37 C.F.R. § 41.200
Procedure; pendency
(a) A patent interference is a contested case subject to the procedures set forth in subpart D of this part.
(b) Any reference to 35 U.S.C. 102 or 135 in this subpart refers to the statute in effect on March 15, 2013, unless otherwise expressly indicated. Any reference to 35 U.S.C. 141 or 146 in this subpart refers to the statute applicable to the involved application or patent.
(c) Patent interferences shall be administered such that pendency before the Board is normally no more than two years.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12
cases, 2006–2010 · leading case: Koninklijke Philips Elec. N v. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Koninklijke Philips Elec. N v. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “” 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (b) (2009) (emphasis added).”
Sears Ecological Applications Co. v. MLI Assocs., LLC, 652 F. Supp. 2d 244 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). “” 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (b). SEACO’s confusion as to whether the Board even constructed the claim language in the '310 and '325 patents is understandable because section C of the Board’s decision, entitled “Claim Interpretation,” (Bd.”
Robertson v. Timmermans, 603 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “” To determine the correct construction of Timmermans’s claims 8 and 9, the Board applied 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (b), a PTO regulation governing claim construction in interference proceedings.”
Agilent Tech., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “Affymetrix places great emphasis on the language of 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (b) (2004), which provides: “A claim shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the application or patent in which it appears.”
Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Tech. Corp., 603 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “1997); 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (b). This court will uphold any reasonable interpretation of disputed claim language by the PTO.”
Michael S. Brown, Joseph L. Goldstein, & Yuval Reiss v. Mariano Barbacid & Veeraswamy Manne, 436 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “690 and adding 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.200 through 41.208). The Board acknowledged the change, but did not err in continuing to apply the rules under which this case was decided.”
Robert D. Brand, Capital Mach. Co., Inc., & Indiana Forge, LLC v. Thomas A. Miller, Darrel C. Pinkston, & Miller Veneers, Inc., 487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “All motions must be accompanied with “appropriate evidence, such that, if unrebutted, it would justify the relief sought.” 37 C.”
Yorkey v. Diab, 605 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “See 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (b) (“A claim shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the application or patent in which it appears.”
Cytologic, Inc. v. Biopheresis Gmbh, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). “…to the general procedures governing contested cases, including the procedures set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 41.121 (b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (a).”
Spine v. Biedermann Motech Gmbh, 684 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2010). “See 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (a). An interference proceeding may involve one or more counts; a count is the Board’s description of the interfering subject matter that sets the scope of admissible proofs on priority.”
Brand v. Miller (Fed. Cir. 2007). “158 (regulations governing contested cases); 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (a) (“A patent interference is a contested case.”
Spine v. Biedermann Motech Gmbh (D.D.C. 2010). “See 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (a). An interference proceeding may involve one or more counts; a count is the Board’s description of the interfering subject matter that sets the scope of admissible proofs on priority.”
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