(a) A person holding a certificate of registration for a motor vehicle who substantially changes the appearance or mechanical equipment of the motor vehicle so that the motor vehicle no longer conforms to the description contained in the application for, or certificate of, registration shall notify the commissioner of the change within forty-eight hours of the change. Notice is unnecessary if (1) the intent to make the change is specified in the original registration, or (2) in the case of a motor vehicle registered as a motor bus and having a seating capacity in excess of sixteen passengers, or in the case of a truck having a carrying capacity of two thousand pounds or more, and if the change is solely in regard to the motor, and, in case of the substitution of a motor, the motor so substituted has been registered with the commissioner. The commissioner may register such motor upon written application by the owner thereof setting forth such information as the commissioner may require. The fee for such registration shall be ten dollars.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be deemed to have committed an infraction and be fined fifty dollars for each offense.
(1949 Rev., S. 2365; P.A. 82-223, S. 7; P.A. 83-577, S. 13; P.A. 84-429, S. 8; P.A. 90-263, S. 44, 74; P.A. 10-3, S. 55.)
History: P.A. 82-223 specified that violation of the section constituted an infraction and increased the fine from maximum of $10 to $25; P.A. 83-577 increased the fine from $25 to $35; P.A. 84-429 rephrased provisions, divided section into Subsecs. and made other technical changes; P.A. 90-263 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to delete reference to public service motor vehicle and to substitute truck for commercial motor vehicle; P.A. 10-3 amended Subsec. (b) to increase fine from $35 to $50, effective April 14, 2010.
Cited. 177 C. 93.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
228
cases (
26 in the last 5 years), 1964–2026 · leading case:
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
· cites it 26× “ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
State v. Garcia, 597 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 2004).
· cites it 14× “C.G.S. § 14-17. Braxton, 352 N.C. at 174 , 531 S.”
State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2018).
· cites it 4× “C.G.S. § 14-17 (2017). And yet, murder is one of only a handful of crimes for which the General Assembly has permitted short-form indictments.”
State v. Jones, 538 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. 2000).
· cites it 8× “For reasons outlined and discussed below, we hold the Court of Appeals erred in that for purposes of felony murder: (1) culpable negligence may not be used to satisfy the intent requirements for a first-degree murder charge; and, (2) a defendant may not be subject to a potential…”
State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1987).
· cites it 6× “C.G.S. § 14-17 (1986). The victim, Wayne Gerald, who had been working at his desk at home the evening of 5 May 1984, was killed by a single shotgun blast fired through the window beside him.”
State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1991).
· cites it 10× “C.G.S. § 14-17. That statute classifies murders as either first or second degree, but only for purposes of assigning punishment; it does not define or redefine the crime of murder.”
State v. McKoy, 394 S.E.2d 426 (N.C. 1990).
· cites it 6× “C.G.S. §§ 14-17, -21, -52, -58 (1969). Under N.”
State v. Bunch, 689 S.E.2d 866 (N.C. 2010).
· cites it 6× “C.G.S. § 14-17, [2] and this Court has confined the offense to "only two elements: (1) the defendant knowingly committed or attempted to commit one of the felonies indicated in N.”
State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593 (N.C. 2003).
· cites it 3× “C.G.S. § 14-17, the common-law definition of murder remained unchanged.”
State v. Tirado, 599 S.E.2d 515 (S.C. 2004).
· cites it 3× “C.G.S. § 14-17 (2003); State v. Peoples, 141 N.”
State v. Tirado, 599 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. 2004).
· cites it 3× “C.G.S. § 14-17 (2003); State v. Peoples, 141 N.”
State v. Williams, 434 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. 1993).
· cites it 8× “C.G.S. § 14-17 provides that a murder which occurs during the course of any "arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon" is punishable as first-degree murder.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) — 16 cases
State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2018).
“C.G.S. § 14-17 (2017). And yet, murder is one of only a handful of crimes for which the General Assembly has permitted short-form indictments.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b) — 5 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b)(1) — 2 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
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