Colo. R. Crim. P. 24 (2026)

(a) Orientation And Examination Of Jurors. An orientation and examination shall be conducted to inform prospective jurors about their duties and service and to obtain information about prospective jurors to faciliate an intelligent exercise of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.

(1) The jury commissioner is authorized to examine and, when appropriate, excuse prospective jurors who do not satisfy the statutory qualifications for jury service, or who are entitled to a postponement, or as otherwise authorized by appropriate court order.

(2) When prospective jurors have reported to the courtroom, the judge shall explain to them in plain and clear language:

(i) The grounds for challenge for cause;

(ii) Each juror’s duty to volunteer information that would constitute a disqualification or give rise to a challenge for cause;

(iii) The identities of the parties and their counsel;

(iv) The nature of the case using applicable instructions if available or, alternatively a joint statement of factual information intended to provide a relevant context for the prospective jurors to respond to questions asked of them. Alternatively, at the request of

counsel and in the discretion of the judge, counsel may present such information through brief non-argumentative statements;

(v) General legal principles applicable to the case including the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, definition of reasonable doubt, elements of charged offenses and other matters that jurors will be required to consider and apply in deciding the issues.

(3) The judge shall ask prospective jurors questions concerning their qualifications to serve as jurors. The parties or their counsel shall be permitted to ask the prospective jurors additional questions. In the discretion of the judge, juror questionnaires, posterboards and other methods may be used. In order to minimize delay, the judge may reasonably limit the time available to the parties or their counsel for juror examination. The court may limit or terminate repetitious, irrelevant, unreasonably lengthy, abusive or otherwise improper examination.

(4) Jurors shall not be required to disclose personal locating information, such as address or place of business in open court and such information shall not be maintained in files open to the public. The trial judge shall assure that parties and counsel have access to appropriate and necessary locating information.

(5) Once the jury is impaneled, the judge shall again explain in more detail the general principles of law applicable to criminal cases, the procedural guidelines regarding conduct by jurors during the trial, case specific legal principles and definitions of technical or special terms expected to be used during the presentation of the case.

(b) Challenges for Cause.

(1) The court shall sustain a challenge for cause on one or more of the following grounds:

(I) Absence of any qualification prescribed by statute to render a person competent as a juror;

(II) Relationship within the third degree, by blood, adoption, or marriage, to a defendant or to any attorney of record or attorney engaged in the trial of the case;

(III) Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, employer and employee, landlord and tenant, debtor and creditor, or principal and agent to, or being a member of the household of, or associated in business with, or surety on any bond or obligation for, any defendant;

(IV) The juror is or has been a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or has complained against or been accused by him in a criminal prosecution;

(V) The juror has served on the grand jury which returned the indictment or on a coroner’s jury which inquired into the death of a person whose death is the subject of the indictment or the information, or on any other investigatory body which inquired into the facts of the crime charged;

(VI) The juror was a juror at a former trial arising out of the same factual situation or involving the same defendant;

(VII) The juror was a juror in a civil action against the defendant arising out of the act charged as a crime;

(VIII) The juror was a witness to any matter related to the crime or its prosecution;

(IX) The juror occupies a fiduciary relationship to the defendant or a person alleged to have been injured by the crime or the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;

(X) The existence of a state of mind in a juror manifesting a bias for or against the defendant, or for or against the prosecution, or the acknowledgement of a previously formed or expressed opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall be grounds for disqualification of the juror, unless the court is satisfied that the juror will render an impartial verdict based solely upon the evidence and the instructions of the court;

(XI) [Reserved]

(XII) The juror is an employee of a public law enforcement agency or public defender’s office.

(2) If either party desires to introduce evidence, other than the sworn responses of the prospective juror, for the purpose of establishing grounds to disqualify or challenge the juror for cause, such evidence shall be heard and all issues related thereto shall be determined by the court out of the presence of the other prospective jurors. All matters

pertaining to the qualifications and competency of the prospective jurors shall be deemed waived by the parties if not raised prior to the swearing in of the jury to try the case, except that the court for good cause shown or upon a motion for mistrial or other relief may hear such evidence during the trial out of the presence of the jury and enter such orders as are appropriate.

(c) Challenge to Pool.

(1) Upon the request of the defendant or the prosecution in advance of the commencement of the trial, the defendant or the prosecution shall be furnished with a list of prospective jurors who will be subject to call in the trial.

(2) Either the prosecution or the defendant may challenge the pool on the ground that there has been a substantial failure to comply with the requirements of the law governing the selection of jurors. Such challenge must be made in writing setting forth the particular ground upon which it is based and shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits specifying the supporting facts and demographic data. The challenge must be filed prior to the swearing in of the jury selected to try the case.

(3) If the court finds the affidavit or affidavits filed under subsection (2) of this section, if true, demonstrate a substantial failure to comply with the ‘‘Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act’’, the moving party is entitled to present in support of the motion the testimony of any person responsible for the implementation of the ‘‘Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act.’’ Any party may present any records used in the selection and summoning of jurors for service, and any other relevant evidence. If the court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that in selecting either a grand jury or a petit jury there has been a substantial failure to comply with the ‘‘Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act’’, the court shall discharge the jury panel and stay the proceedings pending the summoning of a new juror pool or dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint, or grant other appropriate relief.

(4) At any time before trial, upon motion by a party or on its own motion, the court may declare a mistrial in a case on the ground that a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled in that particular case due to a public health crisis or limitations brought about by such crisis. A declaration of a mistrial under this paragraph must be supported by specific findings.

COMMITTEE COMMENT

These changes were made in order to con- Act, Sections 13-71-101 to 13-71-145, C.R.S. form Rule 24 to the legislative changes in the which became effective January 1, 1990. Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service

(d) Peremptory Challenges.

(1) For purposes of Rule 24 a capital case is a case in which a class 1 felony is charged.

(2) In capital cases the state and the defendant, when there is one defendant, shall each be entitled to ten peremptory challenges. In all other cases where there is one defendant and the punishment may be by imprisonment in a correctional facility, the state and the defendant shall each be entitled to five peremptory challenges, and in all other cases, to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, each side shall be entitled to an additional three peremptory challenges for every defendant after the first in capital cases, but not exceeding twenty peremptory challenges to each side; in all other cases, where the punishment may be by imprisonment in a correctional facility, to two additional peremptory challenges for every defendant after the first, not exceeding fifteen peremptory challenges to each side; and in all other cases to one additional peremptory challenge for every defendant after the first, not exceeding ten peremptory challenges to each side. In any case where there are multiple defendants, every peremptory challenge shall be made and considered as the joint peremptory challenge of all defendants. In case of the consolidation of any indictments, informations, complaints, or summons and complaints for trial, such consolidated cases shall be considered, for all purposes concerning peremptory challenges, as though the defendants had been joined in the same indictment,

information, complaint, or summons and complaint. When trial is held on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the number of peremptory challenges shall be the same as if trial were on the issue of substantive guilt.

(3) For good cause shown, the court at any time may add peremptory challenges to either or both sides.

(4) Peremptory challenges shall be exercised by counsel, alternately, the first challenge to be exercised by the prosecution. A prospective juror so challenged shall be excused, and another juror from the panel shall replace the juror excused. Counsel waiving the exercise of further peremptory challenges as to those jurors then in the jury box may thereafter exercise peremptory challenges only as to jurors subsequently called into the jury box without, however, reducing the total number of peremptory challenges available to either side.

COMMITTEE COMMENT

The rule is changed to permit, but not to to allow the exercise of peremptory challenges, require, the court to allow the simultaneous in writing, in its discretion, as is done in civil questioning of more than 12 potential jurors and cases. This rule change is intended to apply to one or two alternate jurors at one time. Further, both district and county court criminal cases. the rule permits, but does not require, the court

(e) Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that a sufficient number of jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror shall not be discharged until the jury renders its verdict or until such time as determined by the court. When alternate jurors are impaneled, each side is entitled to one peremptory challenge for each alternate to be selected, and such additional peremptory challenges may be exercised as to any prospective jurors. In a case in which a class 1, 2 or 3 felony is charged and in any case in which a felony listed in section 24-4.1-302 (1), C.R.S. is charged, the court, at the request of the defendant or the prosecution, shall impanel at least one alternate juror.

(f) Custody of Jury.

(1) The court should only sequester jurors in extraordinary cases. Otherwise, (J)urors should be permitted to separate during all trial recesses, both before and after the case has been submitted to the jury for deliberation. Cautionary instructions as to their conduct during all recesses shall be given to the jurors by the court.

(2) The jurors shall be in the custody of the bailiff whenever they are deliberating and at any other time as ordered by the court.

(3) If the jurors are permitted to separate during any recess of the court, the court shall order them to return at a day and hour appointed by the court for the purpose of continuing the trial, or for resuming their deliberations if the case has been submitted to the jury.

(g) Juror Questions. Jurors shall be allowed to submit written questions to the court for the court to ask of witnesses during trial, in compliance with procedures established by the trial court. The trial court shall have the discretion to prohibit or limit questioning in a particular trial for reasons related to the severity of the charges, the presence of significant suppressed evidence or for other good cause. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard on each question, the court shall determine whether to ask the submitted question. The trial court shall permit appropriate follow-up questions from the parties within the scope of the jurors’ questions.

effective January 1, 1999; (b)(1)(XI) repealed and reserved March 11, 1999, effective July 1, 1999; (g) added and adopted February 19, 2003, effective July 1, 2004; (e) amended and effective May 15, 2013; (g) amended and effective September 6, 2018; (c)(4) added and effective April 7, 2020; (c)(4) amended and effective July 22, 2020.

Cross references: For the ‘‘Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act’’, see article 71 of title 13, C.R.S.

(5) Improper Bias (Including Unconscious or Implicit Bias). This rule pertains to peremptory challenges against a prospective juror whom the parties stipulate or the trial court finds is more likely than not a member of a racial or ethnic minority group. The exclusion of prospective jurors based on race or ethnicity is prohibited. When a party claims that the opposing party’s peremptory challenge is rooted in improper bias (including unconscious or implicit bias), the court must conduct a three-step analysis as follows:

(I) Objection. A party may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to raise the issue of improper bias. Any discussion related to the objection must be conducted outside of the hearing of the jury panel. Additionally, the objection must be made before the prospective juror is excused, unless the objecting party shows that the objection stems from new information discovered after the prospective juror’s excusal.

(II) Prima Facie Case. When addressing an objection to a peremptory challenge under this rule, the court must first determine whether the objecting party has made a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was based on the prospective juror’s race or ethnicity. It suffices for such a showing that the totality of the relevant circumstances gives rise to an inference of racial or ethnic motivation. The court may raise an objection to a peremptory challenge on its own, and such objection will constitute the requisite prima facie showing.

(III) Response and Rebuttal. If the court finds that the objecting party has failed to make the requisite prima facie showing, the court must overrule the objection and allow the peremptory challenge. Conversely, if the court finds that the objecting party has made the requisite prima facie showing, the court must direct the party exercising the peremptory challenge to articulate a race- and ethnicity-neutral reason for the challenge. The party exercising the peremptory challenge must not attempt to articulate such a reason unless directed to do so by the court. The court must then determine whether the given reason is, on its face, race- and ethnicity-neutral. In assessing such neutrality, the court may not consider the stated reason’s plausibility or persuasiveness; rather, the court must assume the stated reason is true and then determine whether, as stated, the reason is neutral or is instead based on the prospective juror’s race or ethnicity. If the court finds that the stated reason is rooted in improper bias, it must sustain the objection. But if the court determines that the proffered reason is, on its face, race- and ethnicity-neutral, it must give the objecting party an opportunity to rebut the stated reason. The objecting party must not attempt to rebut the given reason for the peremptory challenge unless directed to do so by the court.

(IV) Final Determination. The court must evaluate the persuasiveness of the reason given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of any rebuttal offered and the totality of the relevant circumstances. If the court finds that the objecting party has met its burden of establishing purposeful discrimination by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the peremptory challenge was substantially motivated by race or ethnicity, the court must disallow the peremptory challenge and direct the prospective juror to remain on the jury panel. However, if the court finds that the objecting party has not met its burden, the court must allow the peremptory challenge and excuse the prospective juror. In ruling on the record, the court may consider a party’s unconscious or implicit bias, as both conscious bias and unconscious or implicit bias may contribute or lead to purposeful discrimination, but the court must guard against engaging in speculation. Express demeanor and credibility findings, though not required, are the preferred practice.

(V) Circumstances Considered. In making its final determination, the court must consider any relevant circumstances, including but not limited to the following, which may reflect that the peremptory challenge was substantially motivated by race or ethnicity:

(A) the number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, including whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the reason for the challenge;

(B) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked significantly more questions or different questions of the prospective juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in comparison to questions that party asked of other prospective jurors;

(C) whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers or made similar statements but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by the party exercising the peremptory challenge;

(D) if the basis of the peremptory challenge concerns the prospective juror’s alleged bias against law enforcement or the criminal justice system, whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge explored the issue through questioning or rehabilitation, and whether that party challenged the prospective juror for cause on that basis;

(E) whether the justification for the peremptory challenge might be disproportionately associated with race or ethnicity. Such justification may include, but is not limited to, the prospective juror:

a. having had prior contact with law enforcement, b. having a close relationship with others who have had contact with law enforcement, c. living in a high-crime neighborhood, or d. not being a native English speaker;

(F) if the basis of the peremptory challenge concerns the demeanor, attitude, or body language of the prospective juror, whether such demeanor, attitude, or body language was contemporaneously brought to the attention of the court or was corroborated by the court’s own observation or that of opposing counsel; and

(G) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity in the present case or in past cases.

The court need not make a finding as to each relevant circumstance. Neither the existence nor the absence of any particular relevant circumstance is determinative.

COMMITTEE COMMENT

The rule is changed to permit, but not to require, the court to allow the simultaneous questioning of more than 12 potential jurors and one or two alternate jurors at one time. Further, the rule permits, but does not require, the court to allow the exercise of peremptory challenges, in writing, in its discretion, as is done in civil cases. This rule change is intended to apply to both district and county court criminal cases.

Nothing in subsection (d)(5) alters Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), or its application in Colorado jurisprudence. Subsection (d)(5) is simply intended to provide further guidance when a peremptory challenge allegedly seeks to improperly exclude a prospective juror based on race or ethnicity. Any provisions in this subsection addressing unconscious or implicit bias, including specifically part (d)(5)(IV) (“Final Determination”) and part (d)(5)(V) (“Circumstances Considered”), are not inconsistent with Batson, as both conscious bias and unconscious or implicit bias may contribute or lead to purposeful discrimination. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“A prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically.”); see also State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 338 n.8 (Wash. 2013) (plurality opinion) (noting that “purposeful discrimination” arguably “already encompasses unconscious bias” because “the ‘purposeful discrimination’ requirement was never intended to be a proxy for . . . anything resembling a conscious mens rea, but rather a signpost for distinguishing between discriminatory purpose and disproportionate impact”; and further observing that both the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and scholarship support the proposition that Batson’s “purposeful discrimination” requirement means “not that the state’s attorney need be found intentionally racist,” but rather “that racial bias (conscious or unconscious . . . ) be the source of any disparate impact.” (citation omitted)), abrogated in part on other grounds by City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 Emory L. J. 1053, 1090–93

(2009) (concluding that “discriminatory purpose” includes unconscious or implicit bias under current equal protection jurisprudence).

(e) Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that a sufficient number of jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror shall not be discharged until the jury renders its verdict or until such time as determined by the court. When alternate jurors are impaneled, each side is entitled to one peremptory challenge for each alternate to be selected, and such additional peremptory challenges may be exercised as to any prospective jurors. In a case in which a class 1, 2 or 3 felony is charged and in any case in which a felony listed in section 24-4.1-302 (1), C.R.S. is charged, the court, at the request of the defendant or the prosecution, shall impanel at least one alternate juror.

(f) Custody of Jury.

(1) The court should only sequester jurors in extraordinary cases. Otherwise, (J)urors should be permitted to separate during all trial recesses, both before and after the case has been submitted to the jury for deliberation. Cautionary instructions as to their conduct during all recesses shall be given to the jurors by the court.

(2) The jurors shall be in the custody of the bailiff whenever they are deliberating and at any other time as ordered by the court.

(3) If the jurors are permitted to separate during any recess of the court, the court shall order them to return at a day and hour appointed by the court for the purpose of continuing the trial, or for resuming their deliberations if the case has been submitted to the jury.

(g) Juror Questions. Jurors shall be allowed to submit written questions to the court for the court to ask of witnesses during trial, in compliance with procedures established by the trial court. The trial court shall have the discretion to prohibit or limit questioning in a particular trial for reasons related to the severity of the charges, the presence of significant suppressed evidence or for other good cause. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard on each question, the court shall determine whether to ask the submitted question. The trial court shall permit appropriate follow-up questions from the parties within the scope of the jurors’ questions.

effective January 1, 1999; (b)(1)(XI) repealed and reserved March 11, 1999, effective July 1, 1999; (g) added and adopted February 19, 2003, effective July 1, 2004; (e) amended and effective May 15, 2013; (g) amended and effective September 6, 2018; (c)(4) added and effective April 7, 2020; (c)(4) amended and effective July 22, 2020.

Cross references: For the ‘‘Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act’’, see article 71 of title 13, C.R.S.

Source: (e) amended September 20, 1984, effective January 1, 1985; (d)(4) amended June 9, 1988, effective January 1, 1989; the introductory portion to (c), (c)(2), and (c)(3) amended July 16, 1992, effective November 1, 1992; (e) amended February 4, 1993, effective April 1, 1993; (a) repealed and readopted and (f)(1) amended June 25, 1998,

Source: (e) amended September 20, 1984, effective January 1, 1985; (d)(4) amended June 9, 1988, effective January 1, 1989; the introductory portion to (c), (c)(2), and (c)(3) amended July 16, 1992, effective November 1, 1992; (e) amended February 4, 1993, effective April 1, 1993; (a) repealed and readopted and (f)(1) amended June 25, 1998,

Amended by Rule Change 2025(15), adopted June 26, 2025, effective January 2, 2026.