As used in sections
42-133e to
42-133g, inclusive:
(a) “Person” means a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, partnership or other entity and, in case of an entity, includes any other entity which has a majority interest in such entity or effectively controls such other entity as well as the individual officers, directors and other persons in active control of the activities of such entity;
(b) “Franchise” means an oral or written agreement or arrangement in which (1) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling or distributing goods or services under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor, provided nothing contained herein shall be deemed to create a franchisor-franchisee relationship between the grantor and grantee of a lease, license or concession to sell goods or services upon or appurtenant to the premises of the grantor, which premises are occupied by the grantor primarily for its own independent merchandising activities; and (2) the operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such plan or system is substantially associated with the franchisor's trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising or other commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate, and includes any agreement between a manufacturer, refiner or producer and a distributor, wholesaler or jobber, between a manufacturer, refiner or producer and a retailer, or between a distributor, wholesaler or jobber and a retailer;
(c) “Franchisor” means a person who grants a franchise to another person, including a manufacturer, refiner or producer or a distributor, wholesaler or jobber who grants to a distributor, wholesaler or jobber or retailer, as the case may be, the authority to use a trademark, tradename, service mark or other identifying symbol or name under a franchise;
(d) “Franchisee” means a person to whom a franchise is granted, including a distributor, wholesaler or jobber or retailer who is granted the authority under a franchise to use a trademark, tradename, service mark or other identifying symbol or name.
(1972, P.A. 287, S. 1; P.A. 73-500, S. 1; P.A. 75-560, S. 1; P.A. 95-79, S. 161, 189.)
History: P.A. 73-500 redefined “franchise” to delete reference to agreements or arrangements “for a definite or indefinite period”; P.A. 75-560 redefined “franchise”, “franchisor” and “franchisee” to include specific references to manufacturers, refiners, producers, distributors, wholesalers, jobbers and retailers; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995.
See Sec. 42-133h re applicability of sections.
Cited. 179 C. 471.
Cited. 1 CA 439.
Subdiv. (b):
Since plaintiff's business was not “substantially associated” with a trademark of defendant, no franchise arrangement existed under pre-1975 statute. 180 C. 720. Parties' actions, in addition to terms of written agreement, held to constitute an agreement or arrangement for purposes of determining whether a franchise exists; “substantial” association of franchisee with franchisor for purposes of section does not mean exclusive or complete association. 250 C. 334.
Cited. 38 CS 495.
Subdiv. (c):
Defendant, a wholesaler, distributor and jobber of gasoline and petroleum products, was not a franchisor under pre-1975 statute since plaintiff's business was not “substantially associated” with a trademark of defendant. 180 C. 720.
Notes of Decisions
Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 736 A.2d 824 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 64× “In this appeal, the defendant Allen-Bradley Company, LLC, 1 claims that the trial court improperly found that, under the Connecticut Franchise Act (franchise act), General Statutes §§ 42-133e through 42-133h: (1) a franchise relationship existed between the defendant…”
Muha v. United Oil Co., 433 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1980).
· cites it 19× “The single question presented by this appeal is whether the defendant, United Oil Company (hereinafter United), was, at the time it terminated two month-to-month leases it had entered into with the plaintiffs for property operated as automobile service stations, a franchisor as…”
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
· cites it 4× “Some statutes, such as the Connecticut Franchise Act, General Statutes § 42-133e through 42-133h, do impose limitations of just cause upon the power to terminate some contracts ; see § 42-133f; but the legislature has recently refused to interpolate such a requirement into…”
Edmands v. Cuno, Inc., 892 A.2d 938 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 6× “” General Statutes § 42-133e *438 (b). The trial court’s oral decision specifically addressed only subdivision (1) of subsection (b), and, therefore, we do not consider whether the fact that most of the plaintiffs’ business was derived from the sale of CUNO products would…”
Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 473 A.2d 318 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983).
· cites it 6× “On September 3,1982, the defendant instituted an action in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford against the plaintiff under General Statutes § 42-133g 2 for an injunction against the termination of the franchise, and for money damages…”
Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 950 (D. Conn. 1988).
· cites it 8× “(Count One), the Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-133e et seq. (Count Two), and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.”
Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v. Ahmad, 757 A.2d 494 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 11× “, after that court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide notice to the defendants as required by General Statutes § 42-133f (a) 1 of the Connecticut franchise act (general franchise *808 act), General Statutes §§ 42-133e through 42-133h, for termination of the leases…”
McKeown Distributors, Inc. v. Gyp-Crete Corp., 618 F. Supp. 632 (D. Conn. 1985).
· cites it 6× “§§ 35-24 to 35-45, the Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-133e to 42-133h, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.”
Carlos v. Philips Bus. Sys., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y 1983).
· cites it 4× “1982-83); and the nearly identical Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-133e et seq. (West Supp.”
Jason Robert's, Inc. v. Adm'r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 15 A.3d 1145 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
· cites it 6× “3 On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the appeals referee had failed to consider the issue of whether a franchise agreement existed between it and Derose pursuant to General Statutes § 42-133e (b). Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that, as a matter of law, a finding that a…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e(b) — 13 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e(b)(2) — 2 cases
Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 950 (D. Conn. 1988).
“(Count One), the Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-133e et seq. (Count Two), and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.”
Carlos v. Philips Bus. Sys., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y 1983).
“1982-83); and the nearly identical Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-133e et seq. (West Supp.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e(b)(l) — 1 case
Carlos v. Philips Bus. Sys., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y 1983).
“1982-83); and the nearly identical Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-133e et seq. (West Supp.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e(c) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e(d) — 1 case
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