(a) Generally. A recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, apply different rules or regulations, impose different fees or requirements, or offer different services or benefits related to housing, except as provided in this section (including housing provided only to married students).
(b) Housing provided by recipient. (1) A recipient may provide separate housing on the basis of sex.
(2) Housing provided by a recipient to students of one sex, when compared to that provided to students of the other sex, shall be as a whole:
(i) Proportionate in quantity to the number of students of that sex applying for such housing; and
(ii) Comparable in quality and cost to the student.
(c) Other housing. (1) A recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, administer different policies or practices concerning occupancy by its students of housing other than provided by such recipient.
(2) A recipient which, through solicitation, listing, approval of housing, or otherwise, assists any agency, organization, or person in making housing available to any of its students, shall take such reasonable action as may be necessary to assure itself that such housing as is provided to students of one sex, when compared to that provided to students of the other sex, is as a whole:
(i) Proportionate in quantity and
(ii) Comparable in quality and cost to the student.
A recipient may render such assistance to any agency, organization, or person which provides all or part of such housing to students only of one sex.
[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 85 FR 30579, May 19, 2020]
Notes of Decisions
G.G. Ex Rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 4× “§ 1686 ; 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.32 (b), 106.33. Strikingly, the majority now reverses the district court’s ruling, without any supporting case law, and concludes that when Title IX and its regulations provide for separate living facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower…”
Drew Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., Florida, 57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2022).
“The regulations implementing Title IX explicitly permit schools receiving federal funds to “provide sepa- rate housing on the basis of sex,” so long as the housing is “[p]roportionate in quantity to the number of students of that sex applying for such housing” and “[c]omparable…”
Roe v. Critchfield, 137 F.4th 912 (9th Cir. 2025).
· cites it 2× “See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.32 (b) (stating that “[a] recipient may provide separate housing on the basis of sex” but requiring separate housing to be comparable in quality and cost.”
Bd. of Educ. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
“9 For the Court to find that the statute was ambiguous, it need not find that the agencies’ interpretation is the only plausible reading of “sex” in the statute, but, rather, that it is one of the plausible readings. Therefore, the district court cases Third-Party Defendants…”
State v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
“34 C.F.R. §§ 106.32 , 106.34. Without question, permitting educational institutions to provide separate housing to male and female students, and separate educational instruction concerning human sexuality, was to protect students’ personal privacy, or discussion of their…”
Parker Tirrell, et al. v. P Frank Edelblut, et al., 2024 DNH 073 (D.N.H. 2024).
“§ 1686 , and that its implementing regulations allow for separate housing, bathrooms, and athletic teams on the basis of sex, 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.32 -.33, .41. But applying Bostock’s recognition of the inextricable relationship between sex and transgender status to Title IX would…”
Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Props., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Utah 1995).
· cites it 2× “” BYU claims exemption from 34 C.F.R. § 106.32 “to the extent that it interferes with the University’s policy of requiring sex-segregated housing by off-campus landlords as a condition of being given approval to house BYU students.”
Gavin Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. (4th Cir. 2020).
· cites it 2× “And the applicable regulations give further detail, 85 permitting schools to provide “separate housing on the basis of sex,” as long as the housing is “[p]roportionate” and “[c]omparable,” 34 C.F.R. § 106.32 (b), and “separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the…”
Roe v. Critchfield (9th Cir. 2025).
· cites it 2× “See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.32 (b) (stating that “[a] recipient may provide separate housing on the basis of sex” but requiring separate housing to be comparable in quality and cost.”
G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 824 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2016).
“§ 1686 ; 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.32 , 106.33, they can override these provisions by redefining sex to mean how any given person identifies himself or herself at any given time, thereby, of necessity, denying all affected persons the dignity and freedom of bodily privacy.”
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