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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 951 — Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 (2025)

Use of reasonable physical force or deadly physical force generally

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1977–2025 35citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 35 opinions since 1977, 7 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (1 case).

(a) The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:

(1) A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, except a person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes as described in subdivision (6) of this section, may use reasonable physical force upon such minor or incompetent person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such minor or incompetent person.

(2) An authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction.

(3) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain order, but he or she may use deadly physical force only when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.

(4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself or herself may use reasonable physical force upon such person to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to thwart such result.

(5) A duly licensed physician or psychologist, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient, provided the treatment (A) is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his or her parent, guardian or other person entrusted with his or her care and supervision, or (B) is administered in an emergency when the physician or psychologist reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

(6) A teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes may use reasonable physical force upon such minor when and to the extent such teacher or other person reasonably believes such force to be necessary to (A) protect such teacher, other person or others from immediate physical injury, (B) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance, as defined in section 21a-240, upon or within the control of such minor, (C) protect property from physical damage, or (D) restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to maintain order.

(b) No person is justified in using force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 18; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 4; P.A. 73-205, S. 6; P.A. 89-186, S. 1, 2; P.A. 90-43; P.A. 92-260, S. 3; P.A. 19-27, S. 3; P.A. 21-40, S. 52; P.A. 23-79, S. 50.)

History: 1971 act specified that force used in Subdivs. (1), (3), (4) and (5) must be “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 73-205 deleted language specifically forbidding use of “deadly physical force” in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 89-186 added new Subdiv. (6) re the use of reasonable physical force by a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes and amended Subdiv. (1) accordingly; P.A. 90-43 applied provisions of Subdiv. (5) to psychologists; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdivs. (1), (3), (4) and (6) to make technical change by replacing “it is necessary” with “such to be necessary”; P.A. 19-27 designated existing provisions re circumstances under which use of physical force justifiable and not criminal as Subsec. (a) and amended same by making technical changes, and added Subsec. (b) re discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression; P.A. 21-40 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(6); P.A. 23-79 made technical and conforming changes in Subsec. (a)(6)(A) and (B), effective July 1, 2023.

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 234 C. 455; 242 C. 211.

Cited. 8 CA 517; Id., 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390. Subsec. (a)(1): Plain language of the parental justification defense demonstrates that the defense does not apply to the situation prong of the risk of injury to a child in Sec. 53-21(a)(1). 199 CA 800.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Former Subdiv. (1):

Offense of risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21(a)(1) is not logically inconsistent with defense of parental justification. 294 C. 243.

Cited. 20 CA 75. Examining plain language of risk of injury statute, Sec. 53-21(a)(1), and this Subdiv., providing for the justification defense of reasonable parental discipline, there is no apparent reason to bar application of Subdiv. to a charge under Sec. 53-21(a)(1). 99 CA 713.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Nathan J., 982 A.2d 1067 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-18 16×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“We granted certification to appeal limited to two issues: (1) whether the Appellate Court properly concluded, as a matter of law, that the justification defense of reasonable physical force by a parent for the purpose of maintaining discipline (parental justification defense)…”
The case’s holding
A defendant may present inconsistent defenses to a jury.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that a defendant may present inconsistent defenses to the jury” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Leavitt, 513 A.2d 744 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 53a-18 15×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“” General Statutes § 53a-18 provides that “[t]he use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances: (1) A parent, guardian, teacher or other person entrusted with the…”
The case’s holding
Disorderly conduct requires the defendant to intend to cause or recklessly create a risk of causing inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm through fighting or violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.
Later courts cite it for
“the crime of disorderly conduct consists of two elements: (1) that the defendant intended to cause, or recklessly created a risk of causing, 'inconvenience, annoyance or alarm' and (2) that he did so by engaging 'in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior ....” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENIngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 2,942 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“§ 13-246 (A) (1) (1956); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 (1977); Neb. Rev.”
The case’s holding
The Eighth Amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in public schools because its protections are reserved for the criminal justice system.
Later courts cite it for
“eighth amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the state has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” · 77 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Torrice, 564 A.2d 330 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
cites § 53a-18 8×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“3 The defendant claims the trial court erred in that (1) it failed to add “judicial gloss” to its instructions to the jury concerning the crime of risk of injury to a minor, (2) it failed to instruct the jury in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 53a-18 (1),…”
The case’s holding
A conviction for risk of injury requires finding that the defendant acted willfully and either intended the injury, knew it would occur, or demonstrated reckless disregard of the consequences.
Later courts cite it for
“it was not permitted to find the defendant guilty for committing any act,' but must find that he acted wilfully and that he either intended the resulting injury to the victim, or he knew that the injury would occur, or that his conduct was of such a character that it demonstrated a reckless disregard of the consequences.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-18 4×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“, General Statutes § 53a-18 (2) (“[a]n authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction”); General…”
The case’s holding
Temporary blindness and chemical burns resulting from pepper spray constitute sufficient evidence of serious physical injury to support a finding that the spray is a dangerous instrument.
Later courts cite it for
“we are constrained to note that well established principles governing appellate review of factual decisions preclude us from utilizing this material to find facts on appeal” · 2 citing courts
6
REDState v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-18 3×cited by 49 cases
Overruled by State v. Kitchens on other grounds: 12 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 2 say in part.
Where it cites § 53a-18
“2d 794 (1989), wherein the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, assault in the third degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant claimed that the jury instructions rendered it “reasonably possible that the jury was misled on essential elements of the crimes with which…”
The case’s holding
Trial courts possess broad discretion in supervising voir dire and are not required to instruct a jury sua sponte on defenses that the defendant fails to request.
Later courts cite it for
“actively induced the trial court to give the . . . instruction that he . . . challenges on appeal . . . .” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Errol J., 237 A.3d 747 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
cites § 53a-18 7×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“The defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury an instruction on the statutory (§ 53a-18 (1)) parental justification defense with respect to the situation prong of the risk of injury to a child charge in count two of the information was unavailing,…”
8
GREENLovan C. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 860 A.2d 1283 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 53a-18 5×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“We are troubled by the hearing officer’s substantiation of the abuse allegation, especially in light of the language in General Statutes § 53a-18. That section provides in relevant part that “[t]he use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an…”
9
GREENDubinsky v. Black, 196 A.3d 870 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 53a-18 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“II The plaintiff nonetheless argues that the arresting officers lacked probable cause in light of the protection afforded parents under General Statutes § 53a-18 (1). That statute provides in relevant part that "[t]he use of physical force upon another person which would…”
10
GREENState v. Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 53a-18 4×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“There is no support for the contention that the use of a reasonableness standard in a penal statute renders it presumptively vague.”
The case’s holding
A statute prohibiting negligent firearm storage is not unconstitutionally vague if the defendant's conduct falls within the core meaning of the law.
Later courts cite it for
“in construing the meaning of terms within a statute we look to general statutes 1-1, entitled 'wjords and phrases,' which provides in subsection (a) that 'in the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Salters, 826 A.2d 202 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 53a-18 5×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“General Statutes § 53a-18 (2) provides that “[a]n authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction.”
Later courts cite it for
“there exists a distinction between a peace officer and a correctional officer as seen by the fact that general statutes 53a-167c(a) separately lists peace officer and employee of the department of corrections.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENValeriano v. Bronson, 546 A.2d 1380 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 174 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“, General Statutes §§ 53a-10, 53a-12, 53a-13, 53a-14, 53a-15, 53a-16.”
The case’s holding
The common law year and a day rule is abrogated by the Penal Code and cannot be readopted through a saving clause.
Later courts cite it for
“that any claim invoking ineffective assistance of appellate counsel automatically satisfies the deliberate bypass requirement.” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENWillis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008).
cites § 53a-18 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“§ 18-1-703(1)(a) (2007); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53a-18(1) (2007); Del.”
The case’s holding
To sustain a battery conviction where parental privilege is asserted, the state must prove the force used was unreasonable or the parent's belief in the necessity of the force was unreasonable.
Later courts cite it for
“a parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his or her child as he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.” · 16 citing courts
14
GREENJames v. Comm'r of Corr., 156 A.3d 89 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 53a-18 6×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“II The petitioner next claims that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to seek a jury instruction on parental discipline/justification pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-18 (1) although the…”
15
GREENComm'r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84 (Conn. 2012).
cites § 53a-18 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“See General Statutes § 53a-18 (4). 10 Specifically with respect to inmate suicide, courts have recognized that “incarceration can place a person under unusual psychological strain and the jail or prison under a commensurate duty to prevent the prisoner from giving way to the…”
16
GREENState v. Pierson, 514 A.2d 724 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“In this case we need not consider whether General Statutes § 53a-18 (5) would protect a physician in the scenario posed by the defendant, as argued by the state, because the evidence indicates no circumstances that could reasonably be deemed to justify the acts the complainant…”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction omitting the requirement of volitional conduct is not constitutionally defective if the evidence contains no suggestion that the defendant's conduct was involuntary.
Later courts cite it for
“our acknowledgement of the fundamental principle that a criminal act must be volitional does not mean that a charge to a jury that omits reference to this principle is constitutionally defective where the evidence at trial contains no suggestion that the defendant's conduct was involuntary and he has made no such claim either in the trial court or on appeal.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENBenjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“7 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-18 (right to use deadly force only where person reasonably believes it necessary to protect self from deadly force or great bodily harm).”
The case’s holding
A state constitutional right to bear arms is not infringed by reasonable regulations that leave citizens with adequate weapons for self-defense.
Later courts cite it for
“every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENVazquez v. Comm'r of Corr., 1 A.3d 1242 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“See General Statutes §§ 53a-18 and 53a-19. 6 The petitioner also argues that counsel failed to inform him that his claim of self-defense was not a good defense because the jury could have believed everything the petitioner said and still have found that the force he used was…”
The case’s holding
A defense lawyer fulfills the duty to advise a client on a plea offer by fully explaining the terms of the plea and the merits of the case.
19
GREENState v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“, General Statutes § 53a-18, “Use of reasonable physical force or deadly physical force generally,” which links the use of physical force or deadly physical force to the reasonableness of the belief that it is justified; General Statutes § 53a-19, “Use of physical force in…”
The case’s holding
A stalking statute is not void for vagueness if it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct through specific intent, willful and repeated actions, and a requirement of reasonable fear.
20
GREENState v. Lori T., 282 A.3d 1233 (Conn. 2022).
cites § 53a-18 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 53a-18
“’’ General Statutes § 53a-18, in turn, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances: ‘‘(1) A parent, guardian or other person…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197720012025

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2009. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.14Conn.13Neb.2Conn. Super. Ct.1D. Conn.1Ind.1Mass.1Ohio Ct. App.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 9 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)1 case
Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008).“§ 18-1-703(1)(a) (2007); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53a-18(1) (2007); Del.”
(2)1 case
State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).“, General Statutes § 53a-18 (2) (“[a]n authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction”); General…”

Show all 35 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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