(a) Preventing or deterring the carriage of any explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon. Each aircraft operator must use the measures in its security program to prevent or deter the carriage of any weapon, explosive, or incendiary on or about each individual's person or accessible property before boarding an aircraft or entering a sterile area.
(b) Screening of individuals and accessible property. Except as provided in its security program, each aircraft operator must ensure that each individual entering a sterile area at each preboard screening checkpoint for which it is responsible, and all accessible property under that individual's control, are inspected for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries as provided in § 1544.207.
(c) Refusal to transport. Each aircraft operator must deny entry into a sterile area and must refuse to transport—
(1) Any individual who does not consent to a search or inspection of his or her person in accordance with the system prescribed in this part; and
(2) Any property of any individual or other person who does not consent to a search or inspection of that property in accordance with the system prescribed by this part.
(d) Prohibitions on carrying a weapon, explosive, or incendiary. Except as provided in §§ 1544.219, 1544.221, and 1544.223, no aircraft operator may permit any individual to have a weapon, explosive, or incendiary, on or about the individual's person or accessible property when onboard an aircraft.
(e) Staffing. Each aircraft operator must staff its security screening checkpoints with supervisory and non-supervisory personnel in accordance with the standards specified in its security program.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
7
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 2010–2025 · leading case:
Nadine Pellegrino v. TSA, 937 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2019).
Nadine Pellegrino v. TSA, 937 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2019).
· cites it 2× “” 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201 (c) (emphases added); see also id.”
Erin Osmon v. United States, 66 F.4th 144 (4th Cir. 2023).
“49 C.F.R. § 1544.201 (c)(1). As a matter of “plain language,” that would seem to be the end of the matter.”
Mengert v. United States, 120 F.4th 696 (10th Cir. 2024).
“Additionally, federal regulations require aircraft operators to “refuse to transport” “[a]ny individual who does not consent to a search or inspection of his or her person” by TSOs.”
Stanley v. United States, 6 A.3d 270 (D.C. 2010).
“23, 2010); See also TSA, DHS, Civil Aviation Security, 49 C.F.R § 1544.201(a) (2009) (“Each aircraft operator must use the measures in its security program to prevent or deter the carriage of any weapon .”
Vizcarrondo-Gonzalez v. Vilsack (D.P.R. 2020).
“” 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201 (c). Page 18 From these elements, courts excluding TSOs from the law enforcement proviso reason that properly read, the proviso “connote[s] traditional law enforcement officer responsibilities.”
Elisabeth Koletas v. United States (11th Cir. 2025).
“Those regulations provide that airlines “must refuse to transport…[a]ny individual who does not consent to a search or inspection of his or her person” and “[a]ny property of any individual…who does not consent to a search or inspection of that property…” 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201…”
— 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201(a) — 1 case
Stanley v. United States, 6 A.3d 270 (D.C. 2010).
“23, 2010); See also TSA, DHS, Civil Aviation Security, 49 C.F.R § 1544.201(a) (2009) (“Each aircraft operator must use the measures in its security program to prevent or deter the carriage of any weapon .”
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