Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (2026)

Liability of employer for discipline or discharge of employee on account of employee's exercise of certain constitutional rights or employee's refusal to attend employer-sponsored meeting or listen to speech relating to employer's opinion on political or religious matters. Definitions. Exceptions

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Political matters” means matters relating to elections for political office, political parties, proposals to change legislation, proposals to change regulation and the decision to join or support any political party or political, civic, community, fraternal or labor organization; and

(2) “Religious matters” means matters relating to religious affiliation and practice and the decision to join or support any religious organization or association.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects or threatens to subject any employee to discipline or discharge on account of (1) the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages; or (2) such employee's refusal to (A) attend an employer-sponsored meeting with the employer or its agent, representative or designee, the primary purpose of which is to communicate the employer's opinion concerning religious or political matters, or (B) listen to speech or view communications, the primary purpose of which is to communicate the employer's opinion concerning religious or political matters, shall be liable to such employee for the full amount of gross loss of wages or compensation, with costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court. If the court determines that such action for damages was brought without substantial justification, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the employer.

(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit: (1) An employer or its agent, representative or designee from communicating to its employees any information that the employer is required by law to communicate, but only to the extent of such legal requirement; (2) an employer or its agent, representative or designee from communicating to its employees any information that is necessary for such employees to perform their job duties; (3) an institution of higher education, or any agent, representative or designee of such institution, from meeting with or participating in any communications with its employees that are part of coursework, any symposia or an academic program at such institution; (4) casual conversations between employees or between an employee and an agent, representative or designee of an employer, provided participation in such conversations is not required; or (5) a requirement limited to the employer's managerial and supervisory employees.

(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a religious corporation, entity, association, educational institution or society that is exempt from the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to 42 USC 2000e-1(a) or is exempt from sections 4a-60a, 46a-81b to 46a-81o, inclusive, pursuant to section 46a-81p with respect to speech on religious matters to employees who perform work connected with the activities undertaken by such religious corporation, entity, association, educational institution or society.

(P.A. 83-578; P.A. 22-24, S. 1; P.A. 23-46, S. 24; 23-145, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 22-24 added Subsec. (a) defining “political matters” and “religious matter”, designated existing section as Subsec. (b) and added provision re employer's liability for disciplining or discharging employee for refusal to attend employer-sponsored meeting or listen to speech relating to employer's opinion on religious or political matters, added Subsecs. (c) and (d) providing exceptions to provision in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 2022; P.A. 23-46 amended Subsec. (b)(1) by adding that employer shall be liable to employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages; P.A. 23-145 amended Subsec. (d) by replacing “46a-81a and 46a-81o” with “46a-81b to 46a-81o, inclusive,”, effective July 1, 2023.

Cited. 193 C. 558; 209 C. 807. Right to jury trial cannot be implied; must be affirmatively expressed. 211 C. 370. Cited. 214 C. 464; 222 C. 346; 224 C. 693; 226 C. 314; 239 C. 356. Whether subject matter addressed by a particular statement is of public concern involves a question of law for the court, and whether the statement addresses such a matter depends on its content, form and context which is a question of fact, and in this case, it was within court's discretion to submit the question to the jury; in an action under section, it is within province of trial court to determine as a matter of law which topics are considered to be of public concern, but whether employee's statements address such a topic is within the province of the jury to be determined by looking at content, form and context; jury instruction was permissible that for protection to apply, employee's statement must concern a broader issue of public concern and not merely employee's personal matters. 249 C. 766. Section extends protection of rights of free speech under federal and state constitutions to employees in a private workplace; managerial decision about placement of flags in the workplace does not involve employee's constitutional rights of free speech. 251 C. 1. Public employees who make statements pursuant to their official duties are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes under federal constitution and plaintiff failed to establish she was speaking in unofficial capacity. 304 C. 483. While constitutional protections grounded in first amendment of federal constitution are applicable to private employees, plaintiff's speech not protected under federal constitution because statements were made pursuant to his employment duties. Id., 585. Rule in 547 U.S. 410 (i.e., when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes, and the federal constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline) does not apply to claim that employer violated section by subjecting employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 3, 4 or 14 of the state constitution; section extends same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in a private workplace as the protection afforded to employee speech in a public workplace for claims involving the state constitution. 319 C. 175.

Section constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. 15 CA 297. Cited. 20 CA 231; 33 CA 600; 40 CA 577; 45 CA 712. Statute applies to some activities and speech that occur at the workplace; plaintiff's failure to display an American flag at his workstation is not constitutionally protected speech to which the statute applies since plaintiff's expression did not involve a matter of public concern. 48 CA 618. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that legislature's use of term “costs” in either Sec. 31-51m or this section was intended to authorize court to award prevailing party the cost of an economist; because an economist is not a listed expert witness whose cost may be reimbursed under Sec. 52-260(f), testimonial fees of plaintiff's expert economist cannot be reimbursed. 79 CA 501. Plaintiff, an elected municipal sheriff, was an independent contractor and not an employee of defendant municipality for purposes of section. 135 CA 699. The term “employer” does not include a customer that exercised its right under a service contract to communicate concerns about vendor company's employee that resulted in disciplinary action against the employee. 158 CA 482. Plaintiff making a claim pursuant to section does not have an affirmative burden to plead noninterference. 226 CA 98.

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 163 cases (54 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport, 43 A.3d 69 (Conn. 2012).

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Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport, 43 A.3d 69 (Conn. 2012). · cites it 53× “Kelly, the former assistant superintendent of the Bridgeport public schools (school district), and Daniel Shamas, [1] the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States…”

Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 43 A.3d 111 (Conn. 2012). · cites it 85× “" The principal issue in this appeal requires us to determine whether the rule in Garcetti is applicable in an action brought against a private employer pursuant to General Statutes § 31-51q, [2] claiming that adverse employment actions taken in response to speech made during…”

Cotto v. United Tech. Corp., 738 A.2d 623 (Conn. 1999). · cites it 74× “General Statutes § 31-51q provides: “Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the…”

Mercer v. Dora B. Schriro, Comm'r of the Dep't of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., the Conn. State Police Union, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D. Conn. 2018). · cites it 38× “Plaintiff concludes that because these actions violated his rights to free speech, the Union Defendants violated Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51q. As set forth supra , that statute provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny employer, including the state and any instrumentality…”

Dighello v. Thurston Foods, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 5 (D. Conn. 2018). · cites it 22× “Moreover, Connecticut's Superior Courts have consistently held that a plaintiff may recover under a theory of wrongful discharge, notwithstanding a contemporaneous claim under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-51q, where the basis of the wrongful discharge claim is a public policy for which…”

Conboy v. State, 974 A.2d 669 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 16× “This interlocutory appeal 1 stems from the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, on the basis of sovereign immunity, a putative class action brought by the plaintiffs, four state employees, 2 to recover damages from the defendant, the state of Connecticut, pursuant to…”

Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 734 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1999). · cites it 19× “By revised complaint dated March 4,1994, Daley initiated an action against the defendants on the following eleven counts: (1) retaliatory discharge under General *774 Statutes § 31-51q; 2 (2) common-law wrongful discharge; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) fraudulent…”

Jennings v. Town of Stratford, 263 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D. Conn. 2017). · cites it 24× “Although it is true that the complaint did not expressly cite § 31-51q, I conclude that the complaint necessarily alleged a cause of action under § 31-51q by *409 virtue of the fact that it alleged that plaintiff was an employee who was subject to retaliation in violation of the…”

Lopez v. Burris Logistics Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D. Conn. 2013). · cites it 39× “Defendant contends that each wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed as “legally insufficient on the ground that an alternate remedy exists under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-51q” and such a statutory claim “has, in fact been pled in Count Three, thereby precluding the [Plaintiffs…”

Skinner v. Angliker, 559 A.2d 701 (Conn. 1989). · cites it 22× “Worrell, the commissioner of the state department of mental health, in their official capacities, alleging that they had discharged him because he had exercised his first amendment rights and that the defendants’ actions were in violation of General Statutes § 31-51q. 2 The…”

Cotto v. United Tech. Corp., 711 A.2d 1180 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 31× “1 The sole issue to be resolved is whether General Statutes § 31-51q 2 provides the plaintiff employee with a cause of action for monetary damages against the defendant, his private employer, after discharge from his employment resulting from an alleged exercise by the plaintiff…”

Dimartino v. Richens, 19 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1750 (Conn. 2003). · cites it 17× “§ 1983 , 2 concerning his rights to freedom of speech and equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution; and (2) the trial court’s findings that the defendants had violated General Statutes § 31-51q, 3…”

Show all 163 citing cases →

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q(b) — 1 case

Light v. New Haven (D. Conn. 2024).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q(b)(1) — 1 case

Brock v. Mental Health & Addiction Servs. (D. Conn. 2025).

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