(1) A person commits stalking if directly, or indirectly through another person, the person knowingly:
(a) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, or places under surveillance that person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship; or
(b) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly makes any form of communication with that person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship, regardless of whether a conversation ensues; or
(c) Repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, places under surveillance, or makes any form of communication with another person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship to suffer serious emotional distress. For purposes of this paragraph (c), a victim need not show that he or she received professional treatment or counseling to show that he or she suffered serious emotional distress.
(2) For the purposes of this part 6:
(a) Conduct "in connection with" a credible threat means acts that further, advance, promote, or have a continuity of purpose, and may occur before, during, or after the credible threat.
(b) "Credible threat" means a threat, physical action, or repeated conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be in fear for the person's safety or the safety of his or her immediate family or of someone with whom the person has or has had a continuing relationship. The threat need not be directly expressed if the totality of the conduct would cause a reasonable person such fear.
(c) "Immediate family" includes the person's spouse and the person's parent, grandparent, sibling, or child.
(d) "Repeated" or "repeatedly" means on more than one occasion.
(3) A person who commits stalking:
(a) Commits a class 5 felony for a first offense except as otherwise provided in subsection (5) of this section; or
(b) Commits a class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense, if the offense occurs within seven years after the date of a prior offense for which the person was convicted.
(4) Stalking is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified presumptive sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-401 (10).
(5) If, at the time of the offense, there was a temporary or permanent protection order, injunction, or condition of bond, probation, or parole or any other court order in effect against the person, prohibiting the behavior described in this section, the person commits a class 4 felony.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or diminish the inherent authority of the court to enforce its orders through civil or criminal contempt proceedings; however, before a criminal contempt proceeding is heard before the court, notice of the proceedings shall be provided to the district attorney for the judicial district of the court where the proceedings are to be heard and the district attorney for the judicial district in which the alleged act of criminal contempt occurred. The district attorney for either district shall be allowed to appear and argue for the imposition of contempt sanctions.
(7) A peace officer shall have a duty to respond as soon as reasonably possible to a report of stalking and to cooperate with the alleged victim in investigating the report.
(8) (a) When a person is arrested for an alleged violation of this section, the fixing of bail for the crime of stalking shall be done in accordance with section 16-4-105 (4), C.R.S., and a protection order shall issue in accordance with section 18-1-1001 (5).
(b) This subsection (8) shall be known and may be cited as "Vonnie's law".
(9) When a violation under this section is committed in connection with a violation of a court order, including but not limited to any protection order or any order that sets forth the conditions of a bond, any sentences imposed pursuant to this section and pursuant to section 18- 6-803.5 or any sentence imposed in a contempt proceeding for violation of the court order shall be served consecutively and not concurrently.
Source: L. 2010: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 294, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2012: (5) amended and (8) and (9) added, (HB 12-1114), ch. 176, pp. 632, 631, § § 4, 1, effective May 11. L. 2014: (8)(a) amended, (SB 14-212), ch. 397, p. 2000, § 8, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 18-9-111 (4)(b), (4)(c), (5), and (6), as they existed prior to 2010.
ARTICLE 3.5 Offenses Against Pregnant Women Editor's note: This article was added in 2003 and was not amended prior to 2013. It was repealed and reenacted in 2013, resulting in the addition, relocation, or elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For the text of this article prior to 2013, consult the 2012 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act amending this article, see section 1 of chapter 372, Session Laws of Colorado 2013.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
35
cases (
23 in the last 5 years), 2010–2026 · leading case:
People v. Wagner, 2018 COA 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
People v. Wagner, 2018 COA 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 17× “Because the defendant was convicted of three counts of stalking (one under each subsection of section 18-3-602(1)) based on one factually inseparable course of conduct, the division concludes that the convictions were multiplicitous.”
v. Burgandine, 2020 COA 142 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 11× “1, § 18-3-602, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (relocating the relevant portion of section 18-9-111(4) to section 18-3-602).”
People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34 (Colo. 2017).
· cites it 6× “” ¶13 The jury ultimately found Beauvais guilty of one count of felony stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2016), and not guilty of the other charges.”
People v. Casper, 2025 COA 69 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 37× “We conclude that it did because section 18-3-602(1)(a) requires the mens rea of knowingly.”
v. Pellegrin, 2021 COA 118 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 10× “Constitutionality of Stalking Statute ¶ 28 Pellegrin next contends that the stalking statute, § 18-3-602, is unconstitutional on its face because the statute is overbroad.”
People v. Berry, 292 P.3d 954 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “" § 18-8-615(1)(a) (adopting definition set forth in stalking statute, § 18-3-602(2)(b), C.R.S8.2011). To constitute such a threat, then, the person threatened must become aware of the threat.”
People v. Herron, 251 P.3d 1190 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 5× “Based on this evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of credible threat stalking, former § 18-9-111(4)(b)(I) (now codified at § 18-3-602(1)(a), C.R.S.2010); emotional distress stalking, former $ 18-9-111(4)(b)(III) (now codified at § 18-3-602(1)(c), C.”
People v. Chase, 411 P.3d 740 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 8× “In 2010, the stalking statute, former section 18-9-111(4), was repealed and reenacted as section 18-3-602, C.R.S.2012, with changes not relevant here.”
People v. Beauvais, 405 P.3d 269 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 8× “Beauvais guilty of one count of stalking under section 18-3-602(l)(c), C.R.S. 2014. Beauvais now contends that the trial court committed reversible error in the jury selection process.”
People v. Morris, 2025 COA 15 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 17× “¶ 35 The 1999 amendment to the stalking statute that added “approaches, contacts, or places under surveillance” to the types of conduct that can constitute stalking supports our conclusion.”
In re Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 3× “Although the district court did not find this incident sufficiently distressing to constitute stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, it is nevertheless indicative of husband’s continued conduct toward wife after their separation.”
People v. Epps, 406 P.3d 860 (Colo. 2017).
· cites it 3× “(Emotional distress is one of the necessary elements of stalking under section 18-3-602(l)(c), C.R.S. (2017).) ¶23 For several reasons, we conclude that the foregoing proposed testimony would not be of sufficient consequence to deny Epps a fair trial were the deputy district…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(1) — 3 cases
People v. Wagner, 2018 COA 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Because the defendant was convicted of three counts of stalking (one under each subsection of section 18-3-602(1)) based on one factually inseparable course of conduct, the division concludes that the convictions were multiplicitous.”
v. Burgandine, 2020 COA 142 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“1, § 18-3-602, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (relocating the relevant portion of section 18-9-111(4) to section 18-3-602).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(1)(a) — 6 cases
People v. Wagner, 2018 COA 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Because the defendant was convicted of three counts of stalking (one under each subsection of section 18-3-602(1)) based on one factually inseparable course of conduct, the division concludes that the convictions were multiplicitous.”
v. Burgandine, 2020 COA 142 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“1, § 18-3-602, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (relocating the relevant portion of section 18-9-111(4) to section 18-3-602).”
People v. Casper, 2025 COA 69 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“We conclude that it did because section 18-3-602(1)(a) requires the mens rea of knowingly.”
People v. Herron, 251 P.3d 1190 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“Based on this evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of credible threat stalking, former § 18-9-111(4)(b)(I) (now codified at § 18-3-602(1)(a), C.R.S.2010); emotional distress stalking, former $ 18-9-111(4)(b)(III) (now codified at § 18-3-602(1)(c), C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(1)(b) — 3 cases
v. Burgandine, 2020 COA 142 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“1, § 18-3-602, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (relocating the relevant portion of section 18-9-111(4) to section 18-3-602).”
People v. Chase, 411 P.3d 740 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
“In 2010, the stalking statute, former section 18-9-111(4), was repealed and reenacted as section 18-3-602, C.R.S.2012, with changes not relevant here.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(1)(c) — 18 cases
People v. Wagner, 2018 COA 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Because the defendant was convicted of three counts of stalking (one under each subsection of section 18-3-602(1)) based on one factually inseparable course of conduct, the division concludes that the convictions were multiplicitous.”
v. Burgandine, 2020 COA 142 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“1, § 18-3-602, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (relocating the relevant portion of section 18-9-111(4) to section 18-3-602).”
People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34 (Colo. 2017).
“” ¶13 The jury ultimately found Beauvais guilty of one count of felony stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2016), and not guilty of the other charges.”
v. Pellegrin, 2021 COA 118 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
“Constitutionality of Stalking Statute ¶ 28 Pellegrin next contends that the stalking statute, § 18-3-602, is unconstitutional on its face because the statute is overbroad.”
People v. Morris, 2025 COA 15 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“¶ 35 The 1999 amendment to the stalking statute that added “approaches, contacts, or places under surveillance” to the types of conduct that can constitute stalking supports our conclusion.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(2)(b) — 2 cases
People v. Berry, 292 P.3d 954 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“" § 18-8-615(1)(a) (adopting definition set forth in stalking statute, § 18-3-602(2)(b), C.R.S8.2011). To constitute such a threat, then, the person threatened must become aware of the threat.”
People v. Casper, 2025 COA 69 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“We conclude that it did because section 18-3-602(1)(a) requires the mens rea of knowingly.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(l)(c) — 3 cases
People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34 (Colo. 2017).
“” ¶13 The jury ultimately found Beauvais guilty of one count of felony stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2016), and not guilty of the other charges.”
People v. Beauvais, 405 P.3d 269 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).
“Beauvais guilty of one count of stalking under section 18-3-602(l)(c), C.R.S. 2014. Beauvais now contends that the trial court committed reversible error in the jury selection process.”
People v. Epps, 406 P.3d 860 (Colo. 2017).
“(Emotional distress is one of the necessary elements of stalking under section 18-3-602(l)(c), C.R.S. (2017).) ¶23 For several reasons, we conclude that the foregoing proposed testimony would not be of sufficient consequence to deny Epps a fair trial were the deputy district…”
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