The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.
(P.A. 03-154, S. 1.)
Construing the plain meaning of Sec. 22a-19 and its relationship to other statutes, court concluded that Sec. 22a-19 allows town to intervene in judicial review of decisions of its wetlands and zoning commission, does not conflict with Secs. 8-1 and 22a-42, which delegates municipal authority to the agencies, and does not yield an absurd or unworkable result. 280 C. 405. Statute did not overrule the principle that ambiguous statutory language is not unconstitutionally vague if the legislative history establishes a clear meaning. 284 C. 573. Under section, ambiguity determination is not limited to the statute itself, but requires viewing the statute at issue in context of other related statutes. Id., 838. The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. Plain meaning rule applied to Workers' Compensation Act provisions. 285 C. 348. Because Sec. 14-164(c) is ambiguous re implicit waiver of sovereign immunity, such ambiguity means waiver of sovereign immunity is not implied and therefore no extratextual evidence is necessary. 293 C. 382. Section does not overrule the prior interpretation of any statutory provision merely because the Court failed to apply the plain meaning rule, rather the ordinary principles of stare decisis apply to interpretations of statutory provisions that predate the enactment of section. 326 C. 190. When statutory language, even if ambiguous for purposes of this section, provides greater support for an interpretation of the statute than does the legislative history, court must yield to the implications of the statutory language, particularly when the legislative history is more general in nature and does not furnish any evidence of legislative intent with respect to the specific point of law at issue. 346 C. 711.
When application of alternative minimum tax credit statute resulted in double taxation and a mathematical impossibility that an individual would ever be eligible to recoup a credit, which was an absurd or unworkable result, court looked to extratextual evidence to determine statute's meaning. 98 CA 439. Under section, cannot look beyond text of statutory language if that language, as applied to facts of the case, is plain and unambiguous and does not yield a bizarre or unworkable result. 105 CA 124.
Cited. 49 CS 43.
Notes of Decisions
Hummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd., 923 A.2d 657 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 105× “This certified appeal raises two principal issues: (1) whether, under the plain meaning rule of recently enacted General Statutes § 1-2z, [2] we are obliged to overrule our precedent importing a final judgment requirement into General Statutes § 31-301b, [3] which governs…”
Envirotest Sys. Corp. v. Comm'r of Motor Vehs., 978 A.2d 49 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 52× “In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.”
Rivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 35× “; the court rejected the plaintiff's invitation, concluding that, because the language of § 7-163a is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, under General Statutes § 1-2z, [6] consideration of extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute,…”
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 12× “In seeking to determine that *1110 meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.”
Spiotti v. Town of Wolcott, 163 A.3d 46 (Conn. 2017).
· cites it 16× “4 The defendant contends that (1) Genovese should be overruled as a result of the legislature's subsequent enactment of General Statutes § 1-2z, 5 and (2) even if Genovese should not be overruled as the result of § 1-2z, it should be overruled because it was wrongly decided…”
State v. Orr, 969 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 16× “In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.”
State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739 (Conn. 2021).
· cites it 15× “Moreover, the straightforward rule created by these savings statutes—that changes to the sentencing scheme of a criminal statute are not retroactive unless explicitly stated—is supported by the legislature’s directive in § 1-2z that we ascertain the meaning of a statute ‘‘in the…”
State v. Fernando a., 981 A.2d 427 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 14× “In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.”
Peek v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 342 Conn. 103 (Conn. 2022).
· cites it 25× “They further argue that this court should con- strue § 52-584 consistent with the plain meaning rule of General Statutes § 1-2z, and that such a construction would require reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court.”
Housatonic R.R. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 21 A.3d 759 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 15× “If, *773 after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”
State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 (Conn. 2022).
· cites it 11× “, 106 (holding, based on interpretation of language of General Statutes § 53a-223a as required by § 1-2z, that legislature intended to criminalize each separate offense under § 53a-223a, not continuous course of con- duct).”
Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 147 A.3d 104 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 8× “3d 248 (2010) ; see General Statutes § 1-2z. 19 "[O]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.