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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-91 (2025)

Definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1977–2025 113citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 113 opinions since 1977, 8 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (7 cases).

The following definitions are applicable to this part:

(1) “Restrain” means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein “without consent” means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.

(2) “Abduct” means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B) using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.

(3) “Relative” means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subdivs. (1) and (2) to replace Subpara. designators “(a)” and “(b)” with “(A)” and “(B)”, respectively.

Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165. Cited. 177 C. 335; 179 C. 328; 188 C. 406; 191 C. 604; 200 C. 586; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 672; 215 C. 716; 216 C. 647; 219 C. 489; 225 C. 347; 226 C. 618. Terms “restrained” and “abducted” interpreted to include frightening victim to remain in bedroom through repeated physical and verbal abuse. 258 C. 510. The point at which an intended interference with liberty under Subdiv. (1) crosses the line to become an intended prevention of liberation under Subdiv. (2) is not entirely clear. 287 C. 509.

Cited. 20 CA 437; 46 CA 486; 55 CA 447.

Subdiv. (1):

Cited. 180 C. 565; 195 C. 253; 198 C. 147; Id., 430; Id., 537; 202 C. 520; 215 C. 173; 237 C. 284.

Cited. 5 CA 586; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 396; 30 CA 281; 31 CA 312.

Subdiv. (2):

Cited. 172 C. 22; 177 C. 637; 178 C. 634; 182 C. 449; 199 C. 537.

Cited. 36 CA 190. To prove unlawful restraint, the state had to prove that defendant abducted alleged victim by restraining her with intent to prevent her liberation by using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. 81 CA 320.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-91 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-91 189×subsections: (2) 4× (1) 3× (1)(A) 2× (2)(A) 2×cited by 242 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“31, reprinted in 28A Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53a-91 (West 2007) p.”
The case’s holding
To commit kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation more extensively than is necessary to commit that other crime.
Later courts cite it for
“to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENState v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-91 49×subsections: (1) 4× (2) 4× (1)(B) 2× (2)(A)cited by 197 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“[9] In Salamon , we reconsidered our prior interpretation of the kidnapping statutes, General Statutes § 53a-91 et seq. Id., at 528, 949 A.”
The case’s holding
Courts may admit evidence of uncharged misconduct more liberally in sexual assault cases than in other criminal cases due to strong public policy reasons.
Later courts cite it for
“a limited exception to the prohibition on the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence in sex crime cases to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual behavior.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 53a-91 20×subsections: (1) 4× (2) 2×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“liberation"; General Statutes § 53a-91 (2); or restrict the jury's role in determining whether it has been proven.”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping statute is not unconstitutionally vague when the specific intent to prevent a victim's liberation is established by the surrounding circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“the determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Kitchens, 10 A.3d 942 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 53a-91 8×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 238 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“[2] General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) provides: "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.”
The case’s holding
A defendant implicitly waives the right to challenge jury instructions if counsel receives a meaningful opportunity to review them and fails to object during the charge conference.
Later courts cite it for
“when the trial court provides counsel with a copy of the proposed jury instructions, allows a meaningful opportunity for their review, solicits comments from counsel regarding changes or modifications and counsel affirmatively accepts the instructions proposed or given, the defendant may be deemed to have knowledge of any potential flaws therein and to have waived implicitly the constitutional right to challenge the instructions on direct appeal.” · 23 citing courts
5
GREENLuurtsema v. Comm'r of Corr., 12 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 53a-91 12×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“2d 1092 , we had cause to revisit our interpretation of the kidnapping statutes, General Statutes § 53a-91 et seq. Although we acknowledged that our interpretation of the kidnapping statutes in Luurtsema traced its origins as far back as State v.”
The case’s holding
A general presumption in favor of full retroactivity applies to judicial decisions that narrow the scope of liability of a criminal statute.
Later courts cite it for
“a general presumption in favor of full retroactivity for judicial decisions that narrow the scope of liability of a criminal statute.” · 2 citing courts
6
REDState v. Luurtsema, 811 A.2d 223 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 53a-91 10×cited by 63 cases
Overruled by State v. Salamon on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 3 say in part.
Where it cites § 53a-91
“General Statutes § 53a-91 (2) defines abduct as restrain[ing] a person with intent to prevent his liberation by .”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping conviction is unconscionable when the restraint element is based on miniscule movement of the victim (rejecting argument imputing a temporal requirement to the restraint element).
7
REDState v. Sanseverino, 949 A.2d 1156 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-91 10×cited by 58 cases
Overruled in part by State v. DeJesus: 15 citing opinions say in part, 3 limit it to other grounds, and 1 adds another limit ("to the extent").
Where it cites § 53a-91
“528 -41, we reconsidered our long-standing interpretation of our kidnapping statutes, General Statutes §§ 53a-91 through 53a-94a.”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping conviction cannot stand if the restraint of the victim is merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of a separate sexual assault.
Later courts cite it for
“under the facts of sanseverino, no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of kidnapping in the first degree on the basis of the evidence that the state proffered at trial.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Tweedy, 594 A.2d 906 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 53a-91 12×cited by 110 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“on October 2, 1988, at [the victim’s apartment] in New Haven, [the defendant] abducted [the victim], and restrained her with the intent to violate her or abuse her sexually” in violation of the statute. In the defendant’s view, there is “simply no evidence” from which the jury…”
The case’s holding
A defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising from the same criminal incident if each crime contains an element not found in the other.
Later courts cite it for
“the negative connotations of restraints, nevertheless, are without significance unless the fact of the restraints comes to the attention of the jury.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Niemeyer, 782 A.2d 658 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-91 7×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“Under General Statutes § 53a-91; see footnote 1 of this opinion; “ ‘[r]estrain’ means to restrict a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by .”
The case’s holding
Whether a detention is incidental to a lawful arrest is ordinarily a question for the jury (explaining that the incidental detention issue is ordinarily a question for the jury).
Later courts cite it for
“the guiding principle is whether the confinement or movement was so much the part of another substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts . . . .” · 1 citing court
10
GREENState v. Youngs, 904 A.2d 1240 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 53a-91 10×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“General Statutes § 53a-91 (1).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction error regarding an essential element of a crime is harmless if the trial record establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“wjhen a jury is misinstructed on an essential element of a crime and a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENFranko v. Comm'r of Corr., 139 A.3d 798 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 53a-91 10×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“In order to prove that the petitioner was guilty of kidnapping in the second degree, the state had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he "abducted" the victim, meaning that he "restrain[ed] [her] with [the] intent to prevent [her] liberation by either .”
12
GREENState v. Suggs, 553 A.2d 1110 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 53a-91 10×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“” See General Statutes § 53a-91 (2). 14 The defendant maintains that the field behind Johnnie’s Garage could not possibly be construed to be “a place where [one] is not likely to be found.”
The case’s holding
A jury unanimity charge is unnecessary when alternative statutory bases for intent result in the same criminal culpability and do not reflect disagreement on the underlying facts.
Later courts cite it for
“in situations where 'the alternatives of mens rea intent component give rise to the same criminal culpability, it does not appear critical that the jury may have reached different conclusions regarding the nature of the defendant's intent if such differences do not reflect disagreement on the facts pertaining to the defendant's conduct.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Dahlgren, 512 A.2d 906 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 53a-91 8×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“Under General Statutes § 53a-91 (2), abduct “means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.”
The case’s holding
An error in jury instructions regarding uncharged statutory alternatives is not a constitutional violation if the court provides curative instructions and the defendants suffer no prejudice.
14
GREENState v. Rice, 142 A.3d 1267 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 53a-91 10×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“3 We are not persuaded. "[T]he question of intent is purely a question of fact.”
15
REDState v. Sanseverino, 969 A.2d 710 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-91 4×cited by 57 cases
Overruled in part by State v. Payne: 2 citing opinions say in part, 1 limits it to other grounds, and 1 adds another limit ("to the extent").
Where it cites § 53a-91
“" General Statutes § 53a-91 (1). In the present case, there is no question that the defendant restricted the victim's movement by nonconsensual force when he sexually assaulted her.”
The case’s holding
Appellate courts may modify judgments to lesser included offenses without jury instructions if post-trial legal changes necessitate reversal and the jury necessarily found all elements of the lesser crime.
16
GREENState v. Cotton, 825 A.2d 189 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 53a-91 6×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“General Statutes § 53a-91 (1) defines “restrain” as “to restrict a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the…”
17
GREENState v. Faria, 703 A.2d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
cites § 53a-91 8×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“” General Statutes § 53a-96 (a), 18 unlawful restraint in the second degree, requires an intent only to restrain another person.”
The case’s holding
Second-degree unlawful restraint is a lesser included offense of first-degree kidnapping.
Later courts cite it for
“in a case involving an evidentiary ruling, it is the defendant's burden to show that it is more probable than not that the court's action affected the result.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Franko, 64 A.3d 807 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
cites § 53a-91 7×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“” General Statutes § 53a-91 (2) (B). The state, therefore, needed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant restrained the victim with the intent to prevent the victim’s liberation by use or threat of physical force or intimidation.”
The case’s holding
Evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is admissible to prove specific intent if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Later courts cite it for
“kidnapping in the second degree ... is a specific intent crime” · 1 citing court
19
GREENState v. Winot, 897 A.2d 115 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 53a-91 7×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“” The term “restrain” is defined in § 53a-91 (1) as “restricting] a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the…”
The case’s holding
The kidnapping statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the minuscule amount of restraint involved in briefly grabbing a child's arm without moving or confining the victim.
20
GREENUnited States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2007).
cites § 53a-91 3×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 53a-91
“Code §§ 13A-6-40, -44(a) (Lexis Nexis 2005) (requiring intent to prevent liberation); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-91, -94(a) (West 2001) (same); Idaho Code Ann.”
The case’s holding
A state conviction is evaluated by determining if the least culpable act constituting a violation of the statute falls within the generic meaning of the enumerated offense.
Later courts cite it for
“least culpable act constituting a violation of that statute” · 3 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197720012025

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 2001. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.64Conn.454th Cir.15th Cir.16th Cir.1D.C. Cir.1
By subsection
(1)7 cases
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).“[9] In Salamon , we reconsidered our prior interpretation of the kidnapping statutes, General Statutes § 53a-91 et seq. Id., at 528, 949 A.”
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).“31, reprinted in 28A Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53a-91 (West 2007) p.”
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).“liberation"; General Statutes § 53a-91 (2); or restrict the jury's role in determining whether it has been proven.”
State v. Kitchens, 10 A.3d 942 (Conn. 2011).“[2] General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) provides: "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.”
State v. Burgos, 155 A.3d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(1)(A)1 case
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
(1)(B)1 case
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
(2)3 cases
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
(2)(A)2 cases
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
(2)(B)1 case
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).

Show all 113 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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