C.F.R. » Title 37 » CHAPTER I—UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE › SUBCHAPTER A—GENERAL › PART 2—RULES OF PRACTICE IN TRADEMARK CASES

37 C.F.R. § 2.102

Extension of time for filing an opposition

Read at: eCFRecfr.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) Any person who believes that he, she or it would be damaged by the registration of a mark on the Principal Register may file a request with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to extend the time for filing an opposition. The request need not be verified, but must be signed by the potential opposer or by the potential opposer's attorney, as specified in § 11.1 of this chapter, or authorized representative, as specified in § 11.14(b) of this chapter. Electronic signatures pursuant to § 2.193(c) are required for electronically filed extension requests.

(1) A request to extend the time for filing an opposition to an application must be filed through ESTTA by the opposition due date set forth in § 2.101(c). In the event that ESTTA is unavailable due to technical problems, or when extraordinary circumstances are present, a request to extend the opposition period for an application based on Section 1 or 44 of the Act may be filed in paper form by the opposition due date set forth in § 2.101(c). A request to extend the opposition period for an application based on Section 66(a) of the Act must be filed through ESTTA and may not under any circumstances be filed in paper form.

(2) A paper request to extend the opposition period for an application based on Section 1 or 44 of the Act must be filed by the due date set forth in § 2.101(c) and be accompanied by a Petition to the Director under § 2.146, with the fees therefor and the showing required under paragraph (a)(1) of this section. Timeliness of the paper submission will be determined in accordance with §§ 2.195 through 2.198.

(b) A request to extend the time for filing an opposition must identify the potential opposer with reasonable certainty. Any opposition filed during an extension of time must be in the name of the person to whom the extension was granted, except that an opposition may be accepted if the person in whose name the extension was requested was misidentified through mistake or if the opposition is filed in the name of a person in privity with the person who requested and was granted the extension of time.

(c) The time for filing an opposition shall not be extended beyond 180 days from the date of publication. Any request to extend the time for filing an opposition must be filed before thirty days have expired from the date of publication or before the expiration of a previously granted extension of time, as appropriate. Requests to extend the time for filing an opposition must be filed as follows:

(1) A person may file a first request for:

(i) Either a thirty-day extension of time, which will be granted upon request; or

(ii) A ninety-day extension of time, which will be granted only for good cause shown. A sixty-day extension is not available as a first extension of time to oppose.

(2) If a person was granted an initial thirty-day extension of time, that person may file a request for an additional sixty-day extension of time, which will be granted only for good cause shown.

(3) After receiving one or two extensions of time totaling ninety days, a person may file one final request for an extension of time for an additional sixty days. No other time period will be allowed for a final extension of the opposition period. The Board will grant this request only upon written consent or stipulation signed by the applicant or its authorized representative, or a written request by the potential opposer or its authorized representative stating that the applicant or its authorized representative has consented to the request, or a showing of extraordinary circumstances. No further extensions of time to file an opposition will be granted under any circumstances.

(d) The filing date of a request to extend the time for filing an opposition is the date of electronic receipt in the Office of the request. In the rare instance that filing by paper is permitted under these rules, the filing date will be determined in accordance with §§ 2.195 through 2.198.

(e) [Reserved]

[68 FR 55765, Sept. 26, 2003, as amended at 73 FR 47685, Aug. 14, 2008; 74 FR 54909, Oct. 26, 2009; 81 FR 69972, Oct. 7, 2016]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2003–2024 · leading case: Custom Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Paychex Props., Inc., 337 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Custom Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Paychex Props., Inc., 337 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). · cites it 3× “, 27 USPQ2d 1075, 1993 WL 236535 (TTAB 1993), the Board interpreted the term “mistake” in 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 (b), the rule that allows for a party misidentified by mistake in an extension request to proceed as the opposing party, to mean “a mistake in the form of the potential…”
Firsthealth of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc., 479 F.3d 825 (1st Cir. 2007). “2003) (deferring to the Board’s interpretation of “mistake” in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 (b)). The Board’s decision in Pumpkin is on point.”
Google, Inc. v. Cent. Mfg. Inc., 316 F. App'x 491 (7th Cir. 2008). “See 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 . Stoller billed himself as “president and CEO” of “Central Mfg.”
Christian Copyright Licensing Int'l LLC v. Multitracks.com LLC (D. Ariz. 2024). “) 10 On March 18, 2024, CCLI requested a 90-day extension of time to file a notice of 11 opposition, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 , asserting as good cause2 the need for additional 12 time “to investigate the claim” and “confer with counsel.”
Firsthealth of the Carolinas v. Carefirst of Maryland [Reposted With Cover Sheet] (Fed. Cir. 2007). “2003) (deferring to the Board’s interpretation of “mistake” in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 (b)). 2006-1148 5 The Board’s decision in Pumpkin is on point.”
Stoller v. N. Telepresence Corp., 152 F. App'x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “37 C.F.R. § 2.102 (a) (2003). In this case, the 30-day time period ended on February 27, 2003.”
Google Inc. v. Cent. Mfg Inc (7th Cir. 2008). “See 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 . Stoller billed himself as “president and CEO” of “Central Mfg.”
Google, Inc. v. Cent. Mfg. Inc., 316 F. App'x 491 (7th Cir. 2008). “See 37 C.F.R. § 2.102 . Stoller billed himself as “president and CEO” of “Central Mfg.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.