Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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As used in this part, the following terms have the following meanings:

(1) “Actor” means a person accused of sexual assault.

(2) “Sexual intercourse” means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal opening of the victim's body.

(3) “Sexual contact” means (A) any contact with the intimate parts of a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person, or (B) for the purposes of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-73a, any contact with the intimate parts of a dead human body, or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a dead human body, for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor.

(4) “Impaired because of mental disability or disease” means that a person suffers from a mental disability or disease which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.

(5) “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.

(6) “Physically helpless” means that a person is (A) unconscious, or (B) for any other reason, is physically unable to resist an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact or to communicate unwillingness to an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact.

(7) “Use of force” means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.

(8) “Intimate parts” means the genital area or any substance emitted therefrom, groin, anus or any substance emitted therefrom, inner thighs, buttocks or breasts.

(9) “Psychotherapist” means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service provider, hypnotist or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.

(10) “Psychotherapy” means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.

(11) “Emotionally dependent” means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist.

(12) “Therapeutic deception” means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the patient's treatment.

(13) “School employee” means: (A) A teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator, school superintendent, guidance counselor, school counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, paraeducator or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary, middle or high school or working in a public or private elementary, middle or high school; or (B) any other person who, in the performance of his or her duties, has regular contact with students and who provides services to or on behalf of students enrolled in (i) a public elementary, middle or high school, pursuant to a contract with the local or regional board of education, or (ii) a private elementary, middle or high school, pursuant to a contract with the supervisory agent of such private school.

(14) “Animal” has the same meaning as provided in section 22-327.

(15) “Sexual contact with an animal” means: (A) Any act between a person and an animal that involves contact between a sex organ or anus of one and the mouth, anus or a sex organ of the other; (B) a person touching or fondling a sex organ or anus of an animal, either directly or through clothing, without a bona fide veterinary or animal husbandry purpose; (C) any intentional transfer or transmission of semen by a person upon any part of an animal; or (D) the insertion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object into the vaginal or anal opening of an animal, without a bona fide veterinary or animal husbandry purpose, or the insertion of any part of the animal's body into the vaginal or anal opening of the person.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A. 93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17; P.A. 06-11, S. 1; 06-107, S. 1; 06-187, S. 45; P.A. 09-242, S. 1; P.A. 13-47, S. 3; P.A. 18-15, S. 12; P.A. 19-189, S. 21; P.A. 23-47, S. 9; 23-149, S. 1; P.A. 24-41, S. 38.)

History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of “deviate sexual intercourse”, “female” and “forcible compulsion”, added definitions of “actor”, “use of force” and “intimate parts”, redefined “sexual intercourse” in detail where previously defined as having “its ordinary meaning” and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted Sec. 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to include “contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor”; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of “psychotherapist”, “psychotherapy”, “emotionally dependent” and “therapeutic deception”; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of “school employee”; P.A. 06-11 redefined “intimate parts” to include any substance emitted from the genital area or anus; P.A. 06-107 and P.A. 06-187 both redefined “psychotherapist” to include a hypnotist; P.A. 09-242 redefined “school employee” in Subdiv. (13) to designate existing provisions as Subpara. (A) and amend same by replacing “elementary or secondary school” with “elementary, middle or high school”, and to add Subpara. (B) re a person who has regular contact with students and provides services to or on behalf of students enrolled in a public or private elementary, middle or high school pursuant to a contract; P.A. 13-47 amended Subdiv. (4) by substituting definition of “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for definition of “mentally defective”, and amended Subdiv. (6) to redefine “physically helpless” by inserting Subpara. (A) and (B) designators and adding provisions re person physically unable to resist an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact; P.A. 18-15 redefined “school employee” in Subdiv. (13)(A) to include school counselor, effective July 1, 2018; P.A. 19-189 amended introductory language by deleting exception for Sec. 53a-70b, redefined “sexual intercourse” in Subdiv. (2), and redefined “sexual contact” in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 23-47 redefined “sexual contact” in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 23-149 added definitions of “animal” and “sexual contact with an animal”; P.A. 24-41 redefined “school employee” by replacing “school paraprofessional” with “paraeducator”, effective July 1, 2024.

Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that “penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio”; it specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757. Cited. 187 C. 216; 191 C. 453; 192 C. 154; 198 C. 190; 210 C. 110.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 11 CA 102; Id., 316; 33 CA 133; 35 CA 173. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.

Subdiv. (2):

Court properly defined the term “cunnilingus” since statute contained no specific definitions; penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757. Cited. 194 C. 258; 198 C. 285; Id., 617; 201 C. 211; 202 C. 509; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 18; 224 C. 397; 226 C. 618. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517. Adequate notice exists that penetration of the vagina includes penetration of the labia majora, and for purposes of the definition of “sexual intercourse”, the two acts are one and the same. 301 C. 122.

Cited. 7 CA 489; Id., 701; 14 CA 451; 23 CA 712; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656. Withdrawal of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173. Cited. 38 CA 56; 41 CA 139; Id., 287; 43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.

Subdiv. (3):

Cited. 191 C. 604; 199 C. 121; 205 C. 386; 224 C. 397; Id., 656.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 8 CA 607; 15 CA 251; 20 CA 694; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; 28 CA 402; 30 CA 281; 31 CA 452.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 198 C. 53; 205 C. 386.

Uncontradicted evidence that complainant could communicate using nonverbal methods, including screeching, biting, kicking and scratching, and lack of evidence that complainant was unable to use these forms of communication at time of alleged assault, preclude finding that complainant was “physically helpless” under section. 118 CA 43; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 186. Evidence was sufficient to show victim was “physically helpless”, even though she was able to communicate during earlier stages of assault but could not physically or verbally communicate her lack of consent during later penile-vaginal intercourse. 180 CA 799.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 189 C. 611; 202 C. 509; 205 C. 386; 228 C. 552.

Cited. 7 CA 489; 14 CA 40; Id., 451; 16 CA 75; 18 CA 694; 21 CA 411; 30 CA 281.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 191 C. 604; 207 C. 456.

Cited. 20 CA 694; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; 28 CA 402.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 311 cases (35 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: State v. Albert, 750 A.2d 1037 (Conn. 2000).
State v. Albert, 750 A.2d 1037 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 54× “” General Statutes § 53a-65 (3) provides: “ ‘Sexual contact’ means any contact with the intimate parts oí a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the puipose of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the…”
State v. James G., 844 A.2d 810 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 16× “” General Statutes § 53a-65 (3); see General Statutes (Rev.”
State v. Scott, 779 A.2d 702 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 24× ““In this case, neither the defendant nor the state argues that the word [penetration] in [General Statutes § 53a-65 (2)] is unclear or ambiguous, nor does the fact that opposing counsel contend for different meanings support such a characterization.”
State v. Paolella, 554 A.2d 702 (Conn. 1989). · cites it 28× “B Facts Pertaining to the State’s Appeal In making his oral motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Practice Book § 884, 8 the defendant argued that he was exempt from prosecution for violating §§ 53a-70 (a) and 53a-70a(a) because, under General Statutes § 53a-65 (2), 9…”
State v. Albert, 719 A.2d 1183 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 25× “There was a separate subsection in § 53a-65 that defined “deviate sexual intercourse” as “sexual contact .”
State v. Mastropetre, 400 A.2d 276 (Conn. 1978). · cites it 12× “" General Statutes § 53a-65 (8). The statute does not delineate "nonconsent" as a distinct element.”
State v. Kish, 443 A.2d 1274 (Conn. 1982). · cites it 11× “Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen.”
State v. Scott, 525 A.2d 1364 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). · cites it 21× “” General Statutes § 53a-65 (2); see footnote 3, infra.”
State v. Bletsch, 912 A.2d 992 (Conn. 2007). · cites it 8× “” It is possible, *29 however, to have “ ‘sexual intercourse,’ ” as that term is defined under General Statutes § 53a-65 (2), 22 without having contact with the victim’s “ ‘intimate parts,’ ” as that term is defined under § 53a-65 (8), 23 if the sexual intercourse involves…”
State v. McKenzie-Adams, 915 A.2d 822 (Conn. 2007). · cites it 6× “” General Statutes § 53a-65 (13) defines the term “ ‘[s]chool employee’ ” as “a teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator, school superintendent, guidance counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or…”
State of Connecticut v. David N.J., 19 A.3d 646 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 12× “ly affecting the defendant for an apparent violation of a sequestration order by his attorney’s investigator, despite the fact that the sequestration order only applied to the state’s witnesses; and (4) provided a supplemental jury instruction that expanded the crimes charged in…”
State v. Milardo, 618 A.2d 1347 (Conn. 1993). · cites it 11× “General Statutes § 53a-65 (2). 11 Further, he alleges that the trial court’s reference to the entire statutory definition of sexual intercourse violated his constitutional rights to notice of the crimes with which he was charged and to conduct an adequate cross-examination.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(2) — 7 cases
State v. JUAN V., 951 A.2d 651 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
State v. Elmer G., 170 A.3d 749 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
State v. Anthony L., 179 A.3d 1278 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
Commonwealth v. Gallant, 369 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 1977).
State v. Smith, 166 A.3d 691 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(3) — 5 cases
State v. Gupta, 998 A.2d 1085 (Conn. 2010).
State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630 (Conn. 2008).
Nelida Cabeda v. Attorney Gen. United States, 971 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2020).
State v. Kyle O., 703 N.W.2d 909 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Bariteau, 2016 SD 57 (S.D. 2016).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(4) — 1 case
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(5) — 1 case
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(6) — 1 case
People v. Hosei, 2023 Guam 22 (Guam 2023).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(8) — 4 cases
State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630 (Conn. 2008).
State v. Purcell, 166 A.3d 883 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1985).
State v. Anthony L., 179 A.3d 1278 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(9) — 1 case
State of Iowa v. Patrick Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 2014).
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