(a) A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when such person commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section
53a-181d, and (1) such person has previously been convicted of a violation of section
53a-181d, (2) such conduct violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense, (3) such person is twenty-two years of age or older and the other person is under sixteen years of age, or (4) such person intentionally directs such conduct at the other person, in whole or in part, because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person.
(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 92-237, S. 1; P.A. 12-114, S. 11; P.A. 21-56, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (a) to delete “this section or” re previous conviction in Subdiv. (1) and make technical changes; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, add language re person 22 years of age or older in Subdiv. (3) and add Subdiv. (4) re conduct due to perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, add language re person 22 years of age or older in Subdiv. (3) and add Subdiv. (4) re conduct due to perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
State was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would reasonably cause fear or emotional distress; course of conduct means two or more acts and there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed two acts with the intent to follow, lie in wait for, monitor, surveil or observe. 346 C. 432.
Cited. 46 CA 661.
Cited. 43 CS 46.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
28
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1993–2024 · leading case:
State v. Fernando a., 981 A.2d 427 (Conn. 2009).
State v. Fernando a., 981 A.2d 427 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 4× “" [13] General Statutes § 54-1g(a) provides: "Any arrested person who is not released sooner or who is charged with a family violence crime as defined in section 46b-38a or a violation of section 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e shall be promptly presented before the superior…”
State v. Boscarino, 861 A.2d 579 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
· cites it 8× “The defendant, James Boscarino, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c (a) (2) 1 and five counts of harassment in the second degree in violation of General…”
State v. Arthurs, 997 A.2d 568 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 7× “Arthurs, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a trial to the court, of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223.”
State v. Gibson, 969 A.2d 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 6× “A warrant was issued for the defendant's arrest on November 28, 2005, charging him with stalking in the first degree under General Statutes § 53a-181c. [1] The defendant previously had been convicted of stalking in the second degree under General *789 Statutes § 53a-181d on…”
State v. Michael R., 346 Conn. 432 (Conn. 2023).
· cites it 15× “to 2017) § 53a-181c (a) (2) and (3)) proscribing, respectively, stalking that violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense and the stalking of a person under sixteen years of age: The jury reasonably could have inferred a course of conduct from the fact that, on…”
Kellman v. Comm'r of Corr., 174 A.3d 206 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 2× “Rosenblum was initially appointed to represent the petitioner at the time of his arraignment, but he became ill and was replaced by Silverstein prior to trial.”
State v. Gibson, 31 A.3d 346 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 2× “Gibson, was convicted, after a jury trial, of failure to appear in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172 (a) (l), 1 and was acquitted of a charge of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c.”
State v. Cummings, 701 A.2d 663 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
· cites it 2× “The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c (a) (2), stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181d, two counts of harassment in the…”
State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 53a-181c (a), entitled “stalking in the first degree: class D felony,” provides: “A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and (1) he has previously been convicted of this…”
Champagne v. Gintick, 871 F. Supp. 1527 (D. Conn. 1994).
· cites it 2× “Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-181c prohibits stalking in the first degree, a Class D felony which carries a maximum penalty of one to five years imprisonment or a fine of $5,000, or both.”
State v. Martin, 741 A.2d 337 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 2× “The defendant was charged in three separate files with two counts of threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1) and (2), and one count each of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c (a) (2) , disorderly conduct in violation of…”
State v. Kellman, 742 A.2d 423 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
· cites it 2× “The state and defense both requested as follows: “Our statute [General Statutes § 53a-7] provides, insofar as it is relevant here, that intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge, but in any prosecution for an offense evidence of the defendant’s intoxication may be…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181c(a)(2) — 1 case
Kellman v. Comm'r of Corr., 174 A.3d 206 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“Rosenblum was initially appointed to represent the petitioner at the time of his arraignment, but he became ill and was replaced by Silverstein prior to trial.”
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