Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405 (2026)

Sexual assault on a child

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim. (2) Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony if: (a) The actor applies force against the victim in order to accomplish or facilitate sexual contact; or (b) The actor, in order to accomplish or facilitate sexual contact, threatens imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping against the victim or another person, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute the threat; or (c) The actor, in order to accomplish or facilitate sexual contact, threatens retaliation by causing in the future the death or serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping against the victim or another person, and the victim believes that the actor will execute the threat; or (d) The actor commits the offense as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse as described in subsection (1) of this section. No specific date or time must be alleged for the pattern of sexual abuse; except that the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse, whether charged in the information or indictment or committed prior to or at any time after the offense charged in the information or indictment, shall be subject to the provisions of section 16-5-401 (1)(a), concerning sex offenses against children. The offense charged in the information or indictment shall constitute one of the incidents of sexual contact involving a child necessary to form a pattern of sexual abuse as defined in section 18-3-401 (2.5). Prosecution for any incident of sexual contact constituting the offense or any incident of sexual contact constituting the pattern of sexual abuse may be commenced and charged in an information or indictment in a county where at least one of the incidents occurred or in a county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed. (3) If a defendant is convicted of the class 3 felony of sexual assault on a child pursuant to paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (2) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406. (4) A person who is convicted on or after July 1, 2013, of sexual assault on a child under this section, upon conviction, shall be advised by the court that the person has no right: (a) To notification of the termination of parental rights and no standing to object to the termination of parental rights for a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense; (b) To allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time and decision- making responsibilities for a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense; (c) Of inheritance from a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense; and (d) To notification of or the right to object to the adoption of a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense.

Source: L. 75: Entire part R&RE, p. 630, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 962, § 18, effective July 1. L. 83: (2) amended, p. 693, § 2, effective June 15. L. 86: (3) added, p. 777, § 7, effective July 1. L. 89: (2)(b) and (3) amended and (2)(c) added, p. 903, §§ 2, 3, effective June 1. L. 90: (2)(b) repealed, p. 1033, § 25, effective July 1. L. 95: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1252, § 11, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2)(d) amended, p. 1582, § 8, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 1513, § 191, effective October 1. L. 2006: (2)(d) amended, p. 413, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2013: (4) added, (SB 13-227), ch. 353, p. 2061, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2017: (2)(d) amended, (HB 17-1109), ch. 97, p. 293, § 2, effective April 4.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 18-3-408 as it existed prior to 1975.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 249 cases (21 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 55× “Although the supreme court concluded that neither section 18-3-405 nor 18-3-405.3 "authorizes multiple punishments for each discrete act of sexual contact that occurs within a single incident of sexual assault on a child," it also noted that the prosecution may pursue multiple…”
People v. Graham, 876 P.2d 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 52× “The challenged subsection of the statute, § 18-3-405(2)(c), should be viewed in context of the entire statute § 18-3-405, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) which reads: (1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a…”
People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769 (Colo. 2001). · cites it 28× “" § 18-3-405(@2)(c). Here, the information alleges that the pattern of sexual abuse occurred within a fifteen-month period of time commencing on June 1, 1992, and ending September 1, 1998, which clearly satisfies the ten-year period required by the statute.”
People v. Simon, 266 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2011). · cites it 21× “Similarly, section 18-3-405 makes sexual assault on a child a class 4 felony, but the crime is elevated to a class 3 felony if committed "as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse.”
v. Mkt., 2020 COA 90 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 11× “Based on that definition, the court in Hodge concluded that, for the force enhancer under section 18-3-405 to apply, there only needs to be some exertion of force applied to the victim’s body; an extra application of force that is distinct from the sexual contact is not required.”
Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 21× “In this case, we determine the unit of prosecution for the crimes of sexual assault on a child, section 18-3-405, C.R.S. (2004), and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, section 18-3 — 405.”
People v. Gholston, 26 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 25× “163, § 18-3-405(@)(c) at 908. In contrast, pursuant to the current statute under which defendant was charged, the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have occurred within ten years prior to the predicate offense.”
People v. Hodge, 2018 COA 155 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 11× “Hodge — Crimes — Unlawful Sexual Behavior — Sexual Assault on a Child In this interlocutory appeal, a division of the court of appeals interprets section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(a), C.R.S. 2018, to hold that a child sexual assault victim cannot legally consent to the use of force…”
People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993). · cites it 37× “The defendants assert that section 18-3-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986), is unconstitutional because subsection (2)(c), which incorporates the definition of “pattern of sexual abuse” from section 18-3-401(2.”
Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 10× “Quintano-was arrested and charged in Arapahoe County with, among other things, five counts of sexual assault on a child, in violation of section 18-3-405(1), C.R.S. (2004). All five offenses occurred on the same day and against the same victim, M.”
People v. Day, 230 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2010). · cites it 46× “The jury acquitted Day of sexual assault on a child, § 18-3-405(1), and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, § 18-3-405.”
People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 15× “, the People charged defendant with one count of sexual assault on a child (count 1) in violation of section 18-3-405(1), C.R.S.2010, and one count of sexual assault on a child-pattern (count 2) in violation of section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(d), C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(1) — 105 cases
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “Although the supreme court concluded that neither section 18-3-405 nor 18-3-405.3 "authorizes multiple punishments for each discrete act of sexual contact that occurs within a single incident of sexual assault on a child," it also noted that the prosecution may pursue multiple…”
Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005). “Quintano-was arrested and charged in Arapahoe County with, among other things, five counts of sexual assault on a child, in violation of section 18-3-405(1), C.R.S. (2004). All five offenses occurred on the same day and against the same victim, M.”
People v. Graham, 876 P.2d 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The challenged subsection of the statute, § 18-3-405(2)(c), should be viewed in context of the entire statute § 18-3-405, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) which reads: (1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a…”
People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769 (Colo. 2001). “" § 18-3-405(@2)(c). Here, the information alleges that the pattern of sexual abuse occurred within a fifteen-month period of time commencing on June 1, 1992, and ending September 1, 1998, which clearly satisfies the ten-year period required by the statute.”
People v. Hodge, 2018 COA 155 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). “Hodge — Crimes — Unlawful Sexual Behavior — Sexual Assault on a Child In this interlocutory appeal, a division of the court of appeals interprets section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(a), C.R.S. 2018, to hold that a child sexual assault victim cannot legally consent to the use of force…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(1)(2)(b) — 1 case
People v. Gholston, 26 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “163, § 18-3-405(@)(c) at 908. In contrast, pursuant to the current statute under which defendant was charged, the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have occurred within ten years prior to the predicate offense.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(1)(2)(c) — 1 case
People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769 (Colo. 2001). “" § 18-3-405(@2)(c). Here, the information alleges that the pattern of sexual abuse occurred within a fifteen-month period of time commencing on June 1, 1992, and ending September 1, 1998, which clearly satisfies the ten-year period required by the statute.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(2) — 31 cases
People v. Graham, 876 P.2d 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The challenged subsection of the statute, § 18-3-405(2)(c), should be viewed in context of the entire statute § 18-3-405, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) which reads: (1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a…”
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “Although the supreme court concluded that neither section 18-3-405 nor 18-3-405.3 "authorizes multiple punishments for each discrete act of sexual contact that occurs within a single incident of sexual assault on a child," it also noted that the prosecution may pursue multiple…”
People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1983).
People v. Gholston, 26 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “163, § 18-3-405(@)(c) at 908. In contrast, pursuant to the current statute under which defendant was charged, the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have occurred within ten years prior to the predicate offense.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(2)(a) — 9 cases
v. Mkt., 2020 COA 90 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). “Based on that definition, the court in Hodge concluded that, for the force enhancer under section 18-3-405 to apply, there only needs to be some exertion of force applied to the victim’s body; an extra application of force that is distinct from the sexual contact is not required.”
People v. Hodge, 2018 COA 155 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). “Hodge — Crimes — Unlawful Sexual Behavior — Sexual Assault on a Child In this interlocutory appeal, a division of the court of appeals interprets section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(a), C.R.S. 2018, to hold that a child sexual assault victim cannot legally consent to the use of force…”
Delgado v. People, 105 P.3d 634 (Colo. 2005).
Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003).
People v. Henderson, 794 P.2d 1050 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(2)(b) — 11 cases
People v. Gholston, 26 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “163, § 18-3-405(@)(c) at 908. In contrast, pursuant to the current statute under which defendant was charged, the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have occurred within ten years prior to the predicate offense.”
People v. Wood, 743 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1987).
People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1994).
Harper v. People, 817 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991).
People v. McIntyre, 789 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1990).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(2)(c) — 8 cases
People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769 (Colo. 2001). “" § 18-3-405(@2)(c). Here, the information alleges that the pattern of sexual abuse occurred within a fifteen-month period of time commencing on June 1, 1992, and ending September 1, 1998, which clearly satisfies the ten-year period required by the statute.”
People v. Graham, 876 P.2d 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The challenged subsection of the statute, § 18-3-405(2)(c), should be viewed in context of the entire statute § 18-3-405, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) which reads: (1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a…”
People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993). “The defendants assert that section 18-3-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986), is unconstitutional because subsection (2)(c), which incorporates the definition of “pattern of sexual abuse” from section 18-3-401(2.”
People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
People v. Gholston, 26 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “163, § 18-3-405(@)(c) at 908. In contrast, pursuant to the current statute under which defendant was charged, the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have occurred within ten years prior to the predicate offense.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(2)(d) — 28 cases
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “Although the supreme court concluded that neither section 18-3-405 nor 18-3-405.3 "authorizes multiple punishments for each discrete act of sexual contact that occurs within a single incident of sexual assault on a child," it also noted that the prosecution may pursue multiple…”
People v. Simon, 266 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2011). “Similarly, section 18-3-405 makes sexual assault on a child a class 4 felony, but the crime is elevated to a class 3 felony if committed "as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse.”
People v. Day, 230 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2010). “The jury acquitted Day of sexual assault on a child, § 18-3-405(1), and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, § 18-3-405.”
People v. Gholston, 26 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “163, § 18-3-405(@)(c) at 908. In contrast, pursuant to the current statute under which defendant was charged, the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have occurred within ten years prior to the predicate offense.”
People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011). “, the People charged defendant with one count of sexual assault on a child (count 1) in violation of section 18-3-405(1), C.R.S.2010, and one count of sexual assault on a child-pattern (count 2) in violation of section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(d), C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(2)(e) — 1 case
People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(3) — 4 cases
People v. Brown, 70 P.3d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
Terry v. People, 977 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1999).
Peo v. Wolf (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Baca (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405(8) — 1 case
Hunsaker, Jr. v. People, 2015 CO 46 (Colo. 2015).
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