Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124 (2026)

Credit agreements - required to be in writing

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Credit agreement" means: (I) A contract, promise, undertaking, offer, or commitment to lend, borrow, repay, or forbear repayment of money, to otherwise extend or receive credit, or to make any other financial accommodation; (II) Any amendment of, cancellation of, waiver of, or substitution for any or all of the terms or provisions of any of the credit agreements defined in subparagraphs (I) and (III) of this paragraph (a); and (III) Any representations and warranties made or omissions in connection with the negotiation, execution, administration, or performance of, or collection of sums due under, any of the credit agreements defined in subparagraphs (I) and (II) of this paragraph (a). (b) "Creditor" means a financial institution which offers to extend, is asked to extend, or extends credit under a credit agreement with a debtor. (c) "Debtor" means a person who or entity which obtains credit or seeks a credit agreement with a creditor or who owes money to a creditor. (d) "Financial institution" means a bank, savings and loan association, savings bank, credit union, or mortgage or finance company. (2) Notwithstanding any statutory or case law to the contrary, including but not limited to section 38-10-112, no debtor or creditor may file or maintain an action or a claim relating to a credit agreement involving a principal amount in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars unless the credit agreement is in writing and is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. (3) A credit agreement may not be implied under any circumstances, including, without limitation, from the relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor or from performance or partial performance by or on behalf of the creditor or debtor, or by promissory estoppel.

Source: L. 89: Entire section added, p. 1438, § 1, effective March 15. L. 2013: (1)(d) amended, (SB 13-154), ch. 282, p. 1489, § 71, effective July 1.

JOINT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

ARTICLE 11

Joint Tenancy

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 32 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1991–2025 · leading case: Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-CATTLE, LLC, 155 P.3d 504 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).

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Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-CATTLE, LLC, 155 P.3d 504 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 127× “66 authorized the receivership independent of the deeds of trust, no fraudulent representations had been made by Premier, and defendants' fraud counterclaim pertaining to the deeds of trust was barred by the Colorado credit agreement statute of frauds, § 38-10-124, C.R.S.2006.…”

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). · cites it 130× “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fisher, 292 P.3d 934 (Colo. 2013). · cites it 8× “{1 We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that section 38-10-124(2), C.R.S. (2012) (Colorado's Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds, or "CASOF'), allows the introduction of extrinsic evidence to interpret an allegedly ambiguous contract.”

People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 9× “Application T 77 Defendant argues that section 38-10-124 precludes the court's restitution award because the Attorney General calculated restitution based on alleged oral agreements whereby defendant promised consumers loans with different terms than those in the executed loan…”

Pima Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Selby, 820 P.2d 1124 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 19× “Rather, it concluded that, because the alleged settlement agreement constituted a “credit agreement” within the meaning of § 38-10-124, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.), it could not be enforced because the parties had not reduced it to writing.”

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 902 P.2d 877 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 24× “Orix contends, as it did in the trial eoui-t, that § 38-10-124, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) requires all credit agreements to be in writing and precludes finding implied credit agreements under any circumstances, including those which would otherwise support promissory estoppel.”

Hewitt v. Pitkin Cnty. Bank & Trust Co., 931 P.2d 456 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 13× “Applicability of Statute of Frauds Relating to Credit Agreements Hewitt contends that the trial court erred in applying the statute of frauds relating to credit agreements, § 38-10-124, to bar his third through eighth claims dismissed on the summary judgment.”

Ivar v. Elk River Partners, LLC, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Colo. 2010). · cites it 10× “1996) ("As the plain language of the statute indicates, section 38-10-124 does not *1230 apply only to claims involving transactions which are characterized exclusively as credit agreements, but also applies to claims which merely relate to credit agreements involving a…”

Clark v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2014). · cites it 10× ““[I]t is now well established that § 38-10-124 is not limited by its terms to contract claims or to those tort claims which seek the enforcement of a credit agreement.”

Norwest Bank Lakewood, Nat'l Ass'n v. GCC P'ship, 886 P.2d 299 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 10× “Plaintiff asserted in the trial court that defendants’ counterclaims were barred by operation of the statute of frauds relating to credit agreements, § 38-10-124, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.). It has reasserted that contention here as an additional basis for affirming the trial…”

Fisher v. 1st Consumers Funding, Inc., 160 P.3d 321 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 28× “Treating Ist Consumers' motion as a motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Fishers were debtors and that 1st Consumers was a creditor and financial institution within the meaning of § 38-10-124; that the refinancing of the home mortgage was a credit…”

PayoutOne v. Coral Mortg. Bankers, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (D. Colo. 2009). · cites it 8× “Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 38-10-124 (West 2008); cf.”

Show all 32 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1) — 1 case

Pima Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Selby, 820 P.2d 1124 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). “Rather, it concluded that, because the alleged settlement agreement constituted a “credit agreement” within the meaning of § 38-10-124, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.), it could not be enforced because the parties had not reduced it to writing.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(a) — 3 cases

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-CATTLE, LLC, 155 P.3d 504 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). “66 authorized the receivership independent of the deeds of trust, no fraudulent representations had been made by Premier, and defendants' fraud counterclaim pertaining to the deeds of trust was barred by the Colorado credit agreement statute of frauds, § 38-10-124, C.R.S.2006.…”

Schmitz v. BBVA (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(a)(D) — 1 case

Fisher v. Cmty. Banks of Colorado, Inc., 300 P.3d 565 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(a)(I) — 3 cases

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Lang v. Bank of Durango, 78 P.3d 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

Ultegra Fin. Partners, Inc. v. Marzolf (D. Colo. 2020).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(a)(II) — 1 case

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(b) — 4 cases

Mackall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 356 P.3d 946 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Ultegra Fin. Partners, Inc. v. Marzolf (D. Colo. 2020).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(c) — 3 cases

People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). “Application T 77 Defendant argues that section 38-10-124 precludes the court's restitution award because the Attorney General calculated restitution based on alleged oral agreements whereby defendant promised consumers loans with different terms than those in the executed loan…”

Mackall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 356 P.3d 946 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Fisher v. 1st Consumers Funding, Inc., 160 P.3d 321 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “Treating Ist Consumers' motion as a motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Fishers were debtors and that 1st Consumers was a creditor and financial institution within the meaning of § 38-10-124; that the refinancing of the home mortgage was a credit…”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(1)(d) — 3 cases

Ultegra Fin. Partners, Inc. v. Marzolf (D. Colo. 2020).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(2) — 23 cases

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fisher, 292 P.3d 934 (Colo. 2013). “{1 We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that section 38-10-124(2), C.R.S. (2012) (Colorado's Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds, or "CASOF'), allows the introduction of extrinsic evidence to interpret an allegedly ambiguous contract.”

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Ivar v. Elk River Partners, LLC, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Colo. 2010). “1996) ("As the plain language of the statute indicates, section 38-10-124 does not *1230 apply only to claims involving transactions which are characterized exclusively as credit agreements, but also applies to claims which merely relate to credit agreements involving a…”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(3) — 7 cases

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Clark v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2014). ““[I]t is now well established that § 38-10-124 is not limited by its terms to contract claims or to those tort claims which seek the enforcement of a credit agreement.”

Norwest Bank Lakewood, Nat'l Ass'n v. GCC P'ship, 886 P.2d 299 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “Plaintiff asserted in the trial court that defendants’ counterclaims were barred by operation of the statute of frauds relating to credit agreements, § 38-10-124, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.). It has reasserted that contention here as an additional basis for affirming the trial…”

PayoutOne v. Coral Mortg. Bankers, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (D. Colo. 2009). “Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 38-10-124 (West 2008); cf.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(8) — 4 cases

Mackall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 356 P.3d 946 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Lang v. Bank of Durango, 78 P.3d 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(a) — 1 case

Dalton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (D. Colo. 2011).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(a) — 7 cases

Hewitt v. Pitkin Cnty. Bank & Trust Co., 931 P.2d 456 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). “Applicability of Statute of Frauds Relating to Credit Agreements Hewitt contends that the trial court erred in applying the statute of frauds relating to credit agreements, § 38-10-124, to bar his third through eighth claims dismissed on the summary judgment.”

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 902 P.2d 877 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). “Orix contends, as it did in the trial eoui-t, that § 38-10-124, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) requires all credit agreements to be in writing and precludes finding implied credit agreements under any circumstances, including those which would otherwise support promissory estoppel.”

Keenan v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 529 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2008).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(a)(I) — 4 cases

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(a)(II) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(a)(III) — 2 cases

Dalton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (D. Colo. 2011).

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Boland, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Colo. 2010).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(b) — 5 cases

Keenan v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 529 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2008).

Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996). “Univex also argues that section 38-10-124, 16A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.”

Morris v. Schoen, 998 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Boland, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Colo. 2010).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(c) — 3 cases

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Boland, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Colo. 2010).

Morris v. Schoen, 998 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-124(l)(d) — 1 case

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