Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-117 (2026)

Mortgages, not a conveyance - lien theory

✓ current as of July 2026
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Mortgages, trust deeds, or other instruments intended to secure the payment of an obligation affecting title to or an interest in real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, regardless of its terms, so as to enable the owner of the obligation secured to recover possession of real property without foreclosure and sale, but the same shall be deemed a lien.

Source: L. 27: p. 592, § 12. CSA: C. 40, § 118. CRS 53: § 118-6-17. C.R.S. 1963: § 118-6-17.

Cross references: For sales by public trustee, see article 37 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case: Martinez v. Cont'l Enter., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986).
Martinez v. Cont'l Enter., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986). · cites it 12× “Section 38-35-117, 16A C.R.S. (1982), states as follows: Mortgages, not a conveyance — lien theory.”
. People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 3× “” One instruction described the lien theory detailed in section 38-35-117, C.R.S. 2017, and another instructed that title to property “does not vest with the purchaser until eight days after [a] foreclosure sale.”
Herstam v. Bd. of Directors, 895 P.2d 1131 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 10× “Relying upon § 38-35-117, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A), defendants argue that Colorado is a lien theory state, and AMS has only a lien on the property.”
Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961 (Colo. 2004). · cites it 2× “However, in lien theory states such as Colorado, see § 38-35-117, 10 C.R.S. (2003), merely mortgaging property does not transfer legal title and is therefore insufficient to sever a joint tenancy.”
Lewitz v. Porath Fam. Trust, 36 P.3d 120 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “See 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra, § 60.02(F)(1) (an easement appurtenant is imposed for the benefit of real property, not the owner of it).”
Reid v. Pyle, 51 P.3d 1064 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 3× “Section 38-35-117, C.R.S.2001; Ver Straten v.”
In Re Fisher, 202 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2009). · cites it 2× “1995); § 38-35-117, C.R.S. (2008) ("Mortgages, deeds of trust, or other instruments intended to secure the payment of an obligation shall be deemed a lien.”
Citicorp Person-To-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fremont Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 10× “Section 38-35-117, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol.”
Oken v. Hammer, 791 P.2d 9 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 3× “2d 7 (Colo.App.1984). Deeds of trust that are intended to secure payment of an obligation affecting an interest in real property are liens on property, not conveyances.”
Jenkins v. Peet (In Re Jenkins), 19 B.R. 105 (D. Colo. 1982). · cites it 2× “This argument is contrary to C.R.S. § 38-35-117: .. . trust deeds ... shall not be deemed a conveyance (sic), regardless of its (sic) terms, .”
Bigelow v. Nottingham, 833 P.2d 764 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 3× “Section 38-35-117, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol.”
Hohn v. Morrison, 870 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 3× “Section 38-35-117, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol.”
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