Notwithstanding the provisions of section
52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a person under twenty-one years of age, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of twenty-one.
(P.A. 86-401, S. 6, 7; 86-403, S. 104, 132; P.A. 91-240; P.A. 02-138, S. 2; P.A. 19-16, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change; P.A. 91-240 changed “two” years to “seventeen” years and deleted phrase “except that no such action may be brought more than 7 years from the date of the act complained of”; P.A. 02-138 extended the limitation on bringing an action from 17 to 30 years after the attainment of the age of majority, effective May 23, 2002, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed prior to, on or after said date; P.A. 19-16 replaced “minor” with “person under twenty-one years of age” and replaced “age of majority” with “age of twenty-one”, effective October 1, 2019, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed on or after October 1, 2019.
Cited. 214 C. 464. Court concluded that section as amended by expanding period of liability did not create a substantive change in the law that would preclude its retroactive application. 224 C. 483. Cited. 230 C. 472. Actions may be brought no later than 30 years from the date plaintiff personally attained the age of majority. 279 C. 207. Retroactive application of section to revive plaintiff's otherwise time barred claims does not violate defendant's substantive due process rights under Connecticut Constitution; defendant did not have a vested right to a defense under the lapsed statute of limitations. 317 C. 357. Section applicable to actions against the perpetrators of sexual abuse of minors as well as actions against parties whose negligent acts or omissions legally caused the personal injuries suffered by the victims of sexual abuse. 323 C. 303.
Cited. 39 CA 183. Whether plaintiff did or did not repress memories of the sexual abuse is irrelevant, as the section does not mention or require repressed memories, nor does it bar plaintiffs who have not repressed memories of the abuse from relying on it. 178 CA 547.
Cited. 44 CS 527; 45 CS 136.
Notes of Decisions
Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 147 A.3d 104 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 107× “he plaintiff and the harm was not foreseeable; (3) the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant's conduct had caused the plaintiff's damages; (4) the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant had…”
Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 901 A.2d 673 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 35× “In this appeal, we are asked to decide when the thirty year statute of limitations period under General Statutes § 52-577d, 1 triggered by a minor victim of sexual assault attaining the age of majority, begins to run for the plaintiff, David Doe, who was nineteen years old when…”
Roberts v. Caton, 619 A.2d 844 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 36× “The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an amendment to General Statutes § 52-577d, *485 which extends the statute of limitations for a civil action for damages caused by sexual assault of a minor, may be retroactively applied.”
Giordano v. Giordano, 664 A.2d 1136 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
· cites it 36× “The defendant claims that the attachment was improper because (1) the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577d, 1 which governs civil actions for damages for injury to a minor as a result of sexual abuse, is unconstitutional, (2) General Statutes § 52-278d, as applied…”
Almonte v. New York Med. Coll., 851 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994).
· cites it 17× “1 (action within 3 years of majority or discovery); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577d (action within 17 years of majority); Ga.”
Doe v. Rackliffe, 337 Conn. 627 (Conn. 2020).
· cites it 28× “) General Statutes § 52-577d. The sine qua non for application of the statute is the requirement of harm caused by an originating act of sexual abuse, exploitation or assault.”
Todd M. v. Richard L., 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995).
· cites it 19× “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than seventeen years from the date such…”
Sherman v. Ronco, 985 A.2d 1042 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 9× “General Statutes § 52-577d allows a person who claims that he or she was sexually abused, exploited or assaulted as a minor to bring a personal injury action on the basis of that abuse until the alleged victim reaches thirty years beyond the age of eighteen.”
Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1995).
· cites it 7× “The plaintiffs argue, however, that their claims are not time-barred because Connecticut’s seventeen-year statute of limitations, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577d, 4 applies to all causes of action based upon sexually abusive conduct.”
Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (NY 2006).
· cites it 2× “Conn Gen Stat § 52-577d (extending the time period for minors to bring sexual abuse claims to 30 years from the age of majority); Cal Code Civ Proc § 340.”
John Doe No. 1 v. Knights of Columbus, 930 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2013).
· cites it 3× “§ 52 -577d, a judge of this District has previously held that “§ 52-577d is not substantive, for it does not create a right of action to recover damages for sexual misconduct, but merely creates the appropriate statute of limitations for such [a] claim.”
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