It is the purpose and intention of this article
and article 35, part 2 of article 39, and part 1 of article 41 of this title to render titles to real
property and every interest therein more secure and marketable, and it is declared to be the
policy in this state that this article and all other laws concerning or affecting title to real property
and every interest therein and all recorded instruments, decrees, and orders of courts of record,
including all proceedings in the suits or causes wherein such orders or decrees have been entered
or rendered, shall be liberally construed with the end in view of rendering such titles absolute
and free from technical defects so that subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers by way of
mortgage, judgment, or otherwise may rely on the record title and so that the record title of the
party in possession is sustained and not defeated by technical or strict constructions.
Source: L. 27: p. 605, § 44. CSA: C. 40, § 151. CRS 53: § 118-8-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 118-
8-1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 2185, § 65, effective June 2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1975–2025 · leading case:
Page v. Fees-Krey, Inc., 617 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1980).
Page v. Fees-Krey, Inc., 617 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 10× “As noted in Part I of this dissent, section 38-34-101, C.R.S.1973, requires us to construe the Colorado recording statute liberally in order to "render title to real property and every interest therein more secure and marketable.”
Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002).
· cites it 2× “See *965 §§ 38-34-101 to XX-XX-XXX, 10 C.R.S. (2001).”
Tuttle v. Burrows, 852 P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 3× “Section 38-34-101, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol.”
Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 2× “See § 38-34-101, 16A C.R.S. (1993 Supp.). [A]ll .”
Hohn v. Morrison, 870 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Our conclusion is buttressed by the General Assembly’s declaration in § 38-34-101, C.R.S. (1992 Cum.Supp.) that: [I]t is the purpose and intention of articles 34 and 35 .”
Carmack v. Place, 535 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1975).
· cites it 3× “…appeals with directions that it affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 Now section 38-35-109, C.R.S. 1973. 2 Now section 38-34-101, C.R.S. 1973!”
Upson v. Goodland State Bank & Trust Co., 797 P.2d 845 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 3× “The question thus becomes what is the effect of the release on Goodland Bank, a bona fide purchaser for value in good faith. The general intent of Colorado’s recording statutes is to allow subsequent purchasers of real property to rely on the record title.”
First Interstate Bank v. Tanktech, Inc., 864 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1993).
“Thus, upon foreclosure of the property, pursuant to section 38-39-110, First Interstate received title “free and clear” of the prior lease.”
Upson v. Goodland State Bank & Trust Co., 823 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1992).
“” § 38-34-101, 16A C.R.S. (1982), thereby protecting subsequent bona fide purchasers for value, it should not be at the expense of prior in time innocent parties.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.