Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106 (2026)

Immunity and partial waiver

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) A public entity is immune from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section. Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from: (a) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public entity, by a public employee while in the course of employment, except emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108 (2) and (3), C.R.S.; (b) The operation of any public hospital, correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1- 102, C.R.S., or jail by such public entity; (c) A dangerous condition of any public building; (d) (I) A dangerous condition of a public highway, road, or street which physically interferes with the movement of traffic on the paved portion, if paved, or on the portion customarily used for travel by motor vehicles, if unpaved, of any public highway, road, street, or sidewalk within the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any highway which is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the federal primary highway system, or of any highway which is a part of the federal secondary highway system, or of any highway which is a part of the state highway system on that portion of such highway, road, street, or sidewalk which was designed and intended for public travel or parking thereon. As used in this section, the phrase "physically interferes with the movement of traffic" shall not include traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof. Nothing in this subparagraph (I) shall preclude a particular dangerous accumulation of snow, ice, sand, or gravel from being found to constitute a dangerous condition in the surface of a public roadway when the entity fails to use existing means available to it for removal or mitigation of such accumulation and when the public entity had actual notice through the proper public official responsible for the roadway and had a reasonable time to act. (II) A dangerous condition caused by the failure to realign a stop sign or yield sign which was turned, without authorization of the public entity, in a manner which reassigned the right-of-way upon intersecting public highways, roads, or streets, or the failure to repair a traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed; (III) A dangerous condition caused by an accumulation of snow and ice which physically interferes with public access on walks leading to a public building open for public business when a public entity fails to use existing means available to it for removal or mitigation of such accumulation and when the public entity had actual notice of such condition and a reasonable time to act. (e) A dangerous condition of any public hospital, jail, public facility located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility. Nothing in this paragraph (e) or in paragraph (d) of this subsection (1) shall be construed to prevent a public entity from asserting sovereign immunity for an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property, whether or not such property is located in a park or recreation area or on a highway, road, or street right-of-way. (f) The operation and maintenance of any public water facility, gas facility, sanitation facility, electrical facility, power facility, or swimming facility by such public entity; (g) The operation and maintenance of a qualified state capital asset that is the subject of a leveraged leasing agreement pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of article 82 of this title; (h) Failure to perform an education employment required background check as described in section 13-80-103.9, C.R.S.; (i) An action brought pursuant to section 13-21-128; (j) An action brought pursuant to part 12 of article 20 of title 13, whether the conduct alleged occurred before, on, or after January 1, 2022; or (k) An action brought pursuant to section 24-34-806 (4). (1.5) (a) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraphs (b) and (e) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to claimants who have been convicted of a crime and incarcerated in a correctional facility or jail pursuant to such conviction, and such correctional facility or jail shall be immune from liability as set forth in subsection (1) of this section. (b) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraphs (b) and (e) of subsection (1) of this section does apply to claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted of the crime for which such claimants are being incarcerated if such claimants can show injury due to negligence. (c) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to any backcountry landing facility located in whole or in part within any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity. For purposes of this paragraph (c), "backcountry landing facility" means any area of land or water that is unpaved, unlighted, and in a primitive condition and is used or intended for the landing and takeoff of aircraft, and includes any land or water appurtenant to such area. (2) Nothing in this section or in section 24-10-104 shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity where the injury arises from the act, or failure to act, of a public employee where the act is the type of act for which the public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability. (3) In addition to the immunity provided in subsection (1) of this section, a public entity shall also have the same immunity as a public employee for any act or failure to act for which a public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability. (4) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action against a public entity or a public employee for an injury resulting from a dangerous condition of, or the operation and maintenance of, a public water facility or public sanitation facility. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven. (5) The immunity from liability granted in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to the university of Colorado hospital authority except for any hospital, clinic, surgery center, department, or other facility owned or operated by the authority that is located on the Anschutz medical campus or that is a facility operating under the hospital license issued to the university hospital pursuant to part 1 of article 3 of title 25, including off-campus locations. The "Health Care Availability Act", article 64 of title 13, is applicable to health-care institutions as defined in section 13-64-202 (3) that are not immune from liability under this section because of this section. (6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in subsections (4) or (5) of this section shall be construed to grant any additional immunity from liability beyond that which is otherwise provided in this article 10. Source: L. 71: p. 1206, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-6. L. 79: (1)(b) amended, p. 702, § 76, effective June 21. L. 86: IP(1), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended and (3) added, p. 875, § 5, effective July 1. L. 87: (4) added, p. 931, § 1, effective May 13. L. 92: (1)(d) amended, p. 1116, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (1.5) added, p. 2087, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(a) amended, p. 2556, § 53, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2002: (1.5)(c) added, p. 63, § 1, effective March 22. L. 2004: (1)(g) added, p. 1056, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2008: (1)(h) added, p. 2226, § 4, effective June 5. L. 2015: (1)(i) added, (HB 15-1290), ch. 212, p. 776, § 3, effective May 20, 2016. L. 2020: (5) and (6) added, (HB 20-1330), ch. 230, p. 1119, § 2, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(i) amended and (1)(j) added, (SB 21-088), ch. 442, p. 2927, § 3, effective January 1, 2022. L. 2024: IP(1), (1)(i), and (1)(j) amended and (1)(k) added, (HB 24-1342), ch. 477, p. 3344, § 2, effective January 1, 2025.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-088, see section 1 of chapter 442, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-10-106.1. Immunity and partial waiver - claims against the state - injuries from prescribed fire - on or after January 1, 2012. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the state shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section or section 24-10-106. In addition to any other claims for which the state waives immunity under this article, sovereign immunity is waived by the state in an action for injuries resulting from a prescribed fire started or maintained by the state or any of its employees on or after January 1, 2012. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity if the injury arises from any act, or failure to act, of a state employee if the act is the type of act for which the state employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability. (3) In addition to the immunity provided under subsection (1) of this section, the state shall also have the same immunity as a state employee for any act or failure to act for which a state employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability. (4) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action against the state for an injury resulting from a prescribed fire started or maintained by the state or any of its employees. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven.

Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1361), ch. 242, p. 1145, § 2, effective June 4.

24-10-106.3. Immunity and partial waiver - claims for serious bodily injury or death on public school property or at school-sponsored events resulting from incidents of school violence - short title - definitions. (1) This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Claire Davis School Safety Act". (2) Definitions. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Charter school" means a charter school or an institute charter school established pursuant to article 30.5 of title 22, C.R.S. (b) "Crime of violence" means that the person committed, conspired to commit, or attempted to commit one of the following crimes: (I) Murder; (II) First degree assault; or (III) A felony sexual assault, as defined in section 18-3-402, C.R.S. (c) "Incident of school violence" means an occurrence at a public school or public school-sponsored activity in which a person: (I) Engaged in a crime of violence; and (II) The actions described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) by that person caused serious bodily injury or death to any other person. (d) "Public school" has the same meaning as provided in section 22-1-101, C.R.S., and includes a charter school or institute charter school. (e) "School district" means a school district organized pursuant to article 30 of title 22, C.R.S., and the charter school institute established pursuant to section 22-30.5-503, C.R.S. (f) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that, either at the time of the actual injury or a later time, involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, or a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body. (3) Recognition of duty of care. All school districts and charter schools and their employees in this state have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all students, faculty, and staff from harm from acts committed by another person when the harm is reasonably foreseeable, while such students, faculty, and staff are within the school facilities or are participating in school-sponsored activities. (4) Limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a public school district or charter school is immune from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as otherwise provided in this section or in this article. In addition to any other claims for which the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" waives sovereign immunity in this article, sovereign immunity is waived under the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" with respect to school districts and charter schools for a claim of a breach of the duty of care established in subsection (3) of this section by the school district, a charter school, or an employee of the school district or charter school arising from an incident of school violence on or after June 3, 2015, and, with respect to such claims, the provisions of article 12 of title 22, C.R.S., do not apply to school districts and charter schools. An employee of a public school, school district, or a charter school is not subject to suit under this section in his or her individual capacity unless the employee's actions or omissions are willful and wanton. (5) A public school, school district, or charter school shall not be found negligent under this section solely as a result of not expelling or suspending any student. (6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity by a school district or charter school if the injury arises from any act, or failure to act, of an employee of the school district or charter school if the act is the type of act for which the school district or charter school employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability. (7) In addition to the immunity provided under this section, the school district and charter school shall also have the same immunity as a school district or charter school employee for any act or failure to act for which a school district or charter school employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability. (8) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action filed against a school district or charter school pursuant to this section for serious bodily injury or death caused by a breach of the duty of care, established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven. (9) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (9), the maximum amount of damages that may be recovered under this article in any single occurrence from a school district or charter school for a claim brought under this section is governed by the limits set forth in section 24-10-114 (1). (b) Repealed. (10) In order to promote vigorous discovery of events leading to an incident of school violence in any action brought under this section, an offer of judgment by a defendant under section 13-17-202, C.R.S., prior to the completion of discovery, is not deemed rejected if not accepted until fourteen days after the completion of discovery, and the plaintiff is not liable for costs due to not accepting such an offer of judgment until fourteen days after the completion of discovery. If a defendant refuses to answer a complaint, or a default judgment is entered against a defendant for failure to answer a complaint, or a defendant confesses liability in an action brought under this section, the court shall allow full discovery upon request of the plaintiff.

Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-213), ch. 266, p. 1036, § 2, effective June 3.

Editor's note: Subsection (9)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (9)(b), effective July 1, 2018. (See L. 2015, p. 1036.)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 15-213, see section 1 of chapter 266, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 356 cases (59 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: Burnett v. Colorado Dep't of Nat. Resources, Div. of Parks & Outdoor Rec., 2015 CO 19 (Colo. 2015).

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Burnett v. Colorado Dep't of Nat. Resources, Div. of Parks & Outdoor Rec., 2015 CO 19 (Colo. 2015). · cites it 105× “See Â§ 24-10-106. The Act recognizes that governmental immunity is sometimes inequitable, but it also recognizes that governmental entities provide many essential services that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive.”

sh Found., Katherine Tudor, & Donald Herbert Goede, III v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10 (Colo. 2018). · cites it 72× “The CGIA ¶20 Under the CGIA, sovereign immunity generally bars any action against a public entity for injuries that lie in tort or could lie in tort.”

Bloomer v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990). · cites it 61× “The court ruled that section 24-10-106, 10A C.R.S. (1988), did not waive sovereign immunity for Boulder County, a political subdivision of the State of Colorado.”

Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88 (Colo. 2020). · cites it 34× “(2020), and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”), section 24-10-106, C.R.S. (2020)—each of which serves substantial public policy objectives.”

Fogg v. MacAluso, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1995). · cites it 40× “; § 24-10-106 (emphasis added). The referenced subsections of section 42-4-106 provide: (2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, .”

City & Cnty. of Denver Ex Rel. Bd. of Water Commissioners v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1996). · cites it 53× “However, the plain language of section 24-10-106 does not recognize the distinction that the majority finds controlling.”

Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 325 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2014). · cites it 38× “See § 24-10-106. Accordingly, we must determine legislative intent in the absence of explicit guidance.”

State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000). · cites it 27× “In the alternative, the State argued that it is immune from liability pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), section 24-10-106, 7 C.R.S. (1999), and that the State cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000). · cites it 33× “See § 24-10-106. Because governmental immunity under the CGIA derogates Colorado's common law, we strictly construe the statute's immunity provisions.”

St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L. ex rel. Loveland, 325 P.3d 1014 (Colo. 2014). · cites it 33× “See generally § 24-10-102 (providing declaration of legislative policy); § 24-10-106(1) (outlining specific waiver provisions).”

Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000). · cites it 28× “See § 24-10-106. The GIA then withdraws and restores this immunity through a series of immunity waivers, exceptions to those waivers, and, in some cases, conditions relating to the exceptions.”

Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs, 327 P.3d 891 (Colo. 2014). · cites it 28× “See § 24-10-106(1)(a)-(h) (providing that public entities are immune in tort actions "except as provided otherwise in this section" and thereafter listing the immunity waivers); § 24-10-107, C.”

Show all 356 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1) — 160 cases

Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88 (Colo. 2020). “(2020), and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”), section 24-10-106, C.R.S. (2020)—each of which serves substantial public policy objectives.”

Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).

Swieckowski Ex Rel. Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).

Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000). “See § 24-10-106. Because governmental immunity under the CGIA derogates Colorado's common law, we strictly construe the statute's immunity provisions.”

Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(8) — 1 case

Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(F) — 6 cases

St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L. ex rel. Loveland, 325 P.3d 1014 (Colo. 2014). “See generally § 24-10-102 (providing declaration of legislative policy); § 24-10-106(1) (outlining specific waiver provisions).”

City of Longmont v. Henry-Hobbs, 50 P.3d 906 (Colo. 2002).

deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Wisdom v. City of Sterling, 36 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Ellis v. Town of Estes Park, 66 P.3d 178 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(a) — 44 cases

Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000). “See § 24-10-106. The GIA then withdraws and restores this immunity through a series of immunity waivers, exceptions to those waivers, and, in some cases, conditions relating to the exceptions.”

Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).

Fogg v. MacAluso, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1995). “; § 24-10-106 (emphasis added). The referenced subsections of section 42-4-106 provide: (2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, .”

Gray v. Univ. of Colorado Hosp. Auth., 284 P.3d 191 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).

Young ex rel D.B. v. Jefferson Cnty. Sheriff, 292 P.3d 1189 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(b) — 21 cases

Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 325 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2014). “See § 24-10-106. Accordingly, we must determine legislative intent in the absence of explicit guidance.”

Davis v. Paolino, 21 P.3d 870 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Gray v. Univ. of Colorado Hosp. Auth., 284 P.3d 191 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).

City & Cnty. of Denver Ex Rel. Bd. of Water Commissioners v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1996). “However, the plain language of section 24-10-106 does not recognize the distinction that the majority finds controlling.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(c) — 25 cases

Padilla Ex Rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in the City & Cnty. of Denver, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001).

sh Found., Katherine Tudor, & Donald Herbert Goede, III v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10 (Colo. 2018). “The CGIA ¶20 Under the CGIA, sovereign immunity generally bars any action against a public entity for injuries that lie in tort or could lie in tort.”

Ackerman v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2015 COA 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

Douglas Ex Rel. Douglas v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 203 P.3d 615 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d) — 15 cases

Bloomer v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990). “The court ruled that section 24-10-106, 10A C.R.S. (1988), did not waive sovereign immunity for Boulder County, a political subdivision of the State of Colorado.”

State Ex Rel. Colorado State Claims Bd. of the Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).

Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).

Burnett v. Colorado Dep't of Nat. Resources, Div. of Parks & Outdoor Rec., 2015 CO 19 (Colo. 2015). “See Â§ 24-10-106. The Act recognizes that governmental immunity is sometimes inequitable, but it also recognizes that governmental entities provide many essential services that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive.”

Holliday v. Bestop, Inc., 23 P.3d 700 (Colo. 2001).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(1) — 2 cases

McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

20SC646 – Maphis v. City of Boulder (Colo. 2022).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(1D) — 1 case

Lauck v. E-470 Pub. High. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(D) — 3 cases

Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).

Wark v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) — 17 cases

Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).

Lauck v. E-470 Pub. High. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).

McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

Wark v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Ackerman v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2015 COA 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I1) — 1 case

DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(ID) — 1 case

Moore v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 42 P.3d 82 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(II) — 6 cases

Dep't of Transp. v. Gypsum Ranch Co., 244 P.3d 127 (Colo. 2010).

Moore v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 42 P.3d 82 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Bernard E. Sandoval v. City of Colorado Springs, 2026 CO 34 (Colo. 2026).

Sandoval v. Colorado Springs (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(III) — 3 cases

Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 325 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2014). “See § 24-10-106. Accordingly, we must determine legislative intent in the absence of explicit guidance.”

Nichele Giron v. Justin Hice (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(T) — 1 case

McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(e) — 20 cases

Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 325 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2014). “See § 24-10-106. Accordingly, we must determine legislative intent in the absence of explicit guidance.”

Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs, 327 P.3d 891 (Colo. 2014). “See § 24-10-106(1)(a)-(h) (providing that public entities are immune in tort actions "except as provided otherwise in this section" and thereafter listing the immunity waivers); § 24-10-107, C.”

Ackerman v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2015 COA 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(ec) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(f) — 26 cases

deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

City of Colorado Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002).

Lopez v. City of Grand Junction, 2018 COA 97 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(g) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(h) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(i) — 2 cases

Sigalla v. Meidhof (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(2) — 4 cases

State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000). “In the alternative, the State argued that it is immune from liability pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), section 24-10-106, 7 C.R.S. (1999), and that the State cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

State v. Mason, 724 P.2d 1289 (Colo. 1986).

Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(3) — 1 case

Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 990 P.2d 1092 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(4) — 5 cases

Langlois v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 78 P.3d 1154 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

Gallegos v. City & Cnty. of Denver Ex Rel. Bd. of Water Commissioners, 894 P.2d 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Lawrence v. Buena Vista Sanitation Dist., 989 P.2d 254 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Hendricks ex rel. Martens v. Weld Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Hendricks by & Through Martens v. Weld, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(8) — 3 cases

v. Colorado Dep't of Pub. Health & Env't, 2020 COA 50 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).

Colorado State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Colorado Court of Appeals, 920 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1996).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(a) — 1 case

Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(b) — 2 cases

State Dep't of Corr. v. Watts, 2008 WY 19 (Wyo. 2008).

Muniz v. Garner, 921 F. Supp. 700 (D. Colo. 1996).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(c) — 1 case

Valanzuela v. Snider, 889 F. Supp. 1409 (D. Colo. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(d)(I) — 1 case

Tafoya v. Limon Corr. Facility (D. Colo. 2020).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(e) — 2 cases

Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(a) — 30 cases

Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

Bertrand v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Park Cnty., 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994).

Johnson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 916 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(b) — 16 cases

State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1990).

Pack v. Arkansas Valley Corr. Facility, 894 P.2d 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).

Norsby v. Jensen, 916 P.2d 555 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(c) — 16 cases

Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992).

Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).

Mentzel v. Jud. Dep't of Colorado, 778 P.2d 323 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).

Duong v. Cnty. of Arapahoe, 837 P.2d 226 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

Seder v. City of Fort Collins, 987 P.2d 904 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(d) — 22 cases

State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1992).

City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).

Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).

Stephen v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(d)(I) — 12 cases

Mason v. Adams, 961 P.2d 540 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

Smith v. Town of Estes Park, 944 P.2d 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

Click v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Alamosa, 923 P.2d 347 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

Colucci v. Town of Vail, 232 P.3d 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(d)(II) — 2 cases

Lyons v. City of Aurora, 987 P.2d 900 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(d)(III) — 4 cases

Seder v. City of Fort Collins, 987 P.2d 904 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Stanley v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 27J, 942 P.2d 1322 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

Martinez v. Weld Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Feeney v. Jefferson Cnty. Health Servs. Ass'n, 949 P.2d 103 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(e) — 17 cases

Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).

Rosales v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).

Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992).

Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colleges & Occupational Educ., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

Smith v. Town of Estes Park, 944 P.2d 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(f) — 15 cases

Burnworth v. Adams Cnty., 826 P.2d 368 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

Scott v. City of Greeley, 931 P.2d 525 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).

Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.