Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 (2026)

Use of reasonable physical force or deadly physical force generally

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:

(1) A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, except a person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes as described in subdivision (6) of this section, may use reasonable physical force upon such minor or incompetent person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such minor or incompetent person.

(2) An authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction.

(3) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain order, but he or she may use deadly physical force only when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.

(4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself or herself may use reasonable physical force upon such person to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to thwart such result.

(5) A duly licensed physician or psychologist, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient, provided the treatment (A) is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his or her parent, guardian or other person entrusted with his or her care and supervision, or (B) is administered in an emergency when the physician or psychologist reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

(6) A teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes may use reasonable physical force upon such minor when and to the extent such teacher or other person reasonably believes such force to be necessary to (A) protect such teacher, other person or others from immediate physical injury, (B) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance, as defined in section 21a-240, upon or within the control of such minor, (C) protect property from physical damage, or (D) restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to maintain order.

(b) No person is justified in using force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 18; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 4; P.A. 73-205, S. 6; P.A. 89-186, S. 1, 2; P.A. 90-43; P.A. 92-260, S. 3; P.A. 19-27, S. 3; P.A. 21-40, S. 52; P.A. 23-79, S. 50.)

History: 1971 act specified that force used in Subdivs. (1), (3), (4) and (5) must be “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 73-205 deleted language specifically forbidding use of “deadly physical force” in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 89-186 added new Subdiv. (6) re the use of reasonable physical force by a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes and amended Subdiv. (1) accordingly; P.A. 90-43 applied provisions of Subdiv. (5) to psychologists; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdivs. (1), (3), (4) and (6) to make technical change by replacing “it is necessary” with “such to be necessary”; P.A. 19-27 designated existing provisions re circumstances under which use of physical force justifiable and not criminal as Subsec. (a) and amended same by making technical changes, and added Subsec. (b) re discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression; P.A. 21-40 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(6); P.A. 23-79 made technical and conforming changes in Subsec. (a)(6)(A) and (B), effective July 1, 2023.

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 234 C. 455; 242 C. 211.

Cited. 8 CA 517; Id., 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390. Subsec. (a)(1): Plain language of the parental justification defense demonstrates that the defense does not apply to the situation prong of the risk of injury to a child in Sec. 53-21(a)(1). 199 CA 800.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Former Subdiv. (1):

Offense of risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21(a)(1) is not logically inconsistent with defense of parental justification. 294 C. 243.

Cited. 20 CA 75. Examining plain language of risk of injury statute, Sec. 53-21(a)(1), and this Subdiv., providing for the justification defense of reasonable parental discipline, there is no apparent reason to bar application of Subdiv. to a charge under Sec. 53-21(a)(1). 99 CA 713.

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 35 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case: State v. Nathan J., 982 A.2d 1067 (Conn. 2009).

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State v. Nathan J., 982 A.2d 1067 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 16× “We granted certification to appeal limited to two issues: (1) whether the Appellate Court properly concluded, as a matter of law, that the justification defense of reasonable physical force by a parent for the purpose of maintaining discipline (parental justification defense)…”

State v. Leavitt, 513 A.2d 744 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). · cites it 15× “” General Statutes § 53a-18 provides that “[t]he use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances: (1) A parent, guardian, teacher or other person entrusted with the…”

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). · cites it 2× “§ 13-246 (A) (1) (1956); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 (1977); Neb. Rev.”

State v. Torrice, 564 A.2d 330 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). · cites it 8× “3 The defendant claims the trial court erred in that (1) it failed to add “judicial gloss” to its instructions to the jury concerning the crime of risk of injury to a minor, (2) it failed to instruct the jury in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 53a-18 (1),…”

State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 4× “, General Statutes § 53a-18 (2) (“[a]n authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction”); General…”

State v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 3× “2d 794 (1989), wherein the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, assault in the third degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant claimed that the jury instructions rendered it “reasonably possible that the jury was misled on essential elements of the crimes with which…”

State v. Errol J., 199 Conn. App. 800 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 7× “The defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury an instruction on the statutory (§ 53a-18 (1)) parental justification defense with respect to the situation prong of the risk of injury to a child charge in count two of the information was unavailing,…”

Lovan C. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 860 A.2d 1283 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 5× “We are troubled by the hearing officer’s substantiation of the abuse allegation, especially in light of the language in General Statutes § 53a-18. That section provides in relevant part that “[t]he use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an…”

Dubinsky v. Black, 196 A.3d 870 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 5× “II The plaintiff nonetheless argues that the arresting officers lacked probable cause in light of the protection afforded parents under General Statutes § 53a-18 (1). That statute provides in relevant part that "[t]he use of physical force upon another person which would…”

State v. Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 4× “There is no support for the contention that the use of a reasonableness standard in a penal statute renders it presumptively vague.”

State v. Salters, 826 A.2d 202 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 5× “General Statutes § 53a-18 (2) provides that “[a]n authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction.”

Valeriano v. Bronson, 546 A.2d 1380 (Conn. 1988). · cites it 2× “, General Statutes §§ 53a-10, 53a-12, 53a-13, 53a-14, 53a-15, 53a-16.”

Show all 35 citing cases →

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18(1) — 1 case

Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18(2) — 1 case

State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009). “, General Statutes § 53a-18 (2) (“[a]n authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction”); General…”

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