34 C.F.R. § 300.511

Impartial due process hearing

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(a) General. Whenever a due process complaint is received under § 300.507 or § 300.532, the parents or the LEA involved in the dispute must have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, consistent with the procedures in §§ 300.507, 300.508, and 300.510.

(b) Agency responsible for conducting the due process hearing. The hearing described in paragraph (a) of this section must be conducted by the SEA or the public agency directly responsible for the education of the child, as determined under State statute, State regulation, or a written policy of the SEA.

(c) Impartial hearing officer. (1) At a minimum, a hearing officer—

(i) Must not be—

(A) An employee of the SEA or the LEA that is involved in the education or care of the child; or

(B) A person having a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the person's objectivity in the hearing;

(ii) Must possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the provisions of the Act, Federal and State regulations pertaining to the Act, and legal interpretations of the Act by Federal and State courts;

(iii) Must possess the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice; and

(iv) Must possess the knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice.

(2) A person who otherwise qualifies to conduct a hearing under paragraph (c)(1) of this section is not an employee of the agency solely because he or she is paid by the agency to serve as a hearing officer.

(3) Each public agency must keep a list of the persons who serve as hearing officers. The list must include a statement of the qualifications of each of those persons.

(d) Subject matter of due process hearings. The party requesting the due process hearing may not raise issues at the due process hearing that were not raised in the due process complaint filed under § 300.508(b), unless the other party agrees otherwise.

(e) Timeline for requesting a hearing. A parent or agency must request an impartial hearing on their due process complaint within two years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the due process complaint, or if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a due process hearing under this part, in the time allowed by that State law.

(f) Exceptions to the timeline. The timeline described in paragraph (e) of this section does not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from filing a due process complaint due to—

(1) Specific misrepresentations by the LEA that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the due process complaint; or

(2) The LEA's withholding of information from the parent that was required under this part to be provided to the parent.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1820-0600) (Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(1)(A), 1415(f)(3)(A)-(D))
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 113 cases (28 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: D.K. Ex Rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3rd Cir. 2012).
D.K. Ex Rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3rd Cir. 2012). · cites it 3× “§ 1415 (f)(3)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (e). Parents have the same two years to file an administrative complaint alleging a violation of the IDEA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”
Engwiller v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 110 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). · cites it 5× “See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (a)(1); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.”
Walker v. Dist. of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2001). · cites it 2× “§ 1415 (f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (a); D.C. Mun. Reg. Tit.”
I.L. ex rel. Taylor v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 946 (E.D. Tenn. 2017). · cites it 2× “34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (b)-(c). The ALJ’s decision is final.”
Damarcus S. Ex Rel. K.S. v. Dist. of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D.D.C. 2016). · cites it 2× “See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (d). Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that they failed to raise this claim in their complaint (see AR at 334-41), nor do they argue that the District agreed to litigate it at the hearing.”
G W v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ., 28 F.4th 465 (3rd Cir. 2022). · cites it 2× “§ 1415 (f)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (a); see generally 2 Ronna Greff Schneider & Phyllis 20 U.”
Diaz-Fonseca v. Commonwealth of PR, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006). “See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (a)(1) (“The public agency shall ensure that not later than 45 days after the receipt of a request for a hearing .”
El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R. Ex Rel R.R., 567 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Tex. 2008). · cites it 2× “§ 1415 (f)(3)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (e) (reiterating the general two-year statute of limitations that states may choose to supercede)).”
M.O. v. Dist. of Columbia, 20 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 2013). · cites it 2× “§ 1415 (f)(3)(B); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (d) (“The party requesting the due process hearing may not raise issues *39 at the due process hearing that were not raised in the due process complaint .”
Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2005). · cites it 5× “See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (a). In order to meet the 45 day requirement, District of Columbia regulations require DCPS to convene a hearing within 35 days of a request and to issue a written decision within 10 days of the hearing.”
Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003). · cites it 2× “511 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 , and Sections 5-3029.”
C.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2014). “§ 1415(f)(3)(B); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (d). Here, in their due process complaint, Plaintiffs provided fair notice to the Department of their claim concerning the lack of availability of the proposed site prior to September.”
— 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(1999) — 1 case
H.H. Ex Rel. Hough v. Indiana Bd. of Special Educ. Appeals, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
— 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(2006) — 1 case
H.H. Ex Rel. Hough v. Indiana Bd. of Special Educ. Appeals, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
— 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(a) — 2 cases
A.I. Ex Rel. Iapalucci v. Dist. of Columbia, 402 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2005).
Warton v. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2002).
— 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(b) — 1 case
— 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(c)(1) — 1 case
— 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(f)(2) — 1 case
El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R. Ex Rel R.R., 567 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Tex. 2008). “§ 1415 (f)(3)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (e) (reiterating the general two-year statute of limitations that states may choose to supercede)).”
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