(1) No action shall
be commenced or maintained against a person in possession of real property to question or attack
the validity of or to set aside, upon any ground or for any reason whatsoever any final decree or
final order of any court of record in this state or any instrument of conveyance, deed, certificate
of sale, or release executed by any private trustee, successor in trust, public trustee, sheriff,
marshal, county treasurer, or any public official whatsoever, whether named in this section or
not, or officer or any appointee of any court when such document is the source of or in aid of or
in explanation of the title or chain of title or right of the party in possession or any of his
predecessors or grantors insofar as the same may affect the title or explain any matter connected
with the title in reference to said real property if such document has been recorded and has
remained of record in the office of the county clerk and recorder of the county where said real
property is situated for a period of seven years. All defects, irregularities, want of service,
defective service, lack of jurisdiction, or other grounds of invalidity, nullity, or causes or reasons
whereby or wherefore any such document might be set aside or rendered inoperative must be
raised in a suit commenced within said seven-year period and not thereafter.
(2) This section shall not apply to any of the following cases:
(a) Forged documents;
(b) During the pendency of an action, commenced prior to the expiration of said seven-
year period, to set aside, modify, or annul or otherwise affect such document, and notice of such
action has been filed as provided by law;
(c) When such document has been, by proper order or decree of competent court,
avoided, annulled, or rendered inoperative;
(d) Where the party, or his predecessor, who brings the action to question, to attack, or to
set aside the validity of such documents, has been deprived of possession within two years of the
commencement of said action.
Source: L. 27: p. 603, § 39. CSA: C. 40, § 146. L. 45: p. 272, § 1. CRS 53: § 118-7-11.
C.R.S. 1963: § 118-7-11. L. 75: (2)(d) amended, p. 225, § 84, effective July 16.
Notes of Decisions
Battle North, LLC v. Sensible Hous. Co., 370 P.3d 238 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 4× “" But Sensible's argument that Battle North does not own the Pine Martin parcel is based expressly on its assertion that the Bolt/Brooklyn Placer treasurer's deed is invalid.”
United States v. Novotny, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Colo. 2001).
· cites it 8× “To establish ownership of the properties under C.R.S. § 38-41-111(1), the Trusts must prove actual possession and that the deeds conveying the properties were properly recorded for a seven-year period.”
Dynasty, Inc. v. Winter Park Assocs., Inc., 5 P.3d 392 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 5× “Nevertheless, defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that § 38-41-111 prevents it from challenging the treasurer's deeds.”
Joseph v. Joseph, 608 P.2d 839 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 7× “On appeal, the estate contends that the trial court improperly applied § 38-41-111, C.R.S.1973, and that material factual issues remain in dispute as to the actual owner of the property prior to the 1963 quitclaim deed.”
Ginsberg v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 568 P.2d 35 (Colo. 1977).
· cites it 3× “We agree with the court of appeals that the district court was in error when it quieted title in Ginsberg against Stanley on the basis of section 38-41-111(1), C.R.S. 1973. The record is clear that Ginsberg was ousted of possession in 1954 when Stanley removed the fence from the…”
LeSatz v. Deshotels, 757 P.2d 1090 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
“Furthermore, § 38-41-111, C.R. S. (1982 RepLVol. 16A) places an unequivocal seven-year limitation upon maintaining an action against persons in possession attacking the validity of “any instrument of conveyance .”
United States v. Eaton Shale Co., 433 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Colo. 1977).
“We note that the Colorado statute of limitation, C.R.S. 38-41-111 (1973), is to the same purpose and effect, and strengthens our interpretation of the federal statute herein.”
Kriss v. Mineral Rights, Inc., 911 P.2d 711 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 2× “Section 38-41-111(1) provides, in pertinent *714 part, that no action shall be maintained against a person in possession of real property to attack the validity of any deed executed by a sheriff when that document is the source of, or in aid of or in explanation of, the title or…”
Ginsberg v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 551 P.2d 1086 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
· cites it 5× “1973, the trial court’s alternative finding that the quiet title decree served as prima facie evidence of plaintiffs’ title was correct with the result that the 'burden shifted to Stanley to show a title superior to that of plaintiffs.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-111(1) — 6 cases
United States v. Novotny, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Colo. 2001).
“To establish ownership of the properties under C.R.S. § 38-41-111(1), the Trusts must prove actual possession and that the deeds conveying the properties were properly recorded for a seven-year period.”
Dynasty, Inc. v. Winter Park Assocs., Inc., 5 P.3d 392 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“Nevertheless, defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that § 38-41-111 prevents it from challenging the treasurer's deeds.”
Ginsberg v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 568 P.2d 35 (Colo. 1977).
“We agree with the court of appeals that the district court was in error when it quieted title in Ginsberg against Stanley on the basis of section 38-41-111(1), C.R.S. 1973. The record is clear that Ginsberg was ousted of possession in 1954 when Stanley removed the fence from the…”
Kriss v. Mineral Rights, Inc., 911 P.2d 711 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
“Section 38-41-111(1) provides, in pertinent *714 part, that no action shall be maintained against a person in possession of real property to attack the validity of any deed executed by a sheriff when that document is the source of, or in aid of or in explanation of, the title or…”
Joseph v. Joseph, 608 P.2d 839 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
“On appeal, the estate contends that the trial court improperly applied § 38-41-111, C.R.S.1973, and that material factual issues remain in dispute as to the actual owner of the property prior to the 1963 quitclaim deed.”
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