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C.F.R.Title 48Chapter 1—Federal Acquisition RegulationSubchapter F—Special Categories of ContractingPart 35—Research and Development Contracting

48 C.F.R. § 35.006 (2026)

35.006 Contracting methods and contract type.

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1997–2016 6citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 6 opinions since 1997.

(a) In R&D acquisitions, the precise specifications necessary for sealed bidding are generally not available, thus making negotiation necessary. However, the use of negotiation in R&D contracting does not change the obligation to comply with part 6.

(b) Selecting the appropriate contract type is the responsibility of the contracting officer. However, because of the importance of technical considerations in R&D, the choice of contract type should be made after obtaining the recommendations of technical personnel. Although the Government ordinarily prefers fixed-price arrangements in contracting, this preference applies in R&D contracting only to the extent that goals, objectives, specifications, and cost estimates are sufficient to permit such a preference. The precision with which the goals, performance objectives, and specifications for the work can be defined will largely determine the type of contract employed. The contract type must be selected to fit the work required.

(c) Because the absence of precise specifications and difficulties in estimating costs with accuracy (resulting in a lack of confidence in cost estimates) normally precludes using fixed-price contracting for R&D, the use of cost-reimbursement contracts is usually appropriate (see subpart 16.3). The nature of development work often requires a cost-reimbursement completion arrangement (see 16.306(d)). When the use of cost and performance incentives is desirable and practicable, fixed-price incentive and cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts should be considered in that order of preference.

(d) When levels of effort can be specified in advance, a short-duration fixed-price contract may be useful for developing system design concepts, resolving potential problems, and reducing Government risks. Fixed-price contracting may also be used in minor projects when the objectives of the research are well defined and there is sufficient confidence in the cost estimate for price negotiations. (See 16.207.)

(e) Projects having production requirements as a follow-on to R&D efforts normally should progress from cost-reimbursement contracts to fixed-price contracts as designs become more firmly established, risks are reduced, and production tooling, equipment, and processes are developed and proven. When possible, a final commitment to undertake specific product development and testing should be avoided until (1) preliminary exploration and studies have indicated a high degree of probability that development is feasible and (2) the Government has determined both its minimum requirements and desired objectives for product performance and schedule completion.

[48 FR 42352, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 50 FR 1744, Jan. 11, 1985; 50 FR 52429, Dec. 23, 1985]
The 6 cases that cite 48 C.F.R. § 35.006 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENAm. Tel. & Tel. Co. & Lucent Tech. v. United States, 307 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
cites § 35.006 3×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 35.006
“103 (a) (“Selecting the contract type is generally a matter for negotiation and requires the exercise of sound judgment.”
The case’s holding
Procurement regulations providing internal governmental direction and cautionary directives supply no remedy for private parties in a judicial forum.
Later courts cite it for
“moreover, in a negotiated procurement, as in this case, this court has held that the regulations entrust the contracting officer with especially great discretion, extending even to his application of procurement regulations.” · 9 citing courts
2
GREENGloberanger Corp. v. Software AG United States, Inc., 836 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2016).
cites § 35.006 1×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 35.006
“48 C.F.R. § 35.006 (b), (c). The reimbursement process would also facilitate identification of the development for which the government is responsible and in which it obtains rights.”
The case’s holding
State trade secret claims are not preempted by the Copyright Act if they require proof that information was taken via improper means or a breach of a confidential relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“the costs a plaintiff spent in development . . . can be a proxy for the costs that the defendant saved.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 35.006 1×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 35.006
“, 48 C.F.R. § 35.006 (c) (1984-1998) (“Because the absence of precise specifications and difficulties in estimating costs with accuracy (resulting in a lack of confidence in cost estimates) normally precludes using fixed-price contracting for R & D, the use of cost-reimbursement…”
The case’s holding
Invalidation of a contract is not a necessary consequence of a statutory violation and must be considered in light of the statutory purpose and the policy of supporting contract integrity.
Later courts cite it for
“invalidation of the contract is not a necessary consequence when a statute or regulation has been contravened, but must be considered in light of the statutory or regulatory purpose, with recognition of the strong policy of supporting the integrity of contracts made by and with the united states.” · 6 citing courts
4
GREENAm. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 156 (Fed. Cl. 2000).
cites § 35.006 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 35.006
“104 (1987) and 48 C.F.R. § 35.006 (c) (1987), we cannot go the extra step of saying that the adoption of such a contract in that setting would be a violation of law.”
Later courts cite it for
“non-compliance with section 8118 is not an actionable wrong.... plaintiffs cannot claim a protectable interest in the proper application of section 8118 for congress intended to give them none.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENInfo. Sciences Corp. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 195 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
cites § 35.006 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 35.006
“” 48 C.F.R. § 35.006 (c). Neither of these provisions, however, imposed any mandatory, judicially enforceable requirements, but instead provided “internal government direction.”
6
GREENAm. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 124 F.3d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
cites § 35.006 1×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 35.006
“See 48 C.F.R. § 35.006 (c) (1996). In the mid-1980s, however, the Navy returned to fixed-price contracting for certain types of development contracts.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199720062016

One bar per year. Tallest: 1 case in 1997. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Fed. Cir.3Fed. Cl.25th Cir.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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