(a) General. A State may provide that, when a child with a disability reaches the age of majority under State law that applies to all children (except for a child with a disability who has been determined to be incompetent under State law)—
(1)(i) The public agency must provide any notice required by this part to both the child and the parents; and
(ii) All rights accorded to parents under Part B of the Act transfer to the child;
(2) All rights accorded to parents under Part B of the Act transfer to children who are incarcerated in an adult or juvenile, State or local correctional institution; and
(3) Whenever a State provides for the transfer of rights under this part pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section, the agency must notify the child and the parents of the transfer of rights.
(b) Special rule. A State must establish procedures for appointing the parent of a child with a disability, or, if the parent is not available, another appropriate individual, to represent the educational interests of the child throughout the period of the child's eligibility under Part B of the Act if, under State law, a child who has reached the age of majority, but has not been determined to be incompetent, can be determined not to have the ability to provide informed consent with respect to the child's educational program.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1415(m))
Notes of Decisions
Reyes Ex Rel. E.M. v. Manor Indep. Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 2× “017(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (a)(1)(h). Although a child’s rights flow from the federal statute, states are given authority to set up the enforcement procedures for achieving the IDEA’S goals.”
Farrin v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 59, 165 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D. Me. 2001).
· cites it 2× “§ 1415 (k)(l)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (b). C. The IDEA’S Procedural Protections for Parents and Students The IDEA gives a disabled child’s parents a number of procedural rights intended to ensure their participation in the development of their child’s program and placement.”
Hornstine v. Twp. of Moorestown, 263 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D.N.J. 2003).
“Therefore, the request for due process cannot be processed because it does not seek a final determination concerning “identification, evaluation, reevaluation, classification, educational placement, the provision of a free, appropriate public education, or disciplinary action…”
Baer v. Klagholz, 771 A.2d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
· cites it 2× “(e) In the case of a removal for drug or weapons offenses under 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (a)(2), or a removal by an administrative law judge for dangerousness consistent with 34 C.”
Dohmen Ex Rel. Dohmen v. Twin Rivers Pub. Sch., 207 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Neb. 2002).
“§ 1415 (k)(l)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 .” Id. “The IDEA gives a disabled child’s parents a number of procedural rights intended to ensure their participation in the development of their child’s program and placement.”
Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 745 F. Supp. 2d 700 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
· cites it 2× “1049(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (a). That same fall the parents began to explore other options to KISD, which they concluded was not improving Per’s deficiencies, to help him reach his goal to go to college and live independently.”
Monica Reyes v. Manor Indep. Sch. Di (5th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 2× “017(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (a)(1)(ii). Although a child’s rights flow from the federal statute, states are given authority to set up the enforcement procedures for achieving the IDEA’s goals.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.