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C.F.R.Title 34Chapter III—Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Department of EducationPart 300—Assistance to States for the Education of Children With DisabilitiesSubpart D—Evaluations, Eligibility Determinations, Individualized Education Programs, and Educational Placements

34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (2026)

Initial evaluations

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 ACTIVE · 21 IN 5Y cited 1985–2026 59citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 59 opinions since 1985, 21 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) General. Each public agency must conduct a full and individual initial evaluation, in accordance with §§ 300.304 through 300.306, before the initial provision of special education and related services to a child with a disability under this part.

(b) Request for initial evaluation. Consistent with the consent requirements in § 300.300, either a parent of a child or a public agency may initiate a request for an initial evaluation to determine if the child is a child with a disability.

(c) Procedures for initial evaluation. The initial evaluation—

(1)(i) Must be conducted within 60 days of receiving parental consent for the evaluation; or

(ii) If the State establishes a timeframe within which the evaluation must be conducted, within that timeframe; and

(2) Must consist of procedures—

(i) To determine if the child is a child with a disability under § 300.8; and

(ii) To determine the educational needs of the child.

(d) Exception. The timeframe described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section does not apply to a public agency if—

(1) The parent of a child repeatedly fails or refuses to produce the child for the evaluation; or

(2) A child enrolls in a school of another public agency after the relevant timeframe in paragraph (c)(1) of this section has begun, and prior to a determination by the child's previous public agency as to whether the child is a child with a disability under § 300.8.

(e) The exception in paragraph (d)(2) of this section applies only if the subsequent public agency is making sufficient progress to ensure a prompt completion of the evaluation, and the parent and subsequent public agency agree to a specific time when the evaluation will be completed.

(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1414(a)) [71 FR 46753, Aug. 14, 2006, as amended at 72 FR 61307, Oct. 30, 2007]
The 20 cases that cite 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody ex rel. K.W., 865 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2017).
cites § 300.301 3×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.301 (c) & 300.323(c); see also 19 Tex.”
The case’s holding
School districts must evaluate students with suspected disabilities within a reasonable time after receiving notice of facts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.
Later courts cite it for
“school districts must seek to evaluate students with suspected disabilities within a reasonable time after the school district is on notice of facts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENTimothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2016).
cites § 300.301 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (b). If the school district wishes to deny the request, it must provide written notice to the parents explaining that it refuses to conduct an initial evaluation and provide an explanation as to why it does not suspect the child has a disability and what…”
The case’s holding
A school district violates the IDEA when it fails to assess a child in all areas of suspected disability after receiving notice of symptoms, regardless of informal staff observations.
Later courts cite it for
“when the district has notice that the child has displayed symptoms of that disability.” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENDl v. Dist. of Columbia, 194 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2016).
cites § 300.301 5×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (c)(1) states that an initial evaluation “[m]ust be conducted within 60 days of receiving parental consent for the evaluation” or within a state-established timeframe.”
Later courts cite it for
“on (1) plaintiffs' idea and district law claims related to the failure timely to evaluate children for special education and related services for the period from april 6, 2011 to the present subclass 2, and (2) all of plaintiffs' rehabilitation act claims for the period from march 22, 2010 to the present.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENDL v. Dist. of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“3d at 71 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (d)(1)). In this way, the injunction excuses the District from compliance where it is unable to meet its deadlines through no fault of its own.”
The case’s holding
Rule 23(b)(2) allows class certification for subclasses defined by common harms arising from systemic practices that demand uniform injunctive relief to avoid piecemeal litigation.
Later courts cite it for
“rule 23(b)(2) exists so that parties and courts . . . can avoid piecemeal litigation when common claims arise from systemic harms that demand injunctive relief.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENMr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“§ 1414 (a)(1)(C)(i)(I) ; 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (c)(1)(i)-(ii). Connecticut regulations require that "[s]pecial education and related services shall be provided as soon as possible after the planning and placement team meeting held to review, revise or develop the child's…”
The case’s holding
A procedural violation of the IDEA entitles relief only if it impedes a child's right to a free appropriate public education, significantly impedes parental participation, or causes educational deprivation.
Later courts cite it for
“the idea requires states receiving federal funds to provide 'all children with disabilities' with a fape,” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENZ. B. v. Dist. of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“§§ 1414(a)-(b); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 , 300.304-06. Operationally, when a school has reason to believe that a child with a disability is not receiving an adequate education, see 20 U.”
The case’s holding
An individual education program is substantively adequate if it is reasonably calculated to enable a student's progress based on what the school knew or reasonably should have known.
Later courts cite it for
“the key inquiry regarding an iep's substantive adequacy is whether, taking account of what the school knew or reasonably should have known of a student's needs at the time, the iep it offered was reasonably calculated to enable the specific student's progress.” · 18 citing courts
cites § 300.301 4×cited by 115 cases
Later courts cite it for
“we cannot conclude, without clear statutory support, that congress intended the eha to abrogate such a provision in a privately negotiated contract. we are confident that congress would not have done so without explicitly so providing.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 300.301 7×cited by 3 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
9
GREENJ.S. v. Westerly Sch. Dist., 910 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2018).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“" 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (a). As part of this initial review, a team of professionals must "[r]eview existing evaluation data on the child, including .”
Later courts cite it for
“ensuring that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education "fape” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENISD No. 283 v. E.M.D.H., 960 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2020).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“” 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (a)–(b). The District was also required to “ensure that .”
11
GREENBR ex rel. Rempson v. Dist. of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.D.C. 2011).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 26 cases
Later courts cite it for
“routinely refer to the laffey matrix to determine the reasonableness of requested attorney's fees in idea actions.” · 6 citing courts
12
GREENRAYMOND S. v. Ramirez, 918 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
cites § 300.301 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“In Count II, Plaintiffs contend, again under the IDEA, that Defendant Iowa Department of Education erred in concluding that 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 requires Plaintiffs to utilize some of their limited medical insurance benefits for Joseph to pay for the independent evaluation.”
13
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 9 cases
Later courts cite it for
“an action filed in federal district court pursuant to the idea 'is an original civil action, not an appeal from a state administrative agency.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENA.P. ex rel. Powers v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 572 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D. Conn. 2008).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“” 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (1999). The Hearing Officer found, and the Parents do not dispute, that the Parents “had not submitted a request to have a child evaluated for a disability or identified as a child with a disability” as was their right under the regulations.”
Later courts cite it for
“a school's failure to diagnose a disability at the earliest possible moment is not per se actionable, in part because some disabilities 'are notoriously difficult to diagnose and even experts disagree about whether some should be considered a disability at all.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENWimbish v. Dist. of Columbia, 381 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 7 cases
Later courts cite it for
“it is undisputed that a hearing officer is entitled to make reasonable credibility determinations and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, those determinations are entitled to deference from the court.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENDl v. Dist. of Columbia, 109 F. Supp. 3d 12 (D.D.C. 2015).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“§ 1414 (a)(1)(C); 34 C.F.R. 300.301; D.C. Code 38-2561(a); 5-E DCMR § 3005(1).”
Later courts cite it for
“additionally, the gatekeeping requirement is substantially relaxed when the judge will serve as factfinder in a trial.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENLauren G. ex rel. Scott G. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (c) arid 22 Pa.Code § 14.”
Later courts cite it for
“parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement under the idea for unilaterally changing their child's placement to a private school if the following three elements are proven: (1) the district failed to offer the student a fape; (2) the private placement is appropriate; and (3) equitable considerations favor reimbursement.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENH v. Riesel Indep Sch Dist, 18 F.4th 788 (5th Cir. 2021).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“1011 (c)(1) (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (c)(1) (authorizing states to establish a timeframe for initial evaluation).”
19
GREENR.F. ex rel. Frankel v. Delano Union Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 3d 979 (E.D. Cal. 2016).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“46,682 (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (defining an initial evaluation).”
20
GREEND.B. v. Bedford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 708 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D. Va. 2010).
cites § 300.301 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 300.301
“34 C.F.R. §§ 300.301 , 300.303. The evaluative criteria adopted by the state must not require the use of a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement for determining whether a child has a specific learning disability, as defined in 34 C.”
Later courts cite it for
“although the hearing officer observed that d.b. was promoted a grade every year, he failed to comprehend that this token advancement documents, at best, a sad case of social promotion.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520052026

One bar per year. Tallest: 9 cases in 2023. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.D.C.7E.D. Pa.7D.C. Cir.43rd Cir.35th Cir.3D. Conn.3D.N.J.32d Cir.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 32 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)1 case
Carson v. Dist. of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 197 (D.D.C. 2016).
(b)1 case
Brown ex rel. Brown v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 747 F. Supp. 436 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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