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a)(2). For the twelve months immediately preceding February 25, 1994, and for the twelve months preceding any date after February 25, 1994, plaintiff worked less than 1,250 hours.”
Later courts cite it for
“must, by definition, comprise periods . . . in which the employee is present at work.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENCox v. True North Energy, LLC., 524 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
cites § 825.110 7×subsections: (b)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“), the week counts as a week of employment. For purposes of determining whether intermittent/oecasional/casual employment qualifies as “at least 12 months,” 52 weeks is deemed to be equal to 12 months.”
11
GREENSmith v. Westchester Cnty., 769 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
cites § 825.110 2×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d). Eligibility is a threshold issue, and it is insufficient for Plaintiff to “merely assert[ ] in a conelusory manner that he is eligible without stating any facts that relate to the definition of an eligible employee.”
The case’s holding
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead that individual defendants exercised substantial control over the employment aspects alleged to have been violated.
Later courts cite it for
“however, 'the economic reality test is a factual inquiry that does not bear on the sufficiency of pleadings.' thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff need not allege sufficient facts to satisfy the economic reality test; instead, he must simply 'plead that the proposed individual defendants had substantial control over the aspects of employment alleged to have been violated.” · 8 citing courts
12
GREENMcQuain v. Ebner Furnaces, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
cites § 825.110 7×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“Plaintiff counters that he should be considered an eligible employee because Defendant failed to give Plaintiff notice of his ineligibility within two days of the leave period as required by 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d) and, therefore, Defendant is estopped from challenging…”
13
GREENRich v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
cites § 825.110 6×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“29 C.F.R. § 825.110 . Thus, an employee who has less than 1,250 hours of service in the previous twelve-month period is- not entitled to the protections of the FMLA and may not maintain an action under the Act.”
14
GREENMacSuga v. Cnty. of Spokane, 983 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 825.110 4×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“29 C.F.R. § 825.110 . Ms. MacSuga assigns error to instruction 23, which informs the jury that, in calculating the total hours required to qualify for benefits under the FMLA, “[a]ll hours actually worked for the benefit of the employer and with the employer’s consent,…”
The case’s holding
An employer satisfies the duty to accommodate through good-faith interactive discussions with the employee rather than by consulting outside sources like doctors or government agencies.
Later courts cite it for
“prejudice means the outcome of the trial was affected.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENCoutard v. Mun. Credit Union, 848 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
cites § 825.110 1×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“§ 2611(2)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a) (so defining “eligible employee”).”
The case’s holding
An employee provides sufficient notice under the FMLA if the notice reasonably indicates that the Act may apply, placing the burden on the employer to seek additional information.
Later courts cite it for
“the fact that both sides have moved for summary judgment does not guarantee that there is no material issue of fact to be tried and that one side or the other is entitled to that relief.” · 10 citing courts
16
GREENLaurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2008).
cites § 825.110 2×subsections: (c)cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“§ 2611 (2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a). Sick and annual leave do not count as hours worked for the purposes of the statute.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff cannot establish pretext in a discrimination claim where she is unable to show a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Later courts cite it for
“to prove that plaintiff is similarly situated to another employee, a plaintiff must 'demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation were nearly identical to those of the allegedly comparable employee.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENReynolds v. Inter-Indus. Conf. on Auto Collision Repair, 594 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
cites § 825.110 3×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“This regulation appears to consider the exact scenario at hand, where a currently ineligible employee requests leave to begin on a date on which he will be eligible. Other FMLA implementing regulations support this position.”
Later courts cite it for
“as of the date the fmla leave is to start.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENRoberts v. Ground Handling, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
cites § 825.110 3×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (c). Pursuant to the regulations of the FLSA, “[pjeriods during which an employee is completely relieved from duty and which are long enough to enable him to use the time effectively for his own purposes are not hours worked.”
Later courts cite it for
“(1) that she is an 'eligible employee' under the fmla; (2) that defendants constitute an employer under the fmla; (3) that she was entitled to leave under the fmla; (4) that she gave notice to defendants of her intention to take leave; and (5) that defendants denied her benefits to which she was entitled by the fmla.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENRucker v. Lee Holding Co., 471 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2006).
cites § 825.110 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (b). According to Lee, the second and third sentences of the regulation modify the first sentence to give the only circumstances under which the 12 months “need not be consecutive months.”
Later courts cite it for
“the fmla itself is ambiguous as to whether previous periods of employment count toward the 12-month requirement, but regulations promulgated by the united states department of labor (dol), as interpreted by the dol, establish that previous periods of employment do count.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENErdman v. Nationwide Ins., 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009).
cites § 825.110 1×cited by 195 cases
Where it cites § 825.110
“Can Erdman Claim “Remedial Eligibility”? Erdman argues that 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (d) renders her eligible for FMLA leave regardless of how many hours she worked because Nationwide failed to notify her of her eligibility.”
The case’s holding
Terminating an employee for making a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute unlawful retaliation (holding that firing an employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute retaliation).
Later courts cite it for
“firing an employee for a valid request for fmla leave may constitute interference with the employee's fmla rights as well as retaliation against the employee.” · 36 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199520102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 2007. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
6th Cir.16D.D.C.8E.D. Mich.811th Cir.6N.D. Ohio63rd Cir.5D. Mass.5S.D.N.Y.5

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 77 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)2 cases
Coulibaly v. Tillerson, 273 F. Supp. 3d 16 (D.D.C. 2017).
Awadh v. Tourneau, INC, No. 1:15-cv-13993 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2018).
(a)(2)1 case
Cain v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-cv-00244 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2025).
(b)1 case
Cox v. True North Energy, LLC., 524 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Ohio 2007).“), the week counts as a week of employment. For purposes of determining whether intermittent/oecasional/casual employment qualifies as “at least 12 months,” 52 weeks is deemed to be equal to 12 months.”
(c)1 case
Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2008).“§ 2611 (2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a). Sick and annual leave do not count as hours worked for the purposes of the statute.”
(c)(3)1 case
Lc Bulger v. Detroit Pub. Schs. Cmty. Dist., No. 366447 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2025).
(d)2 cases
Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, 274 P.3d 781.
Pitre v. City Of New York, 713 F. Supp. 3d 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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