The following definitions are applicable to the determination of
culpability requirements for offenses defined in this code:
(1) "Act" means a bodily movement, and includes words and possession of property.
(2) "Conduct" means an act or omission and its accompanying state of mind or, where
relevant, a series of acts or omissions.
(3) "Criminal negligence". A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.
(4) "Culpable mental state" means intentionally, or with intent, or knowingly, or
willfully, or recklessly, or with criminal negligence, as these terms are defined in this section.
(5) "Intentionally" or "with intent". All offenses defined in this code in which the mental
culpability requirement is expressed as "intentionally" or "with intent" are declared to be specific
intent offenses. A person acts "intentionally" or "with intent" when his conscious objective is to
cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense. It is immaterial to the
issue of specific intent whether or not the result actually occurred.
(6) "Knowingly" or "willfully". All offenses defined in this code in which the mental
culpability requirement is expressed as "knowingly" or "willfully" are declared to be general
intent crimes. A person acts "knowingly" or "willfully" with respect to conduct or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of
such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts "knowingly" or "willfully", with
respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause
the result.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is
imposed by law.
(8) "Recklessly". A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.
(9) "Voluntary act" means an act performed consciously as a result of effort or
determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical
possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 403, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-601. L. 75: (3), (5), (6), and (8)
R&RE, p. 616, § 1, effective July 21. L. 77: (4) amended and (5) and (6) R&RE, p. 959, §§ 1, 2,
effective July 1.
18-1-502. Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict
liability and of mental culpability. The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the
performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for
commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not
require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of "strict liability". If a
culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any material element of
an offense, the offense is one of "mental culpability".
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 404, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-602.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
337
cases (
80 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001).
Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 21× “See § 18-1-501; Hall, 999 P.2d at 216 . To convict a defendant of any crime other than one of strict liability, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted with one of these four culpable mental states.”
People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 15× “Defendant argues that proof of criminal negligence requires proof of an act, which is defined as a bodily movement, § 18-1-501(1), C.R.S.2006, and the prosecution did not allege or prove that he performed any bodily movement or other act that constituted a violation of the…”
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 10× “" § 18-1-501(3). By contrast, a person commits reckless manslaughter, a class 4 felony, when he "recklessly causes the death of another person.”
People v. R. V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 35× “" Section 18-1-501, C.R.S.1973. Since complicity is not a substantive crime, the statutory definitions of mens rea do not apply.”
Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 21× “In most instances the legislature has required a more blameworthy level of culpability than the performance of a mere voluntary act, such as conduct performed “intentionally,” “knowingly,” “willfully,” “recklessly,” or “with criminal negligence.”
People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 15× “The definitions have been amended since their adoption in 1971, and section 18-1-501 currently provides detailed explanations of what each level of culpability requires.”
People v. Childress, 2015 CO 65 (Colo. 2015).
· cites it 20× “1981), that because complicity is not itself a separate crime, the word âintentâ appearing in the statutory phrase âwith intent to promote or facilitateâ could not refer to the culpable mental state of ââ[i]ntentionallyâ or âwith intentââ defined at section…”
People v. Oram, 217 P.3d 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 7× “1985) (discussing § 18-1-501(5), C.R.S.2008); People v. Bornman, 953 P.”
v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).
· cites it 4× “” See § 18-1-501(3), (5), (8), C.R.S. (2019). In accordance with these instructions, to establish that Rigsby acted intentionally or recklessly, the prosecution had to prove that Rigsby either had a conscious objective to cause a specific result or consciously disregarded a…”
v. People, 2019 CO 87 (Colo. 2019).
· cites it 3× “2 In this context, intent does not refer to the culpable mental state of “[i]ntentionally” or “with intent” defined in section 18-1-501(5), C.R.S. (2019); it refers to “the commonly understood sense of desiring or having a purpose or design to aid, abet, advise, or encourage the…”
People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).
· cites it 22× “This is not the specific intent encompassed within the Colorado Criminal Code's definition of the terms "intentionally" or "with intent" which requires a conscious object to cause a proscribed result.”
People v. Noble, 635 P.2d 203 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 13× “Section 18-1-501(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(1) — 2 cases
People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Defendant argues that proof of criminal negligence requires proof of an act, which is defined as a bodily movement, § 18-1-501(1), C.R.S.2006, and the prosecution did not allege or prove that he performed any bodily movement or other act that constituted a violation of the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(2) — 4 cases
People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Defendant argues that proof of criminal negligence requires proof of an act, which is defined as a bodily movement, § 18-1-501(1), C.R.S.2006, and the prosecution did not allege or prove that he performed any bodily movement or other act that constituted a violation of the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(3) — 41 cases
People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Defendant argues that proof of criminal negligence requires proof of an act, which is defined as a bodily movement, § 18-1-501(1), C.R.S.2006, and the prosecution did not allege or prove that he performed any bodily movement or other act that constituted a violation of the…”
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
“" § 18-1-501(3). By contrast, a person commits reckless manslaughter, a class 4 felony, when he "recklessly causes the death of another person.”
v. Draper, 2021 COA 120 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000).
“The definitions have been amended since their adoption in 1971, and section 18-1-501 currently provides detailed explanations of what each level of culpability requires.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(4) — 8 cases
People v. R. V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).
“" Section 18-1-501, C.R.S.1973. Since complicity is not a substantive crime, the statutory definitions of mens rea do not apply.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(5) — 87 cases
v. People, 2019 CO 87 (Colo. 2019).
“2 In this context, intent does not refer to the culpable mental state of “[i]ntentionally” or “with intent” defined in section 18-1-501(5), C.R.S. (2019); it refers to “the commonly understood sense of desiring or having a purpose or design to aid, abet, advise, or encourage the…”
People v. Childress, 2015 CO 65 (Colo. 2015).
“1981), that because complicity is not itself a separate crime, the word âintentâ appearing in the statutory phrase âwith intent to promote or facilitateâ could not refer to the culpable mental state of ââ[i]ntentionallyâ or âwith intentââ defined at section…”
v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).
“” See § 18-1-501(3), (5), (8), C.R.S. (2019). In accordance with these instructions, to establish that Rigsby acted intentionally or recklessly, the prosecution had to prove that Rigsby either had a conscious objective to cause a specific result or consciously disregarded a…”
People v. R. V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).
“" Section 18-1-501, C.R.S.1973. Since complicity is not a substantive crime, the statutory definitions of mens rea do not apply.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(6) — 172 cases
Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001).
“See § 18-1-501; Hall, 999 P.2d at 216 . To convict a defendant of any crime other than one of strict liability, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted with one of these four culpable mental states.”
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
“" § 18-1-501(3). By contrast, a person commits reckless manslaughter, a class 4 felony, when he "recklessly causes the death of another person.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(7) — 5 cases
People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Defendant argues that proof of criminal negligence requires proof of an act, which is defined as a bodily movement, § 18-1-501(1), C.R.S.2006, and the prosecution did not allege or prove that he performed any bodily movement or other act that constituted a violation of the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(8) — 66 cases
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
“" § 18-1-501(3). By contrast, a person commits reckless manslaughter, a class 4 felony, when he "recklessly causes the death of another person.”
People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000).
“The definitions have been amended since their adoption in 1971, and section 18-1-501 currently provides detailed explanations of what each level of culpability requires.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(9) — 19 cases
Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982).
“In most instances the legislature has required a more blameworthy level of culpability than the performance of a mere voluntary act, such as conduct performed “intentionally,” “knowingly,” “willfully,” “recklessly,” or “with criminal negligence.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501(b) — 2 cases
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