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C.F.R.Title 34Chapter III—Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Department of EducationPart 300—Assistance to States for the Education of Children With DisabilitiesSubpart E—Procedural Safeguards Due Process Procedures for Parents and Children

34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2026)

Mediation

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1981–2025 49citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 49 opinions since 1981, 2 of them in the last five years.

(a) General. Each public agency must ensure that procedures are established and implemented to allow parties to disputes involving any matter under this part, including matters arising prior to the filing of a due process complaint, to resolve disputes through a mediation process.

(b) Requirements. The procedures must meet the following requirements:

(1) The procedures must ensure that the mediation process—

(i) Is voluntary on the part of the parties;

(ii) Is not used to deny or delay a parent's right to a hearing on the parent's due process complaint, or to deny any other rights afforded under Part B of the Act; and

(iii) Is conducted by a qualified and impartial mediator who is trained in effective mediation techniques.

(2) A public agency may establish procedures to offer to parents and schools that choose not to use the mediation process, an opportunity to meet, at a time and location convenient to the parents, with a disinterested party—

(i) Who is under contract with an appropriate alternative dispute resolution entity, or a parent training and information center or community parent resource center in the State established under section 671 or 672 of the Act; and

(ii) Who would explain the benefits of, and encourage the use of, the mediation process to the parents.

(3)(i) The State must maintain a list of individuals who are qualified mediators and knowledgeable in laws and regulations relating to the provision of special education and related services.

(ii) The SEA must select mediators on a random, rotational, or other impartial basis.

(4) The State must bear the cost of the mediation process, including the costs of meetings described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(5) Each session in the mediation process must be scheduled in a timely manner and must be held in a location that is convenient to the parties to the dispute.

(6) If the parties resolve a dispute through the mediation process, the parties must execute a legally binding agreement that sets forth that resolution and that—

(i) States that all discussions that occurred during the mediation process will remain confidential and may not be used as evidence in any subsequent due process hearing or civil proceeding; and

(ii) Is signed by both the parent and a representative of the agency who has the authority to bind such agency.

(7) A written, signed mediation agreement under this paragraph is enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.

(8) Discussions that occur during the mediation process must be confidential and may not be used as evidence in any subsequent due process hearing or civil proceeding of any Federal court or State court of a State receiving assistance under this part.

(c) Impartiality of mediator. (1) An individual who serves as a mediator under this part—

(i) May not be an employee of the SEA or the LEA that is involved in the education or care of the child; and

(ii) Must not have a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the person's objectivity.

(2) A person who otherwise qualifies as a mediator is not an employee of an LEA or State agency described under § 300.228 solely because he or she is paid by the agency to serve as a mediator.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1820-0600) (Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)) [71 FR 46753, Aug. 14, 2006, as amended at 72 FR 61307, Oct. 30, 2007]
The 20 cases that cite 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENJohnson v. Boston Pub. Schs., 906 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 2018).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“"); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (b)(iii) (same). Here, the negotiations were before a hearing officer who convened the parties for a prehearing conference.”
The case’s holding
A hearing officer may weigh evidence otherwise inadmissible in court, and the FAPE standard focuses on the individual child's circumstances, so an IEP is judged by that child's needs.
Later courts cite it for
“meaningful educational benefit” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENI.L. ex rel. Taylor v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 946 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 21 cases
Later courts cite it for
“under the authority of either the school district or the state educational agency.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENMegan C. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 57 F. Supp. 2d 776 (D. Minn. 1999).
cites § 300.506 3×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“at 436 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 n.) Upper Valley’s reliance of recovery of attorneys’ fees during mediation to enforce provisions of the IDEA is, however, unpersuasive for two fundamental reasons.”
Later courts cite it for
“two separate, distinct, and independent remedies” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENTC v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“1992); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506 -.507. Plaintiffs argue that the exhaustion requirement should be excused because DC was to graduate high school shortly after these issues arose and resorting to administrative remedies would have been futile.”
The case’s holding
A parent cannot assert a student's claims personally, though the student may assert them after reaching adulthood, and school discipline of student speech requires reasonably foreseeable material disruption.
5
YELLOWClifford Burr v. Gordon Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1988).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 79 cases
Vacated: 11 citing opinions add another limit ("vacated (caution)").
Where it cites § 300.506
“34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506 and 300.512. Despite this clear command, the hearing regarding Clifford did not even commence until over four months after the request for it, and the hearing officer’s decision came over a year after the request.”
The case’s holding
Courts may award compensatory education beyond age twenty-one to remedy a violation of a child's right to a free appropriate public education.
Later courts cite it for
“a handicapped child does not have a right to demand a public education beyond the age of twenty-one,” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENAnika Cox v. Dr. Andrew Jenkins, 878 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 58 cases
The case’s holding
A party must exhaust all administrative remedies under the Education of the Handicapped Act before seeking judicial review unless exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.
Later courts cite it for
“the controlling point of law here is that, absent a showing that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate, a party must pursue all administrative avenues of redress under the idea before seeking judicial review under the act.” · 12 citing courts
7
GREENWest Chester Area SD v. A.M. & K.M., 164 A.3d 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“The argument against jurisdiction finds support in two regulatory provisions: 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (b)(7) and § 300.510(d)(2).”
Later courts cite it for
“when possible, it is appropriate for a pennsylvania appellate court to follow the third circuit's ruling on federal questions to which the u.s. supreme court has not yet provided a definitive answer.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENJ.K. v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 833 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“) (“[Njeither of these provisions [ 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506 (b)(7) and 300.510(d)(2), implementing the IDEA] precludes a hearing officer from reviewing a settlement agreement’s terms.”
Later courts cite it for
“to the contrary, the contract plainly states that 'the parties' ... will perform that task.” · 1 citing court
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 25 cases
Later courts cite it for
“one of the obvious purposes of the 'stay-put' provision is to reduce the chance of a child being bounced from one school to another, only to have the location changed again by an appellate court.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENDavid Abney v. Dist. of Columbia, 849 F.2d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“§ 1415 (b)(1)(E) to (d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 -.510. In the instant case, there is no question that the District failed to comply with these statutory provisions during September and October 1985.”
Later courts cite it for
“an iep is not location-specific; the place at which an iep is implemented may change without the iep itself changing.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENWeast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004).
cites § 300.506 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“34 C.F.R. § 300.506 . The school system must also advise the parents "of any WEAST v.”
The case’s holding
In an IDEA administrative due process hearing challenging an individualized education program, the parents who challenge the IEP bear the burden of proof.
Later courts cite it for
“parents who challenge an iep have the burden of proof in the administrative hearing.” · 7 citing courts
12
GREENK.P. v. Juzwic, 891 F. Supp. 703 (D. Conn. 1995).
cites § 300.506 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“§ 1415 (b)(1)(E), (b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (a); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10 — 76h; ConrnBd.”
13
GREENReusch v. Fountain, 872 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Md. 1994).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“See 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (giving parents a right to a due process hearing); id.”
Later courts cite it for
“some educational benefit prong will- not be met by the provision of de minimis, trivial learning opportunities.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENNatrona Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 1988).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“Although state administrative procedural rules may differ, the hearing officer may not be an employee of the agency handling the hearing, be involved in the education or care of the subject child, or have a professional or individual prejudice.”
15
GREENE.M. v. Millville Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312 (D.N.J. 1994).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“34 C.F.R. § 300.506 ; Masotti v. Tustin Unified Sch.”
16
GREENFarmers Ins. Exch. v. South Lyon Cmty. Schs., 602 N.W.2d 588 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“20 USC 1415(b)(1); 34 CFR 300.506. It is undisputed that neither the school district nor Benjamin’s parents have requested that the nursing services be included in Benjamin’s iep.”
Later courts cite it for
“the mcca is not obligated to indemnify its member insurers for amounts the insurers are not obligated to pay under their no-fault policies.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 11 cases
Reversed by Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 300.506
“The parties agree that, if James’s parents enrolled him in a non-sectarian private school or public school, the School District would be obliged to provide a sign language interpreter for him.”
Later courts cite it for
“only the validity of one very specific proposed application of the statutes at issue” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENSean R. ex rel. Dwight R. v. Bd. of Educ., 794 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1992).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“Following the administrative review, the parents requested a due process hearing pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 , et seq., to challenge the appropriateness of plaintiffs educational program from 1988-1990 and to obtain reimbursement for expenditures for language and educational…”
19
GREENBARBARA R. v. Tirozzi, 665 F. Supp. 141 (D. Conn. 1987).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services, Department of Education, issued specific and detailed implementing regulations, including the following: 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (a): A parent ... may initiate a hearing on any of the matters [pertaining to the placement…”
20
GREENSaleh v. Dist. of Columbia, 660 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1987).
cites § 300.506 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 300.506
“See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506 , 300.507. See also Plaintiffs’ Motion Exhibit 1 (Determination filed October 18, 1985, hereinafter referred to as the 1985 Determination) at 2.”

Show all 49 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198120032025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1992. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
2d Cir.59th Cir.4D. Conn.311th Cir.24th Cir.2D.C. Cir.2D.D.C.2E.D. Mich.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 34 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Show all 49 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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