(a) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys or interferes with another person; or (3) makes unreasonable noise; or (4) without lawful authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons; or (5) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or (6) congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a reasonable official request or order to disperse; or (7) commits simple trespass, as provided in section
53a-110a, and observes, in other than a casual or cursory manner, another person (A) without the knowledge or consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is inside a dwelling, as defined in section
53a-100, and not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
(b) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 184; P.A. 01-83, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and add Subdiv. (7) re a person who commits simple trespass and observes another person inside a dwelling under certain circumstances.
Cited. 188 C. 557; 194 C. 347; 224 C. 914; 228 C. 795; 234 C. 78; 237 C. 613; Id., 633.
Cited. 5 CA 616; 9 CA 15; Id., 255; 11 CA 24; 12 CA 258; Id., 306; Id., 364; Id., 481; 17 CA 156; Id., 234; Id., 339; 22 CA 303; 26 CA 157; 28 CA 344; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 36 CA 106; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78. Evidence sufficient to support conviction for disorderly conduct. 96 CA 341.
Cited. 34 CS 612; 36 CS 129; 37 CS 767; 38 CS 472; Id., 665.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 179 C. 328. Subdiv. (3): Under statute, disorderly conduct may occur in a place that is not public. 194 C. 347. Cited. 221 C. 788. Subdiv. (2): Plain language of section unconstitutionally vague, court construed it to provide it with constitutional content for the future; judgment of Appellate Court in 29 CA 283 reversed. 228 C. 795. Cited. 230 C. 183; 237 C. 619.
Cited. 8 CA 153; Id., 517; 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613; 40 CA 643. Subdiv. (2): Held unconstitutional on its face where conduct occurred prior to judicial gloss placed on statute. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (2) should be read and applied as follows: A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with the predominant intent previously defined or with reckless disregard for the risks of his or her conduct, the person, by conduct that is grossly offensive under contemporary community standards to a person who actually overhears it or sees it, disturbs or impedes the lawful activity of another person. 83 CA 724. There was sufficient evidence presented by the state and the court reasonably could have inferred on the basis of the size of defendants' belongings and their position on the sidewalk that defendants intended to cause inconvenience, annoyance and alarm and did obstruct sidewalk. 108 CA 146.
Expression of political views found not to constitute disorderly conduct. 33 CS 93. Subdiv. (2): Failure of charge to limit application of section to “fighting words” deprived defendant of freedom of speech constitutional guarantee. 34 CS 689.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
173
cases (
19 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case:
State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986 (Conn. 1994).
State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986 (Conn. 1994).
· cites it 85× “The dispositive issue of this appeal is whether certain portions of the disorderly conduct statute, namely, General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1) and (2), 1 *797 are unconstitutionally vague under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.”
State v. Parnoff, 186 A.3d 640 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 20× “As a result of his statement, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1), which criminalizes intentionally or **389 recklessly causing inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm by way of "violent, tumultuous…”
State v. Andriulaitis, 150 A.3d 720 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 28× “At issue in this appeal is the gloss providing that the phrase "offensive or disorderly conduct" in § 53a-182 (a) (2) means "conduct that is grossly offensive, under contemporary community standards, to a person who actually overhears it or sees it.”
State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 8× “The defendant now appeals 4 from the judgment, rendered after a trial to the court, convicting him of threatening in the first degree in violation of § 53a-61aa (a) (3), two counts of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (2), 5 and breach of the…”
State v. Szymkiewicz, 678 A.2d 473 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 16× “8 *618 In order to determine whether § 53a-181 (a) (1) proscribes speech that can be characterized as “fighting words,” we look for guidance to the construction given by this court to identical language contained in General Statutes § 53a-182, the disorderly conduct statute.”
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 8× “” Consequently, under the unique factual circumstances presented by this case, even if the defendant’s restraint of the victim also could be found to constitute the “violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior” proscribed by our statutes criminalizing creation of a public…”
State v. Duhan, 481 A.2d 48 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 14× “” The state has taken an appeal to this court, after our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Session of the Superior Court that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the defendant’s conviction under General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (3)…”
State v. Cummings, 701 A.2d 663 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
· cites it 16× “The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c (a) (2), stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181d, two counts of harassment in the…”
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007).
· cites it 4× “REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge: In 2001, plaintiff Thomas Walczyk ("Walczyk") was convicted after a jury trial in Connecticut on state law charges of disorderly conduct, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-182(a)(2); reckless endangerment, see id.”
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2013).
· cites it 5× “In any event, we do not here decide what constitutes an “unusual case” falling within Amore’s exception because we conclude that a reasonable officer in the circumstances presented by this case, even when charged with knowledge of Indrisano , would have had arguable probable…”
State v. Widlak, 812 A.2d 134 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 17× “ms of his probation by committing the criminal conduct of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a when such conduct occurred during a period of time when the terms of his probation were not in effect, (2) the evidence adduced at trial did not…”
State v. Muckle, 947 A.2d 972 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 20× “Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals, Robert Muckle, Stanley Scott and Maryann Sprague, was convicted, after a trial to the court, of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (5) in connection with a demonstration at the Planned…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(a) — 7 cases
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
“” Consequently, under the unique factual circumstances presented by this case, even if the defendant’s restraint of the victim also could be found to constitute the “violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior” proscribed by our statutes criminalizing creation of a public…”
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2013).
“In any event, we do not here decide what constitutes an “unusual case” falling within Amore’s exception because we conclude that a reasonable officer in the circumstances presented by this case, even when charged with knowledge of Indrisano , would have had arguable probable…”
State v. Muckle, 947 A.2d 972 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
“Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals, Robert Muckle, Stanley Scott and Maryann Sprague, was convicted, after a trial to the court, of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (5) in connection with a demonstration at the Planned…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(a)(1) — 1 case
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
“” Consequently, under the unique factual circumstances presented by this case, even if the defendant’s restraint of the victim also could be found to constitute the “violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior” proscribed by our statutes criminalizing creation of a public…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(a)(2) — 2 cases
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007).
“REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge: In 2001, plaintiff Thomas Walczyk ("Walczyk") was convicted after a jury trial in Connecticut on state law charges of disorderly conduct, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-182(a)(2); reckless endangerment, see id.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(a)(5) — 3 cases
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2013).
“In any event, we do not here decide what constitutes an “unusual case” falling within Amore’s exception because we conclude that a reasonable officer in the circumstances presented by this case, even when charged with knowledge of Indrisano , would have had arguable probable…”
State v. Muckle, 947 A.2d 972 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
“Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals, Robert Muckle, Stanley Scott and Maryann Sprague, was convicted, after a trial to the court, of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (5) in connection with a demonstration at the Planned…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(b) — 1 case
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